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ABSTRACT
Yvor Winters' early poetry, from 1920 to 1928, was 
written in free-verse; the aesthetic principle governing 
it centered on the image "purified" of conceptual content, 
and consisting of a "fusion" between the natural object 
being described and the poet's own mind. The result is 
a kind of naturalistic mysticism, destructive of judge­
ments and evaluations of the conscious intellect. The 
early poetry also registers the effect of certain scien­
tific theories on Winters' mind; these theories were 
mechanistic and deterministic in nature, and they turned 
Winters' world into one in which moral and intellectual 
values had no reality. Other themes that appear in the 
early poems are the absence, or non-existence, of God, 
the fear of death, and the apprehension that the ultimate 
nature of the universe might be demonic.
In the late twenties Winters underwent an artistic 
and intellectual reformation in reaction to the free-verse 
and the stylistic violence which that verse finally de­
generated into. He embraced a classicism that respected 
and acted upon the powers of the conscious mind. Writing 
in conventional meter and employing a style both imagistic
iv
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and abstract, he wrote poems dealing with the possibil­
ity, and the realization, of morai control and intellec­
tual order. His new poetics rested on the philosophical 
assumption that absolute truth exists. In order to safe­
guard that truth and save himself from subjective rela­
tivism, he was driven by what: he viewed as philosophical 
necessity to a theistic position. He was influenced in 
this process by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Only the 
existence of God could guarantee and validate truth and 
assure its independence of the human mind.
Winters most reluctantly admitted theism. He had 
an instinctive fear of the supernatural; he was afraid 
the supernatural, its ineffability and absolute foreign­
ness, would generate intellectual confusion in the human 
realm, which he wanted protected at all cost. Conse­
quently, he defined God in the most intellectually re­
spectful terms at his disposal. God becomes Pure Mind 
or Perfect Concept, existentially neutral and non- 
providential as far as the human is concerned. Such a 
"perfect mind" becomes the absolute standard by which 
everything is judged. We see the effects of this defini­
tion and the subsequent standard in Winters' view of the 
natural world, the body-soul composite in man, and the 
"giant movements" working in society at large. Since 
the natural world, as well as man's own body, does not
v
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participate in the reality of the Pure Mind, it was viewed 
by Winters with some distrust as a possible impediment 
to man's realizing his moral and intellectual good. Since 
Winters believed so much of modern society was noted for 
thoughtlessness, he viewed it suspiciously and recommended 
detachment and isolation as the means of saving oneself 
from moral and intellectual contamination. "To the Holy 
Spirit," a poem written in his late forties, summarizes 
all themes related to theism and is his most complete 
statement on the subject.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1947 Yvor Winters brought together and published 
in a single volume, entitled In Defense of Reason, three 
books of criticism he had previously published separately. 
In those books are to be found the major critical state­
ments on which his reputation as a critic is based. They 
are Primitivism and Decadence (1937), Maule's Curse (1938), 
and The Anatomy of Nonsense (1943). Earlier, in 1940, 
he had issued from his own private press a volume he 
simply called P o e m s this book contains all the poems he 
wished to save from his previous volumes, to which only 
a handful of later ones would be added when the book was 
commercially published by Alan Swallow in 1952.^ In fact, 
by the time he came to write the Foreword to In Defense 
of Reason, all but four of the poems that make up his 
total work had already been written and published. It 
was consequently a time of summing up; for all practical 
purposes he had finished his poetic career, and the two 
remaining books of criticism he would write, The Function 
of Criticism (1957) and Forms of Discovery (1967) , would 
be only further, though perhaps deeper, applications of 
the principles already to be found in In Defense of Reason.
1
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2In the Foreword he takes a comprehensive view and 
surveys in summary fashion all other theories of litera­
ture to which his own can be contrasted. The essential 
feature of his theory, which he sees as separating it 
from the others, is its commitment to the proposition 
that the mind through concentrated study and discipline 
can apprehend some degree of truth about human experience 
and can then express that truth in poetic language which 
realizes it both emotionally and intellectually. He also 
sees that the effect of such apprehension and expression 
is not just intellectual, but also moral: the mind is 
enabled not only to recognize in truth what a particular 
good is, but also to define, and then avoid, those things 
that would interfere with the realization of the good in 
question. The value of poetry is that it achieves this 
end in a more inclusive manner than philosophical or 
scientific discourse by utliizing both aspects of language, 
the connotative and the denotative, and by appealing to 
and engaging both the emotional and the intellectual 
faculties of the human being. Poems should be judged and 
evaluated, then, according as they do or do not realize 
this end.
He then states, at the very end of the Foreword, and 
as if in an aside, that a further and final consequence 
of his theory of literature is that it rests on a theistic 
basis, which the moral absolutism of that theory would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
inevitably necessitate. He states this position reluc­
tantly, and in such a tone that the reader soon realizes 
that only the rigor of the argument could have compelled 
him to such an uncomfortable position.
Finally, I am aware that my absolutism implies 
a theistic position, -unfortunate as this admis­
sion may be. If experience appears to indicate 
that absolute truths exist, that we are able to 
work toward an approximate apprehension of them, 
but that they are antecedent to our apprehension 
and that our apprehension is seldom and perhaps 
never perfect, then there is only one place in 
which those truths may be located, and I see no 
way to escape the conclusion.2
It will be the purpose of this dissertation to study 
the causes and consequences of the theistic position 
Winters here summarizes, we shall see that one of the 
major causes is located in his free verse and the aes­
thetic principles, formulated in a very early essay, The 
Testament of a Stone, according to which the free verse 
was written. These principles restricted him to a severe 
form of imagism and exposed him to forces over which he 
could finally maintain no control; the poems themselves 
are records of a mind often on the point of hysterical 
fragmentation. We shall see that it was in reaction 
against them, and the anguish they caused him, that he 
began in the late twenties the intellectual and artistic 
reformation that eventually issued in the 1947 "confes­
sion" of theism. The first part then will be a study of 
the major themes of the free verse, all of which was
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4written in his twenties and published in the following 
four books, The Immobile Wind (1921), The Magpie's Shadow 
(1922), The Bare Hills (1927), and The Proof (1930).
(The contents of all four of these books can be found in 
the 1978 Collected Poems, and all references to poems in 
the text will be to it.)
But the major part will be devoted to a study of 
the consequences of Winters' theism, especially as these 
appear in his poetry, which I consider greater than the 
criticism. As I have said, he most reluctantly, almost 
unwillingly, admitted the existence of God, against which 
he had earlier maintained strong humanistic suspicion 
and distrust. It is not surprising that he should then 
define God, once he was forced by the logic of the argu­
ment to reckon with Him, in the most intellectually 
respectable terms at his disposal. For Winters these 
terms are always rational, and God then becomes the Pure 
Mind of "To the Holy Spirit," his most complete poetic 
statement on the subject, and one which I shall discuss 
in some detail in the last chapter.
Such a definition is of the greatest importance.
Since the formulation of a first principle is the basis 
on which everything else depends, we should not be sur­
prised then if we discover that the effects of Winters' 
definition of God are extensive and touch crucial areas 
of his thought. These consequences appear most tellingly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5in those poems of his which deal with the mind and its 
relationship to either the body or the natural world, a 
relationship that in both cases, for Winters, is fraught 
with ambiguity and peril. The degree of intellectual 
reality, if any, which either the body or the natural 
world possesses is a theme that preoccupied him from the 
beginning to the end of his career, and his solution to 
the problem is a direct result of what led him to think 
of God in terms of "mind." I shall also treat how such 
thinking affected his political and social thought in 
certain of his poems that are concerned in an impersonal 
way with the public issues of his day.
Winters lived a quiet life, devoted almost exclu­
sively to poetry and the teaching of it at Stanford 
University, with which he was connected, either as a 
student or teacher, from 1927 to a short time before his 
death in 1968. As Donald E. Stanford has noted in a 
review of the 1952 Collected Poems, "Winters * career has 
not been sensational enough to catch the public eye, nor 
fashionable enough to interest the elite. He has not 
visited Paris, gone insane, joined the Communist party,
3
become converted to Catholicism, or committed suicide." 
Yet two events of more than an ordinary nature occurred 
during the early part of his life. Since they had a 
rather profound effect on his poetry, perhaps it would 
not be inappropriate if in this introduction I briefly
4
list and discuss them.
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In 1918, when he was seventeen and a student at the 
University of Chicago, Winters discovered he had tuber­
culosis. His family first sent him to California, the 
home of his childhood, then to the drier climate of 
Santa Fe, New Mexico, where he entered a sanatorium some­
time in the late autumn of 1918. He remained there as 
a patient for almost two years, spending most of his 
waking hours following the mistaken medical practice of 
the time and lying flat on his back in a state as im­
mobile as possible. Nearly all of his first two books 
of poetry, The Immobile Wind and The Magpie's Shadow, 
were written in the sanatorium. The disease produced in 
him a state of mind, at times hallucinatory in its in­
tensity. His senses were rendered feverously active and 
the resulting clarity caused him acute pain. We can see 
the effects of such a state in the poems. Their ima- 
gistic vividness and disconnectedness are so startlingly 
apparent that the reader, even without any knowledge of 
his biography, is forced to posit some abnormal state of 
mind as their cause. In fact, the single-minded intensity 
with which Winters devoted himself to the image in both 
the poetry and criticism of the period must be intimately 
connected with the whole "psychology" of tuberculosis.
It surely has to be reckoned as one of the chief factors,
I think, in his later reaction not only against free 
verse, but against Romanticism in general, which, as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Susan Sontag recounts in Illness as Metaphor, often 
glorified the disease and made it an infallible sign of 
spiritual and poetic authenticity.^
He was released from the sanatorium in October,
1921. For the next two years, and before he resumed his 
academic career, first at the University of Colorado, 
then at Stanford, he taught school in two or three small 
coal-mining towns south of Santa Fe. This experience 
forms the background of a great deal of the free verse 
written after The Magpie's Shadow, as well as some of 
the later traditional poems. Its main importance lies 
in the concrete instances it gave him of a primitive 
irrationalism which he spent the rest of his life defining 
and opposing. As he says in the Introduction to The 
Early Poems, "Accidents, many fatal, were common in the 
mines, from which union organizers were vigorously ex­
cluded and sometimes removed; drunken violence was a 
daily and nightly occurrence in both towns; mayhem and
g
murder were discussed with amusement." It was also 
during this time that he experienced in an acute form 
what we might call a metaphysical state of imprecision 
and indeterminacy. Noting the moral aimlessness of the 
men who inhabited these isolated towns, Winters saw in 
actual human terms what the absence of a regulating 
principle can cost the human being. As he says in a 
prose poem which deals with the experience:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Then I withdrew to an empty room I shared with an 
indeterminate consciousness. There was no head, 
and the soiled blankets were thin.
I did not believe in the existence of precision.
It was no matter whether I sat behind my desk or 
behind the window of my room. Often I heard the pale 
Slavs stamping and shouting below me, and one night 
a man wept with drunkenness.
The cinders in the moonlight were the same; I 
saw nothing but perpetuity.7
For his remaining years Winters committed himself 
to opposing this "indeterminate consciousness," and his 
definition of God as Pure Mind directly results from his 
realizing the pain and anguish such a consciousness can 
cost the human being.
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9NOTES
I am indebted for this fact, as well as all other 
bibliographical information concerning Winters,to Kenneth A. 
Lohf and Eugene P. Sheehy, Yvor Winters: A Bibliography 
(Denver: Alan Swallow, 1959j^ “
2
Yvor Winters, In Defense of Reason (Denver: Alan 
Swallow, 1947), p. 14.
Donald E. Stanford, "A Note on Yvor Winters," 
Talisman, 9 (1956), 46.
^ My information is derived from the autobiographical 
Introduction Winters wrote to his The Early Poems (Denver: 
Alan Swallow, 1966), pp. 7-16.
See especially Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978), pp. 26-36.
£
Winters, Early Poems, p. 11.
 ^Winters, Early Poems, p. 102.
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CHAPTER I
THE FREE VERSE OF YVOR WINTERS:
GROUNDS FOR REACTION
1. Solipsistic Mysticism
The aim of poetry, according to the early Yvor 
Winters writing in The Testament of a Stone, is the 
obliteration of differences existing between subject 
and object, so that the two can become fused into one.^ 
The subject in this case is the poet's own mind, a mind, 
it is important to note, deprived of reason and re­
stricted to just sensory impressions; its corresponding 
obj ect is any fragment or detail found in a natural 
world from which all intelligible order is as absent as 
it is from the poet's own mind.
The means by which this fusion is conveyed in 
poetry is the unique and unparaphrasable image, purified 
of concept and consisting of only the poet's naked per­
ception and the thing perceived. In the ideal situation, 
of course, the two are so blended they are indistinguish­
able. The poet becomes what he perceives; what he per­
ceives becomes himself. When he is successful at this 
in a poem, the result is what Winters calls, in a
10
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2
startling phrase, "waking oblivion" --a state of mind, 
all but mystical in nature, in which the poet loses his 
identity as he becomes one with the object, and yet 
still impossibly enjoys the consciousness of his own 
annihilation.
In some of the early poems Winters emphasizes the 
outwardness of this movement, and the resulting oblitera­
tion of the human mind as it fuses with the external 
object. Since extreme sacrifice and renunciation are 
involved in this process, the language of these poems 
inevitably has religious connotations to it. In a poem 
entitled "The Priesthood," first published in 1920, four 
years before The Testament of a Stone, he states
We perish, we 
Who die in art,
With that surprise
Of one who speaks 
To us and knows 
Wherein he lies.3
The last stanza is difficult to understand--the 
reader does not know if the verb in the last line means 
"to reside in" or "to express a falsehood." Perhaps 
the ambiguity is intentional; so often in these early 
poems one senses a calculated obscurity on the part of 
the poet. In any case, the drift of what Winters is 
saying in these lines is that the intensity of the poetic 
experience, involving as it does what we might call a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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naturalistic mysticism, is inexpressible in conceptual 
language. The "surprise" of the speaker is occasioned 
either by his speaking at all, and thus shattering the 
mystical trance he is caught up in, or by his attempting 
to express that trance in language which will only dis­
tort it and be false to its uniqueness. But the dominant 
idea of the poem is sacrifice, of the poet's surrendering 
himself either to the experience itself or to the attempt 
to express the experience in language, both requiring, 
though, a loss of mind and consciousness. And the poem 
is the earliest example of a theme that will occur re­
peatedly in Winters' poetry, namely the intimate relation­
ship he saw existing between art and death.
Another poem with much the same theme is "The Chapel," 
written about the same time as "The Priesthood" and con­
tinuing its religious connotations:
Like hour of death 
I entered in,
Before I knew the cost.
The altar's form,
Though seen of men,
I polished until lost.
And I shall not 
Turn eyes again 
Toward my own face of frost.
"The altar's form" in the second stanza I take to 
symbolize the poet's medium, language, which, apart from 
its transformation at the hands of the poet, is "seen of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
men," that is, is public and accessible in its denotative 
and practical nature. But the poet transforms it by- 
polishing it until it becomes an effaced transparency 
through which the fused image can become arrestingly 
apparent. What is to be noticed again, though, is the 
awareness of the human cost this involves— the poetic 
act is an "hour of death" and the poet's own face, insub­
stantial as frost to begin with, is rubbed out in the 
exigencies of the fusion.
Another poem on the subj ect is "Song." In it the 
poet speaks of running disembodied both outside and be­
fore himself, and falling into a silence within silence, 
mystical in its quiet and brief intensity. Since he is 
rapt outside himself, he can speak of the experience as 
belonging essentially to another person:
I could tell 
Of silence where 
One ran before 
Himself and fell 
Into silence 
Yet more fair.
If at times the movement is outward and calls for 
an almost inhuman sacrifice on the part of the poet, at 
other times it becomes inward and involves an equally 
inhuman assimilation. The poet's mind becomes fragmented 
and dispersed in the process of receiving into itself 
non-human elements. In The Testament of a Stone Winters 
speaks on a theoretical level of the poet's absorbing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the "milieu" surrounding him, which is, as he says,
"infinitely variable." Recognizing the dangers of a
"plastic nature," he insists upon the necessity of the
poet's possessing "a more or less immobile nature," one
which will render him resistant to being invaded and
4
destroyed by that same milieu. Yet such resistance is 
seldom encountered in the poems themselves dealing with 
the theme. Instead one finds first absorption, then 
fragmentation and dispersion. Consider one of his best 
early poems, "Alone”:
I, one who never speaks, 
Listened days in summer trees, 
Each day a rustling leaf.
Then, in time, my unbelief 
Grew like my running-- 
My own eyes did not exist, 
When I struck I never missed.
Noon, felt and far away-- 
My brain is a thousand bees.
Howard Kaye in his unpublished dissertation, The 
Poetry of Yvor Winters, discusses the poem at some length 
and gives an account of its thematic content:
This (i.e. "Alone") seems about as close to 
Whitmanian pantheism as to solipsism which views 
the world as a projection of the self. In 
either case, there is no clear distinction be­
tween subjective and objective, self and the 
external world. Perceiving an object may not 
be separable from being that object. The 
speaker is what he sees, and his own eyes do 
not exist. Such a state will result in, or 
threaten, the extinction of personality.5
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The assimilation of such inhuman swarms, as we see 
in "Alone,” can only result in "extinction of personality. 
The "unbelief" of the fourth line of the poem, as Kaye 
goes on to say, is "a lack of confidence in one's own 
conscious existence." This absence the poet approves of, 
though one senses an incipient hysteria working under­
neath the surface, and conditioning the approval in a 
radical way. Yet the poet grimly maintains his aesthetic 
principles to the extent that he is forced to designate 
belief in separate consciousness as a "lie." We see this 
definition operating in "I Paved a Sky," the first stanza 
of which follows:
I paved the sky 
With days.
I crept beyond the Lie.
This phrase,
Yet more profound,
Grew where 
I was not: I 
Was there.
As in ail monistic systems of thought, there is 
here no distinction between subject and object, nor is 
there one between "here" and "there"--the hunter and the 
hunted of Emerson's poem are one and the same, as the 
line from "Alone," "Where I struck I never missed," 
suggests. In "I Paved a Sky" Winters in eliminating his 
own separate consciousness locates himself beyond such 
distinctions, and conceptual language is destructured in 
the attempt at describing the experience. The poem verges 
on impenetrability.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The drift of all this is toward what the mature 
Winters will call "solipsistic mysticism." At the time 
he could not see it as a consistent philosophical posi­
tion-all he knew of philosophy then, as he says, was a 
smattering of Plato, Emerson, and Herbert Spenser; in­
stead "it struck me as a kind of revelation in early 
childhood, and stayed with me for some years; I had to 
think my way out of it."^
The mystical nature of this "revelation" is apparent. 
Though the object of its contemplation is not God, but 
fragments of the natural world, yet Winters' naturalistic 
mysticism shares all the essential characteristics of 
the transcendental variety. As we have seen in the dis­
cussion above, in both there is a fusion of two entities, 
a blurring of all objective distinctions found in "out­
side" reality, a loss of separate consciousness and a 
trance-like state of being that is, because of its unique­
ness, inexpressible in conceptual language. In fact, 
Winters, in trying to render it in language, an attempt 
that can only fail, is forced to rely on extreme associa­
tions and connotative intensities that result oftentimes 
in total obscurity.
Yet the solipsistic nature of such a mysticism is 
not so apparent at first, primarily because the mystical 
obliteration dramatized in these poems renders the sur­
vival of the solus ipse problematical, to say the very
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
least. What can be left of the mind after it has become 
a thousand bees? But there is a curious double vision 
in Winters' early poetry. Not only does he have his eye 
so riveted on the outside object that he becomes that 
object, at the same time he has another eye, as it were, 
blindly locked inside his own mind, that is equally 
riveted on the process of his perceiving and absorbing 
the object, and watching quite dispassionately what it 
is doing to his own mind. The other eye is the solus 
ipse of solipsism. According to its vision, the world 
is seen, as Kaye says, only as a projection of the self. 
The first stanza of "The Morning" affords us a useful 
example of this kind of thing:
The dragonfly
Is deaf and blind
That burns across
The morning.
The insect in these lines is real. Without explicit 
descriptive detail, one has the unaccountable impression 
that it is there and is being observed. One is also just 
as aware that the dragonfly is becoming the mind of the 
observing poet in a way that traditional symbolism can­
not account for. Like the solipsistic eye that can only 
study its own internal surfaces, the insect is "deaf and 
blind" to everything outside itself. The situation of 
the poet is the same. Consequently the whole poem, as 
Kenneth Fields has noted, "is dominated by the obscure
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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feeling of the inability to get beyond one's own private
Q
and hallucinatory perceptions." The poet himself is 
locked inside his own perceptions, and everything apart 
from them, for the moment, becomes unreal.
It is important to note that this "solipsistic 
mysticism" is more a state of mind than anything else.
It is not a philosophical system for which Winters was 
able to provide any sort of rigorous, technical justifi­
cation. He fell into it, as he says, as children do, 
and it resembled for him an emotional state which he 
later thought himself out of. It does, of course, have 
philosophical implications, as any state of mind has 
for one observing and evaluating it. but Winters was 
insufficiently aware of them on an intellectual level.
In fact, his aesthetic principles made such an under­
standing impossible--his mind had been made an intel­
lectual void in order to create the fused image.
Perhaps a few biographical details will help clarify 
9
the situation. Nearly all the poems dealing explicitly 
with "solipsistic mysticism" appear in Winters' first 
book, The Immobile Wind, published in 1921 and written 
for the most part while he was recovering from tubercu­
losis at a sanatorium in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He was 
eighteen when he entered the sanatorium, twenty-one when 
he left it. Facing the possibility of imminent death, 
he lay for hours flat on his back, following the mistaken
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medical practice of the time, in a state as immobile as 
the hitman body will permit. In a passage in Forms of 
Discovery devoted to another victim of tuberculosis, 
Adelaide Crapsey, he has described the pain and fatigue 
he suffered then as "poisonous and pervasive."^ As 
with Adelaide Crapsey, as well as John Keats and others, 
the disease caused in Winters a heightening and intensifi­
cation of sensory impression to the point of acute clarity. 
While undergoing such an experience the poet might well 
have fallen into believing they were the only things real, 
especially since they duplicated earlier childhood experi­
ences of isolation in the natural world, and were further­
more confirmed and justified by his current aesthetic 
principles.
Two other observations are in order. As we have 
said earlier, the subject matter of these poems is mysti­
cal and, strictly speaking, inexpressible in either 
conceptual or metaphoric terms. Most of them, such as 
"The Chapel" and "The Priesthood," are more commentaries 
that use, contradictorily enough, abstractions instead 
of the images one would think more appropriate for 
naturalistic mysticism. The best of those which actually 
attempt to "dramatize" the experience is "Alone," and 
even it has to be, and is, only an approximation, though 
it is surely close enough to the real thing for intel­
lectual comfort. The very nature of the situation makes
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approximation inevitable, and necessarily involves the 
poet in an element of deceit--he attempts something 
which from the beginning he says is impossible to ac­
complish. Winters will later recognize this fact, and 
it will furnish him with the means of evaluating and 
rejecting what he saw as spurious mysticism in both 19th 
century Romantic poetry and modern poetry. The proper 
subject matter for the poet then becomes, not the in­
effable, but the knowable, which he will locate, not in 
the natural, but the human realm.
Secondly, there is on the part of the poet what we 
might call an instinctive, involuntary objection to both 
the mysticism and the solipsism we have been discussing, 
an objection that will form the basis for the gradual 
intellectual and artistic reformation that will begin 
for Winters sometime in his late twenties. The evidence 
of this objection is found in such poems as "Where My 
Sight Goes" and "Ballad of Men":
And all these things would take
My life from me.
from "Where My Sight Goes"
And all my life
And all my sight
Are scattered like green sea.
There is death in women walking.
Thus I come unto Thee, 
from "Ballad of Men"
He is too much aware of what the mysticism cost in actual
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human terms to be able to celebrate it naively and 
sentimentally. Instead of enlarging his being, he will 
discover the full extent to which it contracts and 
diminishes it. But at the time, he records it accurately 
in language that registers at a level deeper, I believe, 
than conscious intent, his protest against it. He more 
quickly became aware of the dilemma solipsism itself 
was creating for him. From the title poem of The Bare 
Hills, written only a year or two after The Immobile Wind:
And he emerged 
into the diningroom 
with redveined eyes 
that guttered 
into sleep.
And he sat down 
and ate the bread 
as if he ate rock, 
while he ground 
his buttocks.
He got up and smiled 
and went upstairs 
to meet the monstrous 
nakedness of 
his own face. . . .
These lines are similar to a passage from "The Brink 
of Darkness," a short story first published in 1932 in 
Hound and Horn, after he had abandoned the techniques of 
experimental poetry and embraced a poetics that included 
and respected the evaluations of the conscious intellect. 
The difference is that now he sees solipsism as a desperate 
problem over which he possesses some kind of control, 
even if it is only the control found in language itself.
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He is describing himself in an empty house, staring out
a window at the smooth surface of the snow outside:
Again I had the illusion of seeing myself in
the empty room, in the same light, frozen to
my last footprints, cold and unmeaning. A 
slight motion caught my eye, and I glanced up 
at the darkened corner of the window, to be 
fixed with horror. There, standing on the air 
outside the window, translucent, a few lines 
merely, and scarcely visible, was a face, my 
face, the eyas fixed upon my own.-^ -*-
The tone of both these texts is that of drastic, 
even desperate, criticism. Solipsism has become reduced 
to nakedness and isolation with inhuman costs involved.
The poet's face, in "The Brink of Darkness," is disembodied 
and turned against him as if it were a demon, existing 
only in the element of air.
2. The New Science
Solipsistic mysticism in its pure state soon dis­
appears in the experimental poetry of Yvor Winters. In 
an undiluted form it appears only in certain poems of 
The Immobile Wind (1921) and in some of the one-liners 
that make up his second book, The Magpie's Shadow (1922). 
What does remain, though, is the situation implied in 
the remarks I have already quoted from The Testament of 
a Stone: the rejection of the evaluations and judgements 
of the human intellect, a literary technique that relies
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exclusively on the unparaphrasable aspects of language, 
and, finally, an intellectually blind receptivity to the 
poet's milieu, a word which, in Winters' case, is inter­
changeable with the natural world. It remains to ask 
what Winters discovered in that world that brought him 
close to a state he himself quite simply called "madness.'
It will become a fact of literary history, I think, 
that the effect of the "new science" on poets and intel­
lectuals during the first part of this century was far 
more dislocating and more a source of anguish than was 
the effect of the "new philosophy" on John Donne and his 
generation. The very nature of the universe itself, not 
the arrangement of its parts, was at stake, along with 
the identity of man himself. The effect on Winters was 
intensified by the fact that his interest in science was 
more than just interest in the vague concepts which make 
up what is rather innocently called "intellectual back­
grounds . " He studied it from an early age and knew it 
"technically" in detail. As Howard Kaye informs us, 
"Winters taught biology in New Mexico mining camps, read 
proto-zoology, and may at one point have considered coming 
to Stanford to study ichthyology with David Starr Jordan." 
And it was this "new science," working in conjunction 
with the equally revolutionary "new poetry," which pro­
duced his dilemma.
Kenneth Fields, in a review of The Early Poems,
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which appeared in the Southern Review, gives a concise 
account of the nature of this dilemma:
The physical universe that Winters seems to be 
confronting in isolation, especially in the 
later of the experimental poems, is very close 
to the universe of atomic physics of the twen­
ties as described by Whitehead and others. It 
is marked by relativity of time and space which 
renders relationships arbitrary; hence, perhaps, 
something of the method of disparate associa­
tion. It is marked by the interchangeability 
of matter and energy in a kind of Heraclitean 
flux, in which apparently solid matter is di­
visible into atoms in constant motion. 14-
From the earliest times poets have always been pre- 
occupiied with the theme of mutability, but the change 
which Fields is describing here is radically different.
In the older way of thinking, in its terminology and 
imagery, it is the surface, the external, the palpable, 
that suffers change, while an inner core remains constant 
and untouched, a notion influenced, of course, by the 
Aristotelian and Thomistic definition of change as either 
the actualization of potentiality or the development of 
form. In Winters the situation is reversed. The "inner 
core" is in such a state of utter flux that the surface 
can appear relatively stable. Yet such an appearance is 
bitterly deceptive. We see this external appearance of 
"feigned rigidity" in "The Vigil, ” one of the last of 
the experimental poems and one in which time is "speeding" 
the poet "to violence and death":
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The floor burns underfoot, atomic 
flickering to feigned rigidity: God's 
fierce derision.
The outside "rigidity" can only appear so because 
the core itself of the thing, according to the vision of 
the poet, is being so ceaselessly and constantly under­
mined by atomic change. From the title poem of The 
Immobile Wind:
Blue waves within the stones 
Turn like deft wrists interweaving.
And from the last poem of the 1927 Fire Sequence, "The 
Deep: A Service For All the Dead," a poem describing a 
world in which, as Howard Kaye says, "thought and will 
can no longer armor man against the ravages of time, but 
the nostalgic longing for such means of transcendence is 
as evident as the despair of the conclusion": ^
And in the bent heart of the seething rock 
slow crystals shiver, the fine cry of Time.
The most moving poem on the subject is one from the 1930 
The Proof, "The Longe Nightes When Every Creature." The 
title as well as the first four lines of the poem come 
from Chaucer's "Complaint to his Lady," yet Winters bor­
rows for the sake of bitter irony. His "lady" is a naked 
girl and his "complaint" is not concerned with her possib 
inconstancy, but about a world that is moment by moment 
falling apart. In the poem he realizes, to his horror,
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the full scope of the confusion and anguish this sub­
atomic flux, which modern science was revealing to him, 
can cost the human being. The whole poem follows:
Through the long
winter nights when every
beast turns steaming
in his sleep
I lie alone an eddy
fixed, alive with
change that is not I :
slow torture
this to lie and hold
to mind against the stream
with nought
tc seize on: the bed trembles 
to my blood. I break 
the night, I break 
the soundless flow, I 
cry and turn and the cold 
gathers round my hands 
and thickened brain: 
a girl lay naked 
in my bed
with cold small arms 
and wept. The humming tongue 
burrows the nightwind 
of the nightingale 
that comes no more.
We have here a reversal of the mystical position 
found in such poems as "Alone.” Instead of fusion, there 
is conflict and opposition between the poet and the night- 
world surrounding him with its soundless flow of change.
He sees it as a force foreign and hostile to his own 
nature, against which he is afforded no protection. The 
traditional symbolism of the nightingale, with its sug­
gestion of human suffering transformed into art and song,
16is inoperative in this world of "terrifying confusion,"
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as Fields characterizes it, and the naked girl in the 
poem appears more as a fellow victim than as a consoling 
lover. Even the identity of the poet is threatened, 
"insofar as the observer," as Fields notes, "is a par­
ticipant in the flux.""^
The conclusion of such a scientific philosophy of 
pure process is an irrationalistic monism, as Winters 
soon discovered for himself. It resembles in several 
essential points, ironically enough, the solipsistic 
mysticism discussed earlier, as well as the aestheticism 
of The Testament of a Stone, so that Winters made no 
intellectual progress, as it were, when he shifted to 
science away from the solipsism and mysticism of his 
first phase. All three, as well as the aestheticism, 
are noted for either the negation or the absence of the 
intellect. In the scientific theories change is so 
radical that nothing remains constant long enough for 
the intellect to know it and define it; the intellect 
itself is in such a condition of flux that it cannot know 
itself from one second to the next. No intellectual 
continuities can survive in such a world. As we have 
seen, both the solipsistic mysticism and the aestheticism 
negate the intellect in favor of the fused image, so 
that the distinction between observer and observed object 
is deliberately destroyed and a monistic vision consciously 
sought after, as far, that is, as this is humanly possible.
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The monism of the scientific theories is equally
apparent. Robert Jungk in his Brighter Than a Thousand
Suns: the story of the men who made the bomb pinpoints
the dilemma the scientists were creating for themselves,
and one which Winters was grimly duplicating in poetry:
"In the act of observing subatomic processes it was no
longer possible to draw any clear distinction between
the subject (that which observed) and the object (that
18which was observed)." Another scientist, one whom
Winters, according to Thomas Parkinson, was reading at
the time, P. W. Bridgman, states the same problem in The
Logic of Modern Physics: "From the operational point of
view it is meaningless to attempt to separate 'nature'
19from 'knowledge of nature. '" With this loss of any 
valid distinction between subject and object, a loss we 
saw occurring in such a poem as "Alone" and in The Testa­
ment of a Stone, all other distinctions immediately dis­
appear. The physical world, as a consequence, is plunged 
into one undifferentiated state of pure flux. There is 
no other for the intellect to work with.
More was at stake than the physical structure of 
the universe; the "new science" destroyed in the minds 
of many thinkers any reality moral and intellectual values 
might possess. In this regard, Winters was influenced 
by the theories of Jacques Loeb, "a biochemist with a
20strict mechanical interpretation of natural phenomena,"
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who was at the Rockefeller Institute in Chicago when
Winters was growing up there. Loeb was an uncompromising
materialist for whom, in time, the "inner life of man
should be amenable," as he predicted, "to physico-chemical 
21analysis." The main outline of his theories can be 
seen in the following typical passage from The Mechanistic 
Conception of Life, first published in 1912:
If our existence is based on the play of blind 
forces and only a matter of chance; if we our­
selves are only chemical mechanism--how can 
there be ethics for us? The answer is, that 
our instincts are the root of our ethics and 
that the instincts are just as hereditary as 
is the form of our body. We eat, drink and 
reproduce not because mankind has reached an 
agreement that this is desirable, but because, 
machine-like we are compelled to do s o . 2 2
If, at one level, Winters was repelled by this sort 
of thing, nevertheless he saw it at the time as an ac­
curate description of the universe. The only alternative, 
as he saw the situation, was the illusion of religion. 
Nearly all the Fire Sequence and a great number of the 
experimental poems in The Proof are heavily indebted to
Loeb, in particular to the idea of the crystal as being
23intermediate between organic and inorganic matter. 
Throughout his correspondence with Hart Crane and Allen 
Tate in the twenties and early thirties Winters insisted, 
at times dogmatically, on the validity of Loeb's theories. 
His two friends, though, remained stubbornly skeptical, 
Crane calling them "pure hocus-pocus" and Tate viewing
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them as destructive of any coherent metaphysical, religious 
system, the absence of which he saw then and for the rest 
of his life as a severe handicap for the modern poet.
Yet Winters slowly became aware of the bleakness of
the alternatives confronting him. Such an awareness is
implied in a letter Crane wrote Winters in August of 1927:
"I have . . . come to about the same conclusions regarding
the present cul-de-sac of modern science and their drift
25that you voice in your letter." By 1929 this objection 
had become articulate in a poem first published in his 
own magazine, The Gyroscope, in May of that year, first 
titled "The Countryless: Refugees of Science," then re­
titled "The Invaders" for Collected Poems. The "invaders," 
as Winters informs us in a footnote to the poem, are the 
modem physical scientists:
They have won out at last and laid us bare,
The demons of the meaning of the dead,
Stripped us with wheel and flame. Oh, where they tread, 
Dissolves our heritage of earth and air!
Till as a locomotive plunges through 
Distance that has no meaning and no bound 
Thundering some interminable sound 
To inward metal where its motion grew--
Grew and contracted down through infinite
And sub-atomic roar of Time on Time
Toward meaning that its changing cannot find;
So stripped of color of an earth, and lit 
With motion only of some inner rime,
The naked passion of the human mind.
Yet during all his experimental poetry these demons 
possessed Winters. The cul-de-sac they were leading him
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
into, without his knowing the name for it at the time, 
was nominalism, the anti-intellectual doctrine which 
says all universals, and consequently all knowledge, are 
only names with no reference to reality. We have seen 
how no intellectual survivals are possible in a philosophy 
or science of pure process. All ideas, if they are ref­
erential, hence true-to-something, presuppose continuities 
in the real world. When these "continuities" are consumed, 
as they are in the Heraclitean flux of modern science, 
then of necessity ideas collapse back into mere subjective 
impressions, or else become, when they are articulated, 
the flatus vocis of medieval philosophy. This is certainly 
true of such a poem as "The Longe Nightes When Every 
Creature." There the poet can have no way of understand­
ing his dilemma, which necessitates the use of ideas; his 
mind has nothing to hold onto, and he can only cry out 
ineffectually against the night-world invading and consum­
ing him.
Yet only to a certain extent is the designation of 
nominalism an accurate one. This is a world of violence 
and extreme deprivation which Winters is describing. The 
"subatomic" change that is undermining it is so total 
that the very identity and integrity of the res of nominal­
ism are called into question. In fact, the only "thing" 
that seems to be real in such a world is the undifferen­
tiated process of change itself, silent, constant, and
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seamless. By the time he came to write Pr imi tiveness
and Decadence he will call this state, borrowing a term
26from the criticism of Allen Tate, Pure Quality, and 
will give it, not an exclusively philosophical designa­
tion, but a theological one as well, evil.
Behind all of Winters' later objections to roman­
ticism lies his belief that its final conclusion is this 
Pure Quality. He thought its cultivation of the emotions 
at the expense of the mind, its appeal to the irrational, 
its abandonment of the human to the exclusively natural, 
were all so many approaches to Pure Quality, which if 
carried out and acted upon would result in disintegration. 
The suicide of his friend Hart Crane became an emblem 
for such a conclusion, and nearly all his latter essays 
will be studies of approaches to and realizations of 
some form of mental suicide. In Defense of Reason is a 
kind of intellectual Inferno. One also thinks of the sea 
in "The Slow Pacific Swell," "heaving and wrinkled in the 
moon, and blind," and the swarming green world of "Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight," which would graft the thick, 
rapid growth of laurel in the bone of the knight. The 
value of the classical poet, on the other hand, will con­
sist in his possessing enough mind to save himself from 
such a condition of blind change that was first revealed 
to Winters by the modem scientists. Consequently, poetry 
will be looked upon as a sort of spiritual discipline by
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Yet during the twenties, while he was writing his experi­
mental poetry, Winters did not possess this mind. His 
aesthetic and scientific theories both made it impossible. 
Since he was incapable of merely theoretically entertain­
ing an idea--inevitably he lived it through--the result 
for him was a nightmare that at times brought him close 
to actual madness.
3. Death
The alternative to sub-atomic flux for the early 
Winters was the stasis of death, the only absolute he knew 
at the time. Images of fire, bees, and grass, symbolizing 
life and change, alternate with those of stone, ice. and 
bare hills, representing death. He was obsessed with one 
as with the other; consequently, death assumes almost a 
palpable presence in the early poems, and weaves itself 
into their very texture.
This obsession was not imaginary or literary. As I 
have already indicated, much of the early poetry was writ­
ten under the threat of death from tuberculosis, a disease 
that precipitated then the same terror as cancer does today 
too frequently it was terminal or totally incapacitating. 
His third book, The Bare Hills, comes out of the time he 
spent as a schoolteacher, immediately after his release
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from the sanatorium in Santa Fe, in the coal-mining towns
of Madrid and Los Cerrillos, New Mexico, where death, as
we find out, was frequent and commonplace. "Accidents,
many fatal, were common in the mines," Winters informs us
in the Introduction to the Early Poems; "Drunken violence
was a daily and nightly occurrence; mayhem and murder were
27discussed with amusement." This forms the background 
for one of his later poems, "The Journey," written after 
the experimental phase:
These towns are cold by day, the flesh of vice 
Raw and decisive, and the will precise;
At night the turbulence of drink and mud,
Blue glare of gas, the dances dripping blood, 
Fists thudding murder in the shadowy air. . . .
Facing the possibility of dying himself and surrounded 
by murder and accident in these barely settled towns, of 
the Southwest, Winters with reason became acutely sensitive 
to death, which he saw as a presence always just beneath 
the surface of things, a "brink of darkness," as he calls 
it in his short story of that title. It was an immediate 
problem he had to deal with, in isolation, without benefit 
of family, friends, religion, or any sort of philosophical 
consolation, and it provoked in him some rather complex 
emotions that have, I think, important philosophical im­
plications. Consider the following passages taken from 
each successive phase of his experimental period:
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Death goes before me on his hands and knees, 
And we go down among the bending trees.
Weeping I go and no man gives me ease. . . .
My hands are cold, my lips are thin and dumb. 
Stillness is like the beating of a drum, 
from "Death Goes Before Me"
My hair is smooth with death 
And whirls above my brain.
from Two Dramatic Interludes for Puppets
The steady courage 
of the humming oil drives back the 
darkness as I drive back sweating death; 
from out a body stricken by this thought, I 
watch the night grow turgid on the stair-- 
I, crumbling, in the crumbling brain of man. 
from "Prayer Beside A Lamp"
Night. Night the terrible. Where niggers die 
unseen and sink like stones, 
from "The Passing Night"
I came down about seven, passed the coffin in 
the first, gray of the dawn, moved through the 
motionless cold, which seemed to be gathering 
heavier about it and which was somehow identi­
fied with the thin sweet odor, perhaps the odor 
of death, perhaps of the flowers, of which the 
casket itself, with its frosty tent, might have 
been the visible core.
At noon I returned. As I opened the door 
into the darkened hall, the casket awaited me, 
the sweet odor deepening on the still air. I 
was a trifle sickened; it affected me like the 
smell of ether. I had lunch and returned to 
my teaching. The casket awaited me in the 
darkness at five o'clock. . . .  I went up to 
my room and lay down but could not sleep. I 
was beginning to shudder a little as I passed 
the body. . . . The thought of her inexpressible 
solitude filled me with pity.
from "The Brink of Darkness"
The attitude revealed in these passages is a rather
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complicated one. While recognizing death as natural and 
inevitable, the poet opposes it, nevertheless, as some­
thing insidiously foreign to the human being. He sees 
it both as a naturalistic phenomenon, the repulsive 
details of which he faces and spells out, and a state of 
spiritual deprivation. In fewest words, for Winters it 
is an evil, and its presence in the world, as we shall 
see later, suggests actual demonic forces operating be­
hind, and using, natural processes, an idea he took quite 
seriously then as well as after his classical reformation. 
At one and the same time death is natural and unnaturally 
obscene, and the emotions it inspires in him are pity and 
horror. It is also important to note that this attitude 
remains constant throughout all of Winters' career. The 
only thing that changes is the degree of control he has 
over it. In his youth he had no intellectual or stylistic 
means of exercising much control; consequently, the at­
titude often assumes almost hysterical proportions, such 
as we see, I think, in "Prayer Beside A Lamp."
We can see further implications of Winters' response 
to death by contrasting it to two philosophical attitudes 
which he has been accused by some critics of totally em­
bracing to the detriment of his poetry. I mean specifi­
cally the accusation that he is either some cold-blooded 
rationalist or an emotionless "pagan" stoic, for whom the 
plain style of the early Renaissance masters comprises
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the essentials of all good poetry. The basic idea is 
that of a mind exercising such a tight control that it 
kills off all emotion. Yet whatever he was--his philo­
sophical position is at times extremely difficult to 
pinpoint precisely--his attitude to death, the terror it 
provoked in him, proves he is neither a stoic nor a 
rationalist.
The basic tenet of rationalism is not only that the 
mind is innately capable of apprehending truth, but that 
the universe itself is so rationally arranged that its 
essentially mechanical laws readily reveal themselves to 
the enquiring mind. The universe in Winters' early as 
well as late poems is at best chaotic; in fact, in some 
of the early ones, because of the presence of death, it 
is demonic. As far as the mind's apprehension of truth 
is concerned, Winters held no such belief during the 
first part of his career; it is true he changed his posi­
tion after 1928, but the supposedly absolute claims he 
makes for the mind, I think, have been exaggerated. He
was too much aware of the "hard familiar wrinkles of the 
28earth," of the coarse and the intractable in human life, 
of the mind's entanglement in such, to make naive pre­
tenses for the human intellect. But more to the subject 
at hand, I would maintain it was his recognition of death, 
the sense of the tragic it caused, the metaphysical horror 
it inspired in him, that prevented him from taking seriously
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alist, for whom, after all, death caused no wrinkle on 
the smooth surface of his thought. One thinks of Hume 
and the apparent fearlessness with which he anticipated 
his own death, a state of mind that so baffled and 
fascinated Boswell and so exasperated Johnson, who con­
fessed "he never had a moment in which death was not
29terrible to him." In this regard, as in many ethers, 
Winters is closer to Johnson than to Hume and his kind.
Winters' response to death also disproves the claim 
that he is a strict stoic, both emotionless and archaic. 
The stoic saw man and nature as bound together and 
governed by the same inscrutable law, acquiescence to 
which affords man his only happiness. The essential 
spirit of his philosophy is deterministic. Since death 
has been ordained by this law, and, more importantly, 
since it liberates man from the impediment of a body, it 
should, consequently, be no legitimate source of anguish 
for the human mind. We have already seen how Winters' 
position is the opposite of such an attitude. It is 
true that the calmness with which he can write about 
death toward the end of his life does resemble in certain 
of its aspects the stoic ideal of "apathy," yet we shall 
discover that the calmness is deceptive and that under­
neath its surface are intense emotions Winters honestly 
accepts. Finally, he was, of course, no determinist.
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Notwithstanding earlier lapses into mysticism and scientism, 
he maintained all his mature life an uncompromising di­
chotomy between nature and human consciousness, and, fol-
30lowing the lead of H. B. Parkes, who influenced him 
considerably during and after his transition from experi­
mental to conventional poetry, he saw limited areas in 
human consciousness where freedom was possible.
In fact, there is little or nothing of the "classical"
in Winters' attitude toward death, though there is a great
deal of it in other areas of his thought. E. R. Dodds,
the English historian and classicist, argues in The Greeks
and the Irrational with convincing historical support that
31the classical notion of death is puritanical. He locates 
the pre-philosophical source of this puritanism in the sha- 
manistic tradition of northern Greece, which ultimately 
he says was Asiatic in origin. The dissociation of the 
soul from the body, which the shaman experiences in his 
trance, led men to think of the soul as enjoying a limit­
less, superior existence apart from the body, and suffer­
ing a sort of shameful confinement when embodied. Hence, 
the "puritanism," since the whole experience presupposes 
an opposition between body and soul. The philosophers 
take this notion further; in nearly all of them the soul's 
union with the body is viewed as an intellectual and 
spiritual disaster from which only death can extricate 
man. Death then is seen as a purgative discipline which
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frees an encumbered soul, and philosophy becomes, espe­
cially in Stoicism and neo-Platonism, a preparation for 
and a love of death.
Christianity radically reverses this situation.
The idea of a soul entombed in a body, or of a soul using 
a body, as a workman his tools, is transformed into the 
idea of the "person," created in the image of God and 
containing within itself both body and soul so intimately 
connected that Aquinas thought the soul separated from 
the body suffered a state of deprivation. The body then 
became an essential part of the definition of man, and 
its resurrection a matter of dogma. Death, temporarily 
breaking up the body-soul composite, is consequently 
seen as evil. As Martin P. Nilsson, the Swedish historian, 
says in Greek Piety, "For the pagan, death was the in­
evitable end of human life; for the Christian, it was es-
32sentially an evil, the wages of sin."
As I hope will be apparent later on, Winters looked 
on the body-soul union ("mind" frequently replacing "soul" 
in his vocabulary) as a source of potential disorder, 
hence of evil. So often in both his poetry and criticism 
the mind is spoken of as attaining its end, not because 
of the body, but in spite of it. He never saw the body 
as perfecting the soul, as Aquinas, for instance, does.
In this respect he is following the classical "puritanical" 
tradition, but he radically departs from it in viewing
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death, not as a liberation or purgation of the mind, 
but as its annihilation. If, like the classical philoso­
pher but unlike the Christian, he sees the entanglement 
of the mind in a body as an intellectual liability, on 
the other hand, he can only view its disentanglement in 
death with the metaphysical horror mentioned above. It 
is a horror because it means the annihilation of the 
mind, which for Winters is the single source of all the 
gocd man can know or experience.
Winters' attitude to death is essentially Christian
in origin. It resembles St. Paul more than Plato in the
sense of deprivation, even of violation, which death
suggests in his mind. An air of evil always surrounds
it, an "unholy quiet," as he calls it in one of his late 
33poems, which recalls, admittedly at some distance, the 
Pauline notion that death results from sin. And the 
compassion it provokes in him, the "inexpressible pity" 
of "The Brink of Darkness," is closer in spirit to the 
New Testament than to the Phaedo. This is apparent even 
in such a poem as "Tragic Love" from the Fire Sequence, 
which has an explicit, even violent, non-Christian context*
1.
The girl went out 
and died amid a 
cold that clung 
like flame.
The God 
was gene, but he 
came back amid
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great splendor 
and great heat 
and leaves like shells 
broke from the 
earth and rang in 
the thin air 
about her black thighs 
where no God had been 
peering for this 
stiff beauty under 
cold invisible and 
vis ible— periphery 
of air and 
globe of winter.
11.
Then between her thighs 
the seeded grass 
of airy summer-- 
the slow hairlike flame.
The seeded grass of death, with its hairlike flame 
working between the girl's thighs and therefore suggesting 
sexual violation is the embodiment of evil. The sense 
of outrage and anguish underlying this vision is motivated 
on the poet's part by the belief that a God should have 
saved her. But the only God present is the seasonal one 
of pantheism whose "advent" only covers a blackened corpse. 
The poem reminds one of Baudelaire's "Une Charogne," 
which most likely influenced Winters— he had mastered the 
French 19th century by the time he wrote "Tragic Love,” 
and Baudelaire dominated his thinking both before and 
after the transition of 1928. In Baudelaire's poem we 
have the same exposed corpse, the same idea of death as 
cette horrible infection:
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Rappelez-vous l'objet que vous vxmes, mon Ibne,
Ce beau matin d'ete si doux:
Au detour d'un sentier une charogne infame 
Sur un lit seme de cailloux,
Les jambes en l'air, comme une femme lubrique, 
Brulante et suant les poisons,
Ouvrait d'une faqon nonchalante et cynique 
Son ventre plein d'exhalaisons.34
In both poems death is viewed as an obscene and 
repulsive nothingness, connected in an intimate way with 
evil. This vision can only be explained by a prior 
Christian context, one which Baudelaire accepted but 
which Winters, for reasons of his own, rejected.
4. The Absence of God
The world of The Early Poems we have been describing 
is a fortuitous and meaningless one. In the absence of 
God or any kind of informing principle, philosophical or 
otherwise, there is nothing to provide it with cause or 
purpose. Whatever "mind" there is in it is found only 
in man himself, and he is so totally a participant, and 
victim of, constant and violent change that his mind is 
incapable of furnishing such a principle. Besides, since 
the early Winters considered intellectual concepts as 
destructive of the imagistic stuff poetry is made of, he 
would have rejected the principle even if it were available 
to him. Of necessity, then, his world must drift in a 
nominalistic disorder, so that all the traditional answers
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and consolations from religion and philosophy become 
inoperative in its atheistic purposelessness. The situa 
tion is described most movingly in a poem from The Bare 
Hills, "The Moonlight":
I waited on,
In the late autumn moonlight,
A train droning out of thought--
The mind on moonlight 
And on trains
Blind as a thread of water 
Stirring through a cold like dust, 
Lonely beyond all silence,
And humming this to children,
The nostalgic listeners in sleep,
Because no guardian
Strides through distance upon distance, 
His eyes a web of sleep.
Howard Kaye describes the theme of this poem as that 
of "a nostalgic longing for a missing purpose, or God, 
in the universe," and goes on to say of it:
The trains are blind because no purpose directs 
them; they are pure mechanism. The thread of 
water, glistening in the moonlight, evokes a 
sense of beauty mingled with regret, because, 
inhuman, purely physical, it is "blind." A 
cold-like dust suggests a viscous, opaque cold: 
intense, resistant, and featureless.35
In other poems dealing with the absence or non­
existence of God, nostalgia is replaced by either ironic 
contempt or desperate flippancy. In "The Streets" the 
poet first meets Christ, quarrels with Him over some
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trivial matter, then consigns Him "to the flame"; later 
he meets God the Father in a streetcar, but both are too 
embarrassed to speak, and each turns away from the other. 
In "The Vanquished" Christ is discovered drunk in a gully 
where, amid deathly white stones, he shudders mindlessly 
into sleep. As a wind-storm rages outside in "Midnight 
Wind," the poet finds that the "naked fact" of his room, 
with its brute passivity of wood, is more real to him 
than God. And in "To the Crucified" a slowly consuming 
fire eats at the crucified God until He becomes one with 
the flame, which finally shrinks and then only licks 
into the surrounding blackness, the poet all the time 
reading his newspaper by its glare; at the end, after 
God has been annihilated in the fire, the speaker is left 
alone in a "rushing wake of sound."
In fact, the ideas of God and non-existence are so 
closely linked in Winters' mind that God often simply 
becomes synonymous with death. This is true of "Hill 
Burial," the last poem of The Bare Hills, about which 
Kenneth Fields says, "the quiet association, in two lines, 
of water, stone, and air, gives a sense of finality to 
the last line in which the lowered corpse sinks like a 
drowned man":^
Jesus Leal
Who aimed at solitude,
The only mean,
Was borne by men.
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Wet air,
The air of stone. 
He sank to God.
The same association appears in "Strength Out of 
Sweetness," which in the first edition of The Proof con­
tains an inscription identifying the dead woman as
Elizabeth Reid, the one who figures in "The Brink of
37Darkness" as "Mrs. Stone." He is describing the ap­
pearance of her face as she lies in her coffin, after 
having died in an agony no one around her at the time 
noticed:
Three nights I sat beside 
your bier with two old women, 
graying grimaces 
now stiffening toward death—  
I, cold with grief.
They drew the curtains 
back to let me see—  
it struck me
dumb that I should know you.
Your two sons
stood there with forearms
great
from tearing at the rooted 
hills. They could not see.
But I
had known; had passed 
your chair and had not 
paused to speak— your face 
aflow with agony. Now stopped.
And basic, clear. All 
had passed over it. And this 
lay bare: rock 
rigid unto God.
I stood unseen.
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Thus, from the very beginning God, through His as­
sociation with death, becomes linked in Winters' mind 
with the Pure Quality to which the flux of the new 
science, as we have seen, had reduced the material world. 
Since the mystical monism discussed in the first section 
similarly destroys distinctions and objectivity, and 
makes the same reduction, all three concepts--death, 
mysticism, and God— become intimately connected in his 
mind. Though he turned what has been called a "reluctant 
theist" sometime after 1928 and viewed God as philosophi­
cally dissociated from a merely subjective existence or 
the non-existence of death, yet traces of the earlier 
linkage persist to the very end of his career. He had 
an instinctive aversion to anything either below or 
above the capabilities of the human mind; often identify­
ing one with the other, he saw both as threatening 
presences against which he felt compelled to protect 
himself, even when he was forced philosophically to 
recognize God as the guarantee for that mind's reaching 
any truth.
To mitigate, as it were, the atheism of The Early 
Poems there are incidental allusions here and there in 
the book to what some critics have designated as actual 
belief in pantheism. We have already noted the seasonal 
god of "Tragic Love" who returns in the heat and grasses 
of spring, as well as the sort of "consolation" he offers
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the dead girl. The same god figures in a beautiful line 
in ’’Man Regards Eternity in Aging” :
Now rotting time again leaves bare the god.
He also appears in "The Crystal Sun":
. . . and my God 
Lay at my feet 
And spoke from out 
My shadow, eyed me 
From the bees. . . .
Some critics have taken this more seriously than I 
think it deserves. Kaye, for instance, sees "Alone” as
just as concerned with "Whitmanian pantheism as with . . .
38solipsism." Yet it seems to me Winters is dealing with 
something different from pantheism in the poem. It is 
important to note that in those poems that do contain 
explicit references to pantheism the context of each is 
more often than not bitterly ironic and remote from actual 
belief, even poetic belief, whatever that is finally. If 
this god does exist, Winters seems to be saying in such 
a poem as "Tragic Love," he is evil because he resides 
in, and causes, a world involving human pain and suffering 
his non-existence, therefore, is the more acceptable 
alternative.
Yet there are a few poems in the Fire Sequence and 
The Proof, such as "Coal: Beginning and End," "0 Sun," 
"Remembered Spring," and "Wild Sunflower," that are almost
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Nietzschean celebrations of the Life Force, a most un­
characteristic mode even for the early Winters, and an 
argument, based on them, could be made for what I think 
would have to be only a vague, metaphoric tendency toward 
pantheism. He does have a great deal of respect for the 
apparent pantheism found in the "primitive" religion of 
the American Indians. Writing in a 1928 review of The 
Path on the Rainbow and American Love Lyrics and Other 
Verse and commenting on the practical nature of Indian 
religion, he says of their gods: they "are not spiritual 
qualities, but natural forces: they are not in any sense
abstractions, but are things one can lay one's hands on 
39and control." Yet each of these gods is too limited 
and localized to be the comprehensive god of pantheism 
in any real sense of the word. And Winters' respect for 
them is an insufficient reason to suppose he thought them 
applicable to his own situation. That situation as he 
saw it, at least until sometime after 1928, was atheistic. 
Consequently, in the absence of any cause, final or other­
wise, and because of the scientific theories already dis­
cussed in the second section, the world of the early 
poems is bound to be the fortuitous and meaningless one 
Winters registered it as being.
He remedied the situation with a substitute religion, 
one centered around a different sort of godhead, whose 
worship he took seriously indeed. Everything we know
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
about him, judging both from his poetry and criticism, 
as well as the few facts we currently possess about his 
biography, suggests he had a kind of temperamental af­
finity for the absolute. "His sensibility," Kaye remarks, 
"could not rest content in a universe where no final 
answers were possible."^ He gives voice to this meta­
physical restlessness in "Satyric Compliant," one of his 
last free verse poems, marred by melodrama and an almost 
hysterical conclusion, yet valuable in that it bluntly 
expresses his state of mind prior to the 1928 shift in 
thought and technique:
B o m
to die for man. Born to believe, to
be believed.
Bora as he might have been with a desire for truth 
and order, he nevertheless lived in a world which his 
science and philosophy had reduced, with the exception 
of one important area, to an appalling imprecision and 
disorder. That one area was poetry itself, and it is 
around poetry that he constructs a religion of his own, 
much in the fashion of so many of the Victorians before 
him. I am using Winters' own terms for the affair. "The 
artist whose deity is art," he writes in the 1924 Testa­
ment of a Stone, "has a religion as valid and as capable 
of producing great art as any religion of the past. . . . 
As a conscious and intelligent being, no other religion
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will be possible for him, and he cannot, because of his 
religion, be called a heretic.
Another observation occurs in The Testament of a 
Stone which confirms the religious nature of poetry for 
Winters beyond any doubt. Even allowing for the fervor 
and hyperbole to which a twenty-four year old is admittedly 
liable, it is, I submit, one of the most curious passages 
in all of theoretical criticism. It goes beyond any of 
the most extreme pronouncements made by French artists 
in the 19th century, including Flaubert. Because of its 
importance I should like to quote it in full:
A poem is a state of perfection at which a poet 
has arrived by whatever means. It is a stasis 
in a world of flux and indecision, a permanent 
gateway to waking oblivion, which is the only 
infinity and the only rest. It has no respon­
sibilities except to itself and its own perfec­
tion--neither to the man who may come to it 
with imperfect understanding nor to the mood 
from which it may originally have sprung. It 
is not a means to any end, but is in itself an 
end, and it, or one of the other embodiments 
of beauty, is the only end possible to the men 
of intellect.^2
It is almost as if Winters here considers poetry as 
uncreated, so totally does he invest it with the aseity 
of a godhead. In fact, the attributes he gives it— per­
fection, infinity, undeprived sufficiency in itself and 
for those who submit to its study, or worship, as the 
case might be--are identical with those found in any stand­
ard Medieval discussion of the Christian God. The only
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one missing is existence itself, a fact which will be 
important for my argument later on. We should also 
notice what can only be called the tyranny of this god. 
He, or one of his surrogate embodiments of beauty, is 
the only end possible for an intelligent man. All the 
other liberal arts and sciences are to be discarded in 
favor of this god before whom there are to be no other 
gods. One is reminded of Flaubert's famous statement 
in the Letters: "Art, like the God of the Jews, feasts
/ Q
on holocausts."
It might be objected that he is being figurative 
and rhetorical in the manner of one arguing intensely 
for his point. If so, it is the first and last time he 
was so in a statement of principle such as this passage 
is. Both early and late, Winters is one of the most 
precise users of language in our literature. He knew 
exactly what he wanted to say, and he said it with little 
or no rhetorical embellishment. I see no reason to 
doubt he said exactly what he meant to say here.
We should take into account, though, the artistic 
and intellectual background against which Winters was 
working in the twenties when The Testament of a Stone 
was written. Throughout all of the 19th century, and 
during the first part of the 20th, there occurred a 
veritable profusion of excessive claims made on behalf 
of poetry. One thinks of Flaubert and the Symbolists
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in France, with Rimbaud insisting on the poet's ability, 
magical in nature, to achieve supernatural epiphanies 
through the derangement of the senses. In America, there 
was the idea of the poet as pantheistic seer, with ex­
panded, and still expanding, consciousness, which Emerson 
theorized about and Whitman, and later Hart Crane, put 
into practice. The movement was not restricted to avant- 
garde poets; it affected the schools and traditions of 
all artistic persuasions. Poetry in the minds of many 
of the intellectuals and artists became a sort of sub­
stitute religion, and in the process became the "spilt 
religion" of T. E. Hulme's famous remark.^ Winters 
was bound to be affected by these trends; they were part 
of the intellectual air he breathed. Yet at the same 
time he made of them something of his own.
It is true that Winters after 1928 modified this 
extreme position, toning down its ardor and qualifying 
its claims, but he never abandoned entirely its essential 
spirit. We shall see that when he became a theist, how­
ever reluctantly, he defined God, not in terms of existence, 
as Thomas does, but in those of thought, in the manner of 
Aristotle. He considered approximations to that divinity 
possible on the part of man, notwithstanding the almost 
monstrous discipline they would require. These approxi­
mations, he thought, were accomplished, not by means of 
grace or of any of the other traditionally religious
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avenues, about which he always maintained a vigorous 
suspicion, but by thought itself. As we learn from his 
criticism, the highest form of human thought for Winters 
was embodied in poetry, primarily because all aspects of 
language were incorporated in its making, the denotative 
as well as the connotative, and because all the faculties 
of man, the mental and the emotional, were involved in 
its study. It was, for him, the most complete form of 
judgement the mind could make and through it man was 
enabled in however a limited way to participate in the 
only divinity he could know. Thus, poetry became a 
spiritual discipline and some connection between it and 
divinity can be found in late Winters as well as early.
5. Conclusions: A Note on Demonism
Allen Tate has described the main outline of Winters' 
poetry in the following metaphoric terms: "the poet 
stands perpetually at the edge of an abyss (or at the 
'brink of darkness'), which he knows to be an abyss in 
spite of the fact that everybody else is eagerly trying 
to fall into it."^ Years before Tate's remark, Agnes 
Lee Freer used similar language. In a review of The Bare 
Hills, which appeared in Poetry in 1928, she said, "He 
is full of the horror of death and the pain of history, 
as indeed anyone must be who thinks sincerely." She
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went on to speak of the flow of time as being "almost a
A
physical sensation of pain for him." Winters himself 
insisted on such a tragic vision as the proper subject 
for the modern poet. He does so most notably in a passage 
in "The Extension and Reintegration of the Human Spirit," 
first published in 1929 and consequently a "bridge" essay 
between the early and the mature Winters. He is speaking 
in theoretical terms, but the remarks are particularly 
applicable to himself:
The facts of life at best are disheartening; 
the vision of life which man has little by 
little constructed (or perhaps one should say 
stripped bare) is all but crushing. To evade 
the facts and attempt bluff vigor, as Browning 
often seems to do, is not convincing to the 
man who has experienced the imaginative facts. 
The artist who is actually ignorant of the 
metaphysical horror of modern thought or who 
cannot feel it imaginatively— and there are 
many such--is of only a limited, a more or less 
decorative value.47
The "metaphysical horror of modern thought" is in­
deed the subject matter of The Early Poems. Yet one 
aspect of that horror eluded his understanding at the 
time, notwithstanding his comprehensive grasp of its other 
aspects and the acuteness with which he rendered them in 
language. This particular horror consisted of Winters' 
illusion that he possessed some degree of control over 
his subject; whereas, in reality he was not possessing 
anything, but was himself being possessed and, in the 
process, spiritually and intellectually destroyed. His
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aesthetics, and everything else we have discussed in 
this chapter, made no degree of control possible for 
him, so that his subject matter, because of its inevi­
table tendency to invade and overwhelm, ended up con­
trolling him, dictating extreme tension and violence.
The poems after The Bare Hills are especially charac­
terized by hysterical fragmentation. Their actual move­
ment, as Fields has noted, had become nervously more
rapid, in contrast to the slower, more measured movement
48of The Immobile Wind and The Bare Hills. It is no 
exaggeration to say that during the last phase of his 
experimental poetry a kind of demon possessed him finally, 
with Winters locked into an aesthetics that blinded him 
to the possession. Only gradually, beginning sometime 
in 1928, did he become aware of the exact nature of his 
situation.
Apart from such possession, there were times, both 
early and late, when he considered the possibility that 
the ultimate nature of the universe itself was partially 
demonic. It is a fact that the theological definition 
of a demon as formulated by Thomas Aquinas became an 
important concept in his criticism, particularly in his 
understanding of the Romantic genius, such as Rimbaud 
and Hart Crane, whom Winters thought of as not existing 
more than existing, and only valuable in those restricted 
areas where they do indeed exist. I have heard from
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private sources that he had a demon in mind, such, I
suppose, as is defined by Aquinas, when he wrote the
491936 poem "An October Nocturne." There is also the 
rather cryptic note appended to the Swallow Pamphlets 
edition of "The Brink of Darkness," written on the 
authority of the author by the editor: "Winters says 
that this story is a study of the hypothetical possi­
bility of a hostile supernatural world and its effect on
50the perceptions of a consideration of this possibility."
In the story itself, toward the end, there is the follow­
ing statement made by the narrator who for all intents 
and purposes is Winters himself: "I thought back over 
the past months, of the manner in which I had been dis­
turbed, uncentered, and finally obsessed as if by an 
insidious power. I remembered that I had read somewhere 
of a kind of Eastern demon who gains power over one only 
in proportion as one recognizes and fears him."**'*’
Grosvenor Powell takes this passage and in his study 
of Winters, Language as Being in the Poetry of Yvor Winters, 
qualifies it somewhat, then applies it to the whole of 
his intellectual life:
Although Winters believed in a unified universe, 
he also held a Manichaean position with the 
regard to the influence of the supernatural on 
human experience. He felt that we are belea­
guered in some undefined way by evil. He could 
not determine whether this evil is merely a 
product of our minds or whether it is, in some 
sense, demonic.52
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The Early Poems themselves furnish further evidence.
So often it is not to particular passages one can refer,
but to the overall tone of a specific poem, to its almost
preternatural vividness and specificity of imagery. Yet
there are some explicit passages on the subject, all
from The Bare Hills. In one of them, "Moonrise,M the
object of the demonic invasion is a dog, an animal Winters
was particularly fond of— he kept and trained Airedales
all his life, but literally lived with them during the
53periods of isolation before his marriage:
Upon the heavy 
lip of earth 
the dog
at
moments is
possessed and screams:
The rising moon draws 
up his blood and hair.
A dog also figures in "The Cold Room,11 but the human 
presence of the poet has been added by implication, and 
it is he who registers, and is affected by, the halluci­
natory "dream" chat dominates the deadly quiet room.
About the poem Powell makes the following observation:
"The poem could hardly be more schematic in its explora­
tion of the relationship between being and the invasion 
of nonbeing. The dog is relatively imperious to invasion; 
possessing less than human consciousness, it is less 
v u l n e r a b l e . T h e  implication is, of course, that it
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is the poet's own human consciousness which makes him the 
more proper object of the "invasion." The whole poem 
follows:
The dream 
stands
in the night 
above unpainted 
floor and chair.
The dog is 
dead asleep 
and
will not move 
for god or fire.
And from the 
ceiling 
darkness bends 
a heavy flame.
Finally, "The Barnyard," with its background "the 
western wasteland and mindlessness," as Powell charac­
terizes it,"^ is permeated by the same ^indefinable evil 
we saw operating in the preceding poems. The child's 
"short fierce cries" as it staggers into "the clotting 
cold" is a terrifying image of non-human possession, 
almost animalistic in contrast to the more spiritual 
predicament of the old man, "wrinkled in the fear of 
hell." In its intensity it suggests not so much the 
demonic as the diabolic, which moves in through ice to 
kill the two creatures:
It was the 
spring that left 
this rubbish
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and these scavengers 
for ice to kill—  
this old man 
wrinkled in 
the fear of hell, the 
child that staggers 
straight into 
the clotting cold 
with short fierce cries.
His preoccupation with demonism persists just as 
strongly in his mature poetry as in his early. Two of 
the most remarkable poems on the subject are ’’The Werwolf" 
and "A Petition," which Winters included in Before Dis­
aster but excluded from the Collected Poems he himself 
edited in 1952, published by Alan Swallow. (They have 
now reappeared in the 1978 Carcanet-Swallow Collected 
Poems.) "The Werwolf" is a savage denunciation of his 
mother, whom he calls the "wo If-bitch who suckled me," 
and who is seen as flooding the veins of her son with 
the spume of sin, which "no living tears may dissipate." 
Her actions, and "the hairy shadow" of her hate, are 
only explained by demonic possession, the agent of which 
is symbolized in the poem by the moon, a typical symbol 
of the irrational for Winters, which "plays acid havoc.”
In "A Petition,” another autobiographical poem, as so 
many of Winters' poems, in fact, are, the poet has com­
mitted some unspecified act of cruelty against his wife, 
for which he now asks her forgiveness. He explains the 
cruelty as a result of an inherited evil over which he 
has no control, an "unkindness from a past," a "bitterness
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of crime," which arises inexplicably in the night and 
which has the power temporarily to possess him. He can­
not even assume moral responsibility for the act:
It was not I that spoke;
The wild fiend moved my tongue.
I shall go into this subject of demonism in more 
detail later on, and discuss some of the philosophical 
reasons for Winters’ preoccupation with it--it is not 
the spiritualistic nonsense some readers might too hastily 
judge it as being. I only bring it up now because it is 
one of the more important, though slightly foreign, fac­
tors in the "metaphysical horror of modern thought," 
which is the subject matter of The Early Poems, and it 
should be dealt with in any adequate discussion of these 
experimental poems, even if it introduces a complicating 
element of primitiveness into a desperate, peculiarly 
modem situation.
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CHAPTER II 
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF GOD
1. The Abandonment of Free Verse
In a 1929 review of one of Louise Bogan’s books of
poems, Winters writes, "The poet of the present age, in
order to free himself from the handicap of the philo­
sophical misconceptions of the age, has, I believe, to 
turn metaphysician in a profound and serious way if he 
is not to be victimized by false emotions." He goes on
to say that once these misconceptions have been elimi­
nated and a "more or less classical dignity of attitude 
toward human destiny and human experience" has taken 
their place, the poet’s task is not yet finished. Be­
cause of pervasive confusion and temptations he continu­
ally faces, the poet maintains such an attitude only with 
"a good deal of effort, suspicion, and trembling."^ 
Beginning in 1927, the year he started graduate 
studies in English and American literature at Stanford 
University, and continuing up to the 1930 publication of 
The Proof, with 1928 as the decisive year, Winters him­
self began the process of turning metaphysician in a
65
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serious and profound way. The effect of the insights 
and discoveries he achieved during those years was funda­
mental and lasted for the rest of his life. Further ex­
pansions later on and a few modifications here and there 
do not alter the basic "classical" pattern that was then 
established. He saw the benefits of such a pattern as 
inestimable, even though its cost, as he discovered in 
his own way, was indeed "effort, suspicion, and trembling.
The immediate result of these studies was the abandon 
ment of free verse. He came to realize the full extent, 
as he saw it, to which free verse had restricted him to 
a narrow emotional range, while at the same time that it 
had excluded him from any understanding or mastery of 
the particular emotions involved. The concentration upon 
specialized areas of human perception, usually those bred 
in a kind of hallucinatory isolation, and unsupported by 
any rational motivation, had cut him off, he discovered, 
from the intellectual complexity he was beginning to ad­
mire in such poets as Baudelaire, Valery, Hardy, and 
Bridges, all of whom were irreproachably traditional in 
their methods and subject matter. He saw that he never 
could write a poem like Valery's "Le Cimetiere Marin" 
or Bridges' "Low Barometer" in free verse written accord­
ing to the principles of The Testament of a Stone, and, 
because he now wanted to attempt such poems, he saw no 
way except to renounce his former methods and adopt others 
which would make such complexity possible.
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At first he attended to the problem of metrics.
It is important to note the plural of this word, since
Winters considered free verse as having a metrical form
of its own, one which he defined and analyzed in the
concluding chapter of Primitivism and Decadence, and
consequently he never viewed his shift to conventional
2
meter as being one from formlessness to form. Even 
still, the "form" of his free verse presented him with 
insurmountable difficulties. Its basic metrical foot, 
such as he saw employed also by poets like William Carlos 
Williams, H. D. , Ezra Pound, and Marianne Moore, con­
sisted of one primary accent with an indeterminate number 
of secondary accents and an equally indeterminate number 
of unaccented syllables, the position of which is random 
and unfixed. Since it was difficult, even at times im­
possible, to distinguish primary from secondary accents 
in such a meter, and since the number of unaccented 
syllables could proliferate at will, as it were, no 
clearly focused pattern could emerge that would immedi­
ately assign some sort of metrical value to even the 
least important syllable in a poem, so that all is metri­
cally accounted for. If there is no such pattern, sig­
nificant variations become either impossible or else 
extremely difficult to achieve. Poetry then becomes an 
inadequate medium for handling subtle distinctions or 
achieving any kind of intellectual clarity. The result
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inevitably, for the reader, is monotony and, for the poet, 
a restriction to the initial emotion out of which the 
poem "grew," an emotion that in the absence of intellec­
tual control is apt to become exclusive and tyrannical.
The possibility for such tyranny is further enhanced 
by a typical rhetorical device found in most free verse 
poetry, especially in Winters 1. More often than not, 
the whole poem will consist of only one sentence that 
piles itself up, as it were, until it reaches a kind of 
breathless climax. The poet will attempt, of course, to 
slow the movement down by varying his line-length or 
breaking the sentence up~ into such units that either sur­
prise or give pause, but usually the movement is irre­
sistible and will have its own way. Such a device 
encourages neither development nor complexity, but instead 
emotional consistency. There can be no development in 
the "space" which only one sentence gives a poet, nor is 
there room for complexities. Consequently, the exclusive­
ness of the emotion is confirmed and given free rein. I 
do not mean to imply here that all free verse leads to 
this situation, only that the tendency is there and that 
Winters fell victim to it time and again.
But more was involved than just meter and rhetorical 
devices. As a graduate student at Stanford, Winters be­
gan an intensive, systematic study of English poetry, 
beginning with Chaucer and continuing up to the contemporary
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scene of his day. He had already mastered French litera­
ture, especially the 19th century, and he was also familiar 
with a good deal of the Spanish and Latin as well. Under 
the guidance of William Dinsmore Briggs, his major profes­
sor at Stanford and one of the chief influences on his 
thinking at the time,"7 he augmented the poetic studies 
with readings in the history of ideas, with special em­
phasis on classical and medieval philosophy, which he saw 
as still furnishing the background of English poetry up 
until the first part of the 18th century. All in all, 
this study revealed to him the full range and power of 
traditional poetry, and acquainted him with a body of 
poetry written on assumptions radically different from 
those operating in his free verse. He also became aware 
for the first time of the moral and philosophical implica­
tions of certain poetic problems he had previously thought 
were purely technical and aesthetic. The final effect 
was that the deficiencies of free verse became that much 
more clearly focused in his mind after he saw its stark 
contrast to a poetry that respected and acted on the 
powers of the conscious mind, such as he found, for in­
stance, in the masters of the plain style in the Renais­
sance. If at first he only instinctively knew something 
was wrong in his poetry, now he could state reasons and 
start applying remedies.
This study further enabled him to arrive at an
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interpretation of the origin of modern poetry, which 
Harold Bloom says is his greatest single contribution to 
critical studies.^ The dominant idea during the twenties 
and thirties was that modern poets in their extreme tech­
nical and stylistic innovations had achieved a radical 
breakage with their Romantic predecessors. If they felt 
the need of legitimizing their poetry by connecting it 
with a tradition, they usually went to the Metaphysical 
School of the 17th century to do so--specifically they 
had in mind John Donne with his irregular meter, his 
brusque diction, and often violent conceits, all of which 
they saw as similar to techniques of their own.'* Winters 
recognized these similarities, but at the same time he 
saw radical differences which rendered the similarities 
superficial and accidental. For him the great dividing 
line in English poetry occurred sometime toward the middle 
of the 18th century, when certain ideas centered on Lockean 
psychology finally predominated over the older traditional 
conceptions of poetic composition. Before the 18th century 
poets attempted to organize their poems according to 
rational principles; the progression from one idea to 
another in a poem was logical; and the final cause of 
poetry was conceived as being the moral and intellectual 
illumination of human experience. During the 19th century 
these basic principles changed. Then, and afterwards, 
poetic organization became irrational, the progression
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from one idea to another being, not logical, but either 
associational or imagistic, and the whole aim of poetry 
became the self-expression of a poetic personality in 
which the imagination, not reason, was considered the 
supreme faculty.
Consequently, for Winters the 18th and 19th centu­
ries were of the same piece of cloth. And since he saw 
the aims and methods of modern poetry as being in no 
basic disagreement with the anti-intellectual tendencies 
of the two previous centuries, he judged that poetry to 
be essentially romantic in spirit, notwithstanding its 
stylistic similarity, here and there, to certain of the 
Metaphysical poets. In other words, for Winters the 
history of English and American literature from the Earl 
of Shaftsbury to Hart Crane is continuous and unbroken. 
He is quite aware that this history is various and com­
plicated by extraneous factors that make one period some 
what different from another, yet its basic unity is 
assured for him by the one idea that remains constant 
throughout it, the idea, namely, that reason is inimical 
to the essential spirit of poetry. What replaced reason 
varies as the history of the three centuries unfolded 
itself. At first it was merely a distant, theoretical 
admiration for the primitive and the uncivilized, but by 
Winters' time it had degenerated into a sort of psychic 
irrationalism that automatically assumed the superiority 
of the unconscious over the conscious mind.
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Since Winters had lived out these ideas in his free 
verse and had seen how they had brought him to a state 
bordering on actual madness, he reacted violently against 
them once he had traced their history and learned the 
full extent of their consequences. It would be no exag­
geration to say the final consequence he saw quite simply 
as suicide, terrifyingly illustrated for him by his friend 
Hart Crane, whose death Winters interpreted as a direct
result of Crane's scorn for the conscious mind and his
6deliberate cultivation of irrational impulses.
It cannot be doubted that the study of Renaissance 
poetry, and its classical and medieval philosophical back­
ground, helped him to this insight. The poetry of Ben 
Johnson and Fulke Greville especially should be noted.
But some critics, among them Allen Tate,^ have over­
emphasized this debt to the Renaissance masters and have 
overlooked who I think is the major influence at this 
point in his career. I am speaking of Charles Baudelaire, 
whom Winters considered the first critic of Romanticism. 
Baudelaire dominates the opening section of the 1929 
essay "The Extension and Reintegration of the Human Spirit," 
Winters' first full critical statement of his reaction 
against Romanticism and modernism. The French poet is 
praised as the embodiment of that kind of spiritual con­
trol still possible for a poet who finds himself in a 
disintegrating time and wishes to save himself from its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
influence. What especially attracted Winters to Baudelaire 
was a poetic history similar to his own. Baudelaire also 
had undergone the immersion in sensation, had experienced 
what he felt to be its deprivation and evil, and had suc­
cessfully recovered himself from it. Such a recovery and 
reintegration are precisely what Winters himself was at­
tempting in the late twenties and early thirties. Two 
other poets should be mentioned in connection with 
Baudelaire, T. Sturge Moore and Paul Valdry, both of whom 
had made a recovery from a background quite similar to 
Baudelaire's and Winters'. For Moore, the background was 
the English Romantics and the French Symbolists; for Valery, 
specifically, the purified obscurity of Mallarme, who 
had surgically removed all rational meaning from poetry.
These three poets afforded Winters examples of poetic 
escape from "the metaphysical horror of modern thought."
They form a complex in his mind with the Renaissance poets 
and certain medieval philosophers, especially Thomas Aquinas, 
whose pages Winters was beginning to see as packed with the 
density of human experience understood and illuminated. 
Renaissance poetry, with its moral and intellectual content 
and its rational organization of its subject matter, af­
forded him a stark contrast by which he saw modern poetry, 
that is, his own poetic inheritance, as coming out of, 
and continuing, the irrationalism of the Romantic tradi­
tion, which for Winters originated in the 18th century
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philosophy of associationalism formulated by John Locke 
and popularized by the Earl of Shaftsbury. Baudelaire,
T. Sturge Moore, and Paul Valery provided him with examples 
of how a recovery from such a tradition was possible, but 
a recovery, it is extremely important to note, that does 
not return simply to the plainness and abstraction of the 
older tradition, but one that, still insisting on intel­
lectual content in a poem, attempts to retain and incor­
porate the imagistic richness of certain Romantic poets, 
especially the French. In other words, Winters' reforma­
tion is not as Draconian as some of his critics would 
lead one to believe. He still maintains a concern for 
the image, so essential for Romantic and modern poetry, 
but instead of cultivating it to the point of inscruta­
bility, he attempts to incorporate it in a poetic struc­
ture that is rational in its organization and treatment 
of subject matter. The result is not, strictly speaking, 
classical poetry, but what Winters will later call in 
Forms of Discovery "post-Symbolism."
By and large, what the preceding comes to is a new 
awareness on Winters' part of how a poem can be enriched 
and made more inclusive by the presence of the intellect.
He had seen how the earlier "fusion" of the poet with 
the object, and the consequent obliteration of the two 
in the image, had resulted for him in confusion and de­
rangement. With the mind brought into operation, value
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shifted from fusion to detachment and understanding, and 
new areas of human experience were opened for him that 
hitherto had been sealed off. Three consequences im­
mediately follow. One we have already dealt with, the 
shift from experimental to conventional meter as the 
subtler instrument for handling these new areas of ex­
perience. The other two concern diction and what Winters 
calls "poetic convention."
His free verse had been built up of perceptions of 
sensory experience, the movement from one perception to 
another in the poem being non-rational and associational. 
Since it aims at an "untranslatable" originality which 
mirrors the uniqueness of the particular perception in­
volved, the diction of his free verse tends to be star- 
tlingly idiomatic, even at times impenetrably obscure.
The reader often has the unmistakable feeling that the 
poet is straining after a new language, one peculiar to 
himself and his experience, but that he is forced, as it 
were, to form that language in the restricting mold of 
conventional language. Above all, abstractions are 
avoided as trite substitutes for experience, as inevitably 
leading to second-rate commentary and moralizing. The 
only justification for their presence in a poem is a 
negative one. They point out by contrast imagistic vivid­
ness , and Winters calls them in The Testament of a Stone 
"anti-images," as if their identity consists exclusively
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of what they are opposed to, not what they are in 
themselves.
But Winters realized that the intellect cannot per­
form any of its operations in those areas of the totally 
original. It will inevitably be aborted there. By its 
very nature it can only achieve its end by the recogni­
tion of sameness in apparent diversity, and to do so it 
must abstract common properties from discrete particulars. 
Its purpose in doing so is not necessarily to devitalize 
or denature the particular, as so many of the Romantics 
thought and moderns still do, but to further illuminate 
it and enrich our understanding of its nature. As 
Etienne Gilson says in The Unity of Philosophical Experi­
ence, "To abstract is not primarily to leave something 
out, but to take something in, and this is the reason 
why abstractions are knowledge. Before stretching mathe­
matical methods to non-quantitative objects, one should 
remember that our abstract notions validly apply to what
Q
they keep of reality, not to what they leave out."
To apply this principle to the situation in poetry, 
as Winters finally saw it, we may say that the only 
justification for abstractions in a poem is the degree 
of reality they illuminate; that if one wishes to concern 
oneself with reality, and not the stuff of fantasy, and 
if one wishes to understand it, one has to use abstrac­
tions of some sort; finally, that abstractions, because
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of their "common" nature, will inevitably rule out 
"original" diction to the extent that they make poetic 
statements accessible to other human beings.
As Winters began to see the validity of these ideas, 
the diction of his own poetry began to reflect the 
change. It became less original and more conventional, 
less obscure and eccentric, more accessible and abstract. 
But in doing so it never abandoned, except in only a few 
poems, the imagistic vividness of the earlier free verse 
method. Nor was there any necessity for it to do so.
The ultimate purpose of abstraction for Winters, as for 
Gilson, is the enrichment of our understanding of human 
experience, not its cleavage into oppositions and dichoto­
mies. Above all, what he was aiming for was the combina­
tion of the intellectual and the emotional, conveyed in 
a language which possesses, as he says in his essay on
Edgar Bowers, a "gentle seriousness in the face of an
q
overpowering perception."
This change is best illustrated by comparing two 
poems with somewhat similar thematic content, "Satyric 
Complaint," written in free verse, and "The Fall of Leaves, 
written in conventional meter. Both poems take seasonal 
changes and use them to symbolize interior states of mind, 
the changes in both cases denoting loss and deprivation.
The interesting fact is that they were written within a 
few years of each other. From "Satyric Complaint":
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Wood broken by new light. Dogteeth 
of dawn. I live and 
suffer, twist rootfooted from black 
street to street, blurred in the brain.
Blunt boats all night
groan against granite surge. Wet
wind strikes solid on
the flesh the cry starts
from the heels, on concrete,
shatters living bone.
The complete text of "The Fall of Leaves" follows:
The green has suddenly 
Divided to pure flame, 
Leaf-tongued from tree to tree. 
Yea, where we stood it came.
This change may have no name, 
Yet it was like a word 
Spoken, and none to blame,
Alive where shadow stirred.
So was the instant blurred.
But as we waited there 
The slow cry of a bird 
Built up a scheme of air.
The vision of despair 
Starts at the moment’s bound, 
Seethes from the vibrant air 
With slow autumnal sound
Into the burning ground.
The "quiet seriousness" of this last poem, its in­
tensity and control, its accessibility and its peculiarly 
effective combination of the imagistic and the abstract, 
all of which is in contrast to the broken and obscure 
diction of "Satyric Complaint," illustrate better than 
anything else the exact nature of Winters’ "recovery" 
from the free verse movement.
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We have seen earlier how the metrics of free verse 
allowed the poet little or no room for significant varia­
tion and forced him into maintaining at all cost the 
initial emotion out of which the poem began. The only 
modulation available to him was either the diminishment 
or the intensification of the emotion. And in the absence 
of any rational justification it was apt to become tyran­
nical and assume hysterical proportions, especially in 
the later free verse. The initial emotion, or, as Winters 
calls it, "assumption of feeling," whether justified or 
not by a reason assigned to it, is what he designates as 
"poetic convention." Some poets become habituated to, 
even imprisoned in, particular conventions and can think 
of poems in no other terms than those of the convention 
they feel committed to maintaining at all cost. One thinks 
of the ecstasy and despair of Hopkins or the visionary 
hallucination of Rimbaud. The emotional range of these 
poets, intense as it may be in those particular areas of 
human experience they are familiar with, is, nevertheless, 
severely limited. Their intellectual range is even more 
limited, since the convention they are bound to rejects 
as a poetic impurity any rational understanding of the 
emotion involved, an understanding that would necessarily 
mitigate it and act as a calming agent in the texture of 
the poem.
Winters himself in his early poems was locked into
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such a convention. One of the effects of his turning 
"metaphysician11 in the late twenties was the recognition 
on his part of the severe limitations, stylistic and 
thematic, which the conventions available in free verse 
had imposed on him. Concomitantly, he realized the 
existence of other conventions, ones more flexible and 
inclusive of wider ranges of human experience. Robert 
Bridges seems especially important in this connection.
In Primitivism and Decadence Winters discusses Bridges' 
"Eros," and notes how the convention Bridges chose allowed 
for rational motivation of the particular emotion in­
volved, and that the rational element in no way weakens 
or destroys the emotion, but instead quietly strengthens 
it. The emotional range is also extended as a result of 
such motivation. One feels somehow that the feeling in 
the poem is more "normal," less wilful and eccentric than 
that in Rimbaud or Hopkins, that there is more in the 
poems to which common readers can respond.
Winters calls this convention "tradition," and in 
Primitivism and Decadence he fully defines it:
One may describe traditional poetry positively 
by saying that it possesses these closely re­
lated qualities: 1.) equivalence of motivation 
and feeling; 2.) a form that permits a wide 
range of feeling; 3.) a conventional norm of 
feeling which makes for a minimum of "strain”; 
4.) a form and a convention which permits the 
extraction from every unit of language of its 
maximum content, both of connotation and of 
denotation; that is, a form and a convention 
which are in the highest degree economical, or 
efficient.10
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It is this convention which Winters adopts sometime 
in the late twenties. Through it he is enabled to ap­
propriate the powers of the conscious mind, and the effect 
in his poetry is immediate and obvious. A calmness and 
complexity take the place of violence and hysteria:
Music and strength of art 
Beneath long winter rain 
Have played the living part,
With the firm mind for gain.
Nor is the mind in vain.
2. Poetry and Truth
All the changes we have been discussing, the shift 
from free verse to traditional meter, the positive use 
of abstract language, the adoption of a traditional con­
vention, possess in Winters' mind one underlying element, 
common and essential to all of them, the idea, namely, 
that the feeling in a poem should have a rational motiva­
tion. Without such a motivation, on the one hand, there 
is nothing to safeguard the poet from the possibility of 
emotional chaos, especially if his subject matter is as 
explosive as Winters' was for him--the emotion the poet 
arouses will necessarily tend to dominate him and even­
tually cause obscurity and meaninglessness. On the other 
hand, in the absence of any serious, intelligible motive, 
meter, abstraction, and a classical convention will
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degenerate into nothing more than brittle decorative 
shells, devoid of what could properly give them life.
If there is an equivalence between the motive and 
the feeling, as Winters began to assert so frequently 
in his criticism, and if the poetic language is subtle 
and complex enough to express both, then the poem not 
only performs its proper task of understanding some aspect 
of reality, but it also approaches poetic greatness. Be­
hind this, there is another equivalence, just as important, 
though it often is only implicit in the former, an equiva­
lence essentially philosophical in nature: before the 
motive can adequately explain the feeling of a poem, it 
must itself first correspond to some truth located outside 
both the poet and his poem in objective reality. If there 
is no such correspondence, the emotion of the poem becomes 
self-generated and factitious--it then will lack being and 
can be said, in a certain philosophical sense, not to 
exist. But if such a correspondence does exist within 
the poem, not only is there a reason for the feeling within 
the poem, but some aspect of reality has been illuminated, 
just as the poet’s mind itself, in turn, is illuminated 
by the same reality. It is, therefore, this presence of 
truth which irradiates the poem's entire structure and 
regulates all the various adjustments and equivalences we 
have been noting. Put more simply, the end of the mind, 
as Winters saw it, is the apprehension of truth; so the
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greatness of a poem will ultimately depend upon the 
quality of mind found within it and the degree of truth 
it is able to convey in poetic language, language, that 
is, "which permits the extraction from every unit of 
language of its maximum content, both of connotation and 
of denotation.
Once Winters admitted as essential for poetry the 
existence of degrees of truth, even the least, most 
limited of degrees, he immediately faced a philosophical 
problem: what or who is to account for the validity, 
even the bare existence, of that degree of truth? On 
the one hand, if there is truth, it must of necessity be 
something other than a mere subjective impression rela­
tive to the mind in which the impression occurs, for if 
it were only that, there would be no correspondence 
between any operation of that mind and anything in reality 
outside it, and the mind would then stay locked inside 
itself--solipsism and skepticism, the twin enemies of 
Winters' thinking, would be the unavoidable conclusion.
On the other hand, if what we are concerned with is de­
grees of truth, that is, a series more or less true, we 
must get outside that series and arrive at some kind of 
absolute standard according to which the more or less 
can make even the barest of sense. As Thomas Aquinas 
states the situation, with Winters1 entire approval, "But 
more or less are predicated of different things according
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as they resemble in their different ways something which
12is the maximum." And there can be no regress of that
series into infinity, for then we could never arrive at 
an absolute, original and self-generated, and there con­
sequently would be no existence even of the most limited 
truth for the mind to apprehend. But ordinary experience, 
so Winters believed, convinces us there is some degree 
of truth--even the extraordinary experience of the "pure" 
skeptic proves it, for in the most radical of his doubt­
ing he is forced by necessity to admit the truth of the 
existence of the mind performing the doubting. Where 
then is this absolute standard to be located?
As much as he might at one time have felt inclined 
to do so, Winters knew it could not be located in the 
human mind. There are too many texts in both his poetry 
and criticism to prove how limited he thought the mind 
was, how slow and painful the process was by which it 
achieved any truth, and how precarious and uncertain its 
hold on that truth was.
No man can hold existence in the head.
I, too, have known the anguish of the right 
Amid this net of mathematic dearth,
And the brain throbbing like a ship at night: 
Have faced with old unmitigated dread 
The hard familiar wrinkles of the earth, 
from "The Moralists"
No matter how one leans 
One yet fears not to know.
God knows what all this means!
The mortal mind is slow, 
from "A Song in Passing"
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And from the Introduction to his last book of criticism, 
Forms of Discovery:
I trust that I have not given the impression 
that I believe the occidental mind to be pro­
gressing by way of poetry or even by way of 
language in general to some kind of universal 
perfection. I am pessimistic about the human 
race. Few men are born with sufficient in­
telligence to profit by more than a small part 
of the tradition available to them.^-3
Of all the Christian dogmas, as we have already 
seen, the one he could most easily accept was Original 
Sin, "a valuable doctrine in itself," as he calls it in 
the 1929 manifesto, "Notes on Contemporary Criticism."^ 
The mind, for Winters, was mortal, contingent, and prone 
to tragic error, and could never furnish of itself the 
absolute.
The Absolute could only be located in God. The 
argument led Winters to posit a perfect, undeprived, 
absolute mind, and then forced him logically to recognize 
its existence. For the more or less true to have any 
intelligibility, and our common experience tells us that 
it does have such (according to Winters, following Thomas 
Aquinas, a belief ultimately derived from sensory experi­
ence) , there must be absolute truth. Perfect mind, 
absolute truth are merely other names for God. Therefore, 
to complete the syllogism, God necessarily exists.
So Winters, in order to safeguard the existence of 
truth in a poem, in order for his concept of the motive
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and the feeling to have any intelligibility, was led in­
evitably to a theistic position. But he was led most 
reluctantly, almost against the grain, and it was not 
until the late forties that he admitted it publicly. Be­
fore that time, the argument exists only by implication 
in the general critical position he had staked out for 
himself. Writing in the 1947 Introduction to In Defense 
of Reason, he makes for the first time an explicit 
statement:
. . . I am aware that my absolutism implies a 
theistic position, unfortunate as this admis­
sion may be. If experience appears to indicate 
that absolute truths exist, that we are able 
to work toward an approximate apprehension of 
them, but that they are antecedent to our ap­
prehension and that our apprehension is seldom 
and perhaps never perfect, then there is only 
one place in which those truths may be located, 
and I see no way to escape this conclusion.
Winters nowhere spells out the argument in any 
greater detail than he does in this passage. He was, of 
course, exclusively concerned with poetry and the criti­
cism of poetry, not with philosophy, much less with 
theology. But he saw that problems raised in poetry and 
criticism could only be solved in the extrapoetic field 
of metaphysics. And his desire for certitude in those 
disciplines, for a solid basis for the insights possible 
in them, is evidenced by his carrying out the argument 
to its conclusion in that other field, however reluctant 
his humanistic nature caused him to be. In fact, he is
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admirable in the way he submits to the necessity of the 
argument. As is apparent from the preceding, Thomas 
Aquinas is the decisive influence. The argument of the 
quoted passage from In Defense of Reason is almost an 
exact duplication of the Thomistic proof of the existence 
of God by way of the degrees of perfection. This can 
readily be seen once we cite the Thomistic text:
The fourth way is taken from the gradations to 
be found in things. Among beings there are 
some more or less good, true, noble, and the 
like. But more or less are predicated of dif­
ferent things according as they resemble in 
their different ways something which is the 
maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter ac­
cording as it more nearly resembles that which 
is hottest; so that there is something which 
is truest, something best, something noblest, 
and consequently, something which is most being; 
for those that are greatest in truth are great­
est in being, as it is written in the Metaphysics. 
Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of 
all in that genus, as fire, which is the maxi­
mum of heat, is the cause of all hot things, 
as is said in the same book. Therefore, there 
must also be something which is to all beings 
the cause of their being, goodness, and every 
other perfection, and this we call God.f°
But profound differences exist between Winters' posi­
tion and Thomas Aquinas'. As we have already noticed, 
Winters was forced, against his will, by the logic of the 
argument. He did not set out to look for God, nor did 
he apparently have any desire to find Him. Unlike most 
men, for whom the problem is often a source of anguish, 
Winters could have well done without God. As we shall 
soon discover, he had a sort of instinctive distrust,
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even at times actual fear, of the Absolute, especially 
if it were defined in theistic, hence supernatural, terms. 
He felt, once its existence was admitted, that it would 
inevitably invade and overwhelm the human realm, which 
he wanted protected at all costs. Yet he needed God in 
order to safeguard the existence of truth without which 
that same human realm would be invaded and infected by 
enemies far more frightening to Winters than God, namely, 
relativism and skepticism.
He is somewhat like Descartes, who, as Pascal said, 
only needed God to give the "fillip" to the operations 
of his mechanistic universe. Once God had accomplished 
this task, Descartes could then dismiss Him, and, in the 
manner of all clear-thinking Frenchmen, go on to the more 
important job presented by the physical sciences. But 
Winters discovered he could not so easily dismiss God.
The human stuff poetry is made of is not as "pure" as 
that of physics and mathematics. As we shall see, he 
will finally face the problem as honestly and straight­
forwardly as he can in later life, sometime in his late 
forties, and the idea of God will be seen as something 
having both nagged and haunted his consciousness. This 
encounter produces what I think is one of his greatest 
poems, "To the Holy Spirit." The fact remains, though, 
that his most urgent concern from the beginning to the 
end of his life was the safeguarding of the human realm
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
and the kind of truth that man's unaided mind can find 
in it.
His arrival at theism was indeed gradual. The most 
explicit statement on the subject, the one quotad above, 
he did not make until 1947. The earliest statements of 
philosophical principle after the "conversion," the ones 
he makes in his own magazine, The Gyroscope, and in "The 
Extension and Reintegration of the Human Spirit," con­
tain no mention of it, though the existence of God is 
admitted as a possibility in the former and it is implied 
in the latter. But such a possibility affords him no 
consolation— the God could just as likely be for Winters 
a deity of evil as He could be the source of moral per­
fection itself, as in Christianity, and nowhere does he 
mention Him in connection with the philosophical problem 
of truth. Winters’ position in The Gyroscope essays and 
in "The Extension and Reintegration of the Human Spirit" 
is, on the other hand, defiantly humanistic and stoical, 
insisting as he does on the unaided powers of the human 
mind, the "effort, suspicion, and trembling" of the 
Louise Bogan review, and, finally, unrelenting self- 
criticism. The following passage from "Notes on Contem­
porary Criticism," published in The Gyroscope in 1929, 
is typically defiant and dogmatic in its assertion that 
the human mind can dispense with God and pursue its own 
activities in philosophical isolation:
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We have ruled out the possibility of a firm 
religious belief, and so are forced to define 
the least comforting possibility; namely, that 
God, if he exists at all, having no practical 
connection with man, ceases to exist for man, 
and, so far as actual human experience is con­
cerned, the visible universe is the beginning, 
middle, and end of human life. Man comes from 
the earth and returns to the earth and makes 
of the interim what he can, of his own unaided 
powers. This does not imply of necessity a 
belief in a mechanistic universe nor in any 
system of determinism, I, personally, hold no 
such beliefs. It is simply a bare statement 
of the inescapable necessities, and nothing 
more, of belief in existence. Anything beyond 
this basis is inferential and subject to revi­
sion and hence unsafe as a foundation for a 
rule of living. ^
It is interesting to observe that the qualified ag­
nosticism of these early statements resulted temporarily 
in a relativistic position for Winters, a fact which might 
have influenced the explicit statement he makes in In 
Defense of Reason. In the essay I have just quoted from, 
he asks himself how he can account for the truth of what 
he calls a "violation of equity"; he replies: "By a viola­
tion of equity, I mean an act that seems unjust to the
actor after he has put himself as best and as honestly as
18lie is able in the position of a disinterested observer."
But as disinterested as Winters' observer might possibly
be, if it only seems such, there is no absolute assurance
that it i£ such. And Winters himself realizes what the
absence of an unmitigated theism is costing him: "This is
a dangerous standard, but it is the only one available
19without religion."
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Likewise, the three volumes of criticism written 
and published in the thirties and forties. Primitivism 
and Decadence, Maule's Curse, and Anatomy of Nonsense, 
contain no explicit reference to a theistic position, 
though the allusions to God found in them have lost the 
belligerence and sarcasm of the earlier remarks and have 
become calmer and more receptive. It was not until the 
late forties when he came to collect these three volumes 
together in the one volume In Defense of Reason and was 
able to take an overview, as it were, of his critical 
principles that he realized the logical dependence of 
those principles on the existence of God and so made, 
however reluctantly, his "confession" of theism. The 
poetry, as we shall see, is a different matter. There 
the poet often "confesses" at levels deeper than planned 
intent, fortunate or unfortunate as this might be.
However gradual it was, the theism originated in a 
study of poetic styles and in a certain sense it remained 
there. Sometime in the late twenties he became acutely 
dissatisfied with the frenzied, ejaculatory style of his 
free verse. He saw this kind of poetry as a severely 
limited instrument, which allowed him to make only spe­
cialized observations of sensory experiences. He was 
helped to this discovery by an intense, prolonged study 
of Baudelaire and Valery, and a few poems by Hardy, Bridges, 
and Stevens, supplemented by the extensive graduate studies
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in English and American literature he began at Stanford 
in 1927. What he admired in the poets mentioned was not 
their theism— only Baudelaire among them had a consistent, 
clearly focused notion of a deity— but certain stylistic 
qualities. The outcome of these studies was his realiza­
tion that these qualities were the effects finally of 
the presence of the mind in the poem, the judgements and 
evaluations of which he had earlier rejected as poetic 
impurities. With the introduction of mind into poetic 
theory and practice, the question of truth inevitably 
arose, the solution of which was inescapably theistic.
It is probably the only instance in the history of re­
corded human thought where a study of style resulted in 
a proof for the existence of God. But this is to take a 
somewhat superficial view of the matter. Style meant a 
great deal to Winters. Writing in ’’Statement of Purpose" 
in The Gyroscope, he once said, "Stylistic precision is
merely the ultimate manifestation of spiritual preci*'' : m
20 l;:|"4and strength."
3. The Fear of the Absolute
I should like to return to remarks made in the pre­
ceding section about Winters' fear and suspicion of the 
Absolute and make further observations on the subject.
My purpose in doing so is to understand more clearly his
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reluctance in coming to a theistic position and his ap­
parent embarrassment at stating it publicly. And by 
Absolute I do not mean philosophical or moral certitude, 
but rather that Being, necessarily defined in super­
natural terms, on whom such certitude depends for its 
exis tence.
We should first note the equation existing in 
Winters' mind between God and death, which we saw oper­
ating in his free verse and which continues in his tradi­
tional poetry as well. As Winters saw it, death and 
divinity are alike in that each shares with the other a 
simplicity and purity of being, or non-being, which he 
saw as actively opposed to the dualism and complexity of 
the human composite. Both are radically foreign elements, 
in the presence of which the human being is reduced to 
nothingness; they also transcend all known categories, 
so that each is unthinkable for the human mind. "Sonnet," 
one of the transitional poems which appeared in The 
Proof, illustrates this equation quite well. The rele­
vant lines follow:
Real, the writhing grain 
Means nothing, makes you nothing, and the room 
Laid bare is God, the thinning saline Doom, 
Intrinsic cringing of the shadowy brain.
*****
0 you were joyous when the doorbell rang 
And God's pure presence froze your bony jaws.
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God here is defined in terms of the fatal effect He 
has on the human being. He is the salt of drowning in 
the sea; the brain, overshadowed by His presence, cringes 
in fear, and any joy it might have felt in anticipating 
His approach is destroyed in His actual presence, which 
spells out its instant annihilation. Divine incompre­
hensibility is emphasized in other parts of the poem;
God is connected with the meaninglessness and cacophony 
of modern jazz, which "sucks" the human mind to "shrieking."
God and death are equally synonymous with each other 
in another sonnet, "To Emily Dickinson." Winters imagi­
natively follows Emily Dickinson as she traces her way 
to the brink of human comprehension; then he sees language 
itself fail as, dying, she crosses that brink in the "hard 
argument which led to God." The "unholy quiet" which 
death possesses in "A Fragment," though not exactly equated 
with God, is, nevertheless, associated with Him. The only 
"peace" of God possible for man, the epigram says, is 
dictated for him in death, and it is inscrutable and de­
structive of his human nature.
Such a conception of divinity is related to that of 
Pure Quality, which we briefly discussed in the first 
chapter. The term comes from an essay by Allen Tate,
"The Fallacy of Humanism," which he contributed to the 
1930 symposium The Critique of Humanism, to which Winters 
also contributed what later was revised into the first
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chapter of Primitivism and Decadence. It became an ex­
tremely important concept for Winters, one he used in 
both Primitivism and Decadence and in some of his poems, 
especially in "The Grave," one of his most complete 
statements on the subject of death. Tate defines the 
term in his essay as follows:
Pure Quality is nature itself because it is 
the source of experience. . . . Pure Quality 
would be pure evil, and it is only through 
the means of our recovery from a lasting im­
mersion in it . . . that any man survives the 
present hour; Pure Quality is pure disintegration.
And from "The Grave," which appeared a year after 
The Critique of Humanism in the 1931 The Journey:
There is no faintest tremor in that urn.
Each flake of ash is sure in its return—
Never to alter, a pure quality,
A shadow cast against eternity.
Tate locates Pure Quality in an undifferentiated 
naturalism, and later in his essay contrasts it to the 
exclusively quantitative point of view of modern science, 
which he sees as its equally destructive opposite.
Winters, on the other hand, locates it in death and con­
trasts it to the temporal realm with the "vibrant" light 
"running in all ways through quick whisperings"; he sees 
between the two realms the "absolute cleavage" he dis­
cusses in his essay on Emily Dickinson--any supposed 
interpenetration they might share is for him a dangerous
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22illusion. Though Tate and Winters use the term in 
these different senses, yet both men agree in equating 
it with disintegration as far as man is concerned, and 
there is in both of them the desire to protect man from 
immersion in such inhuman purity. And if one considers 
carefully the attributes Winters gives it--perfection, 
eternity, purity of composition, changelessness— one can 
immediately see that they are equally applicable in any 
definition of God. As far as the effects of both God 
and death on the human world go, Winters insists the two 
can be treated as one. To approach the divine, all of 
these poems seem to be saying, is to approach annihilation.
Winters furthermore thought the Absolute, because its 
nature is ineffable and transcends all human categories, 
becomes a source of intellectual confusion when it is 
isolated from "human complications" and viewed as a subject 
in and of itself. Such concentration, Winters felt, would 
blur the poet's perception and understanding of human 
values, which he believed to be the legitimate subject 
matter of poetry. "In so far as one endeavors," he writes 
in "The Morality of Poetry," the first chapter of Primi­
tivism and Decadence, "to deal with the Absolute, not as 
a means of ordering one's moral perception but as the
subject itself of perception, one will tend to say nothing,
23despite the multiplication of words." And in the title 
essay of the same volume, in connection with the poetry
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of T. Sturge Moore, he speaks of "the attempt to violate 
our relationship with God, or with whatever myth we put 
in his place, even with Nothingness . . . which leads 
. . . to the minimizing of moral distinctions, that is,
24
of the careful perception of strictly human experience."
To the extent he concentrates on human experience and 
the moral values of that experience, the poet is safe.
If he is forced by philosophical necessity to pay atten­
tion to the Absolute, he may safely do so only as a means 
of "ordering one's moral perception." Once he pays any 
attention to the Absolute as a subject in and of itself, 
the poet risks intellectual contamination, and his per­
ception of moral values becomes blurred and distorted, 
even if that Absolute, we may suppose, is admitted as 
the very cause of the existence of those same values.
Not only was this attempt to pursue the Absolute in 
isolation a source of confusion, it was also for him 
evidence of fraud and deceit, as is apparent in his 
criticism of such Christian mystics as Crashaw and such 
"secular" ones as Robinson Jeffers and Hart Crane.
Winters thought such poets were attempting to say some­
thing about a Being about Whom they insistently maintained 
that absolutely nothing could be said. The attempt neces­
sarily involved them in theologically suspect analogies, 
usually concerned with human sexuality, that were tinged 
for him with deceit and irrationalism.
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"Theseus: A Trilogy" is Winters' most complete poetic 
statement on the dangers of man's relationship with the 
Absolute. Grosvenor Powell has written an excellent com­
mentary on the poem, in which he classifies its characters 
into three categories:
Within the poem, there are three classes of 
characters, each class distinguished by its 
relationship to the forces of divinity. In 
the first class, we find characters such as 
Theseus and Minos, mortal, political, and 
civilizing. In the second class appear figures 
such as Artemis and Poseidon, divinities and 
supra-human forces. In the third class are 
characters such as Hippolyta, Ariadne, Pasiphae, 
Phaedra, and the Amazons. These are humans 
compromised by their dealings with divinity, 
humans who in turn compromise the political 
man. Significantly, they are all women. The 
characters in the first class are tragic figures, 
men attempting to master divine forces and to 
civilize. The characters in the third class 
are the priestesses or worshippers of divinity, 
and they are compromised by their intercourse 
with the gods„25
The initial error Theseus commits, fatal in its con­
sequences, is the sexual union with the Amazon Hippolyta, 
whose own humanity has been destroyed by the totality and 
purity of her devotation to the goddess Artemis. Out of 
this union comes Hippolytus, the embodiment of the revenge 
planned by Artemis and Hippolyta against the "male" intel­
ligence of Theseus. In one part of the poem we find 
Hippolyta, pregnant with Hippolytus, brooding on the 
"secrets" of her goddess:
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In Attica, the naked land, she strode,
Brooding upon the secrets of the goddess,
Upon the wet bark of the Scythian forest,
The wet turf under bare foot, and the night 
Blue with insistence of the staring eye.
The trochees in the second, third, and especially 
the last line of this passage, along with its two feminine 
endings, work beautifully into the rippled smoothness and 
quiet chill of these lines. In them, we are in a frame 
of mind remote from civilisation, dominated by a female 
divinity infected with cold hate for the human world.
And it is Theseus' tragedy that he becomes tainted with 
the irrationalism of this feminine moon and that he intro­
duces it, as it were, into the sunlit world of Attica.
The second part of the poem is concerned with the 
events on Crete, the "blood-stained island of the gods," 
representative of the mystical and the purely intuitive, 
against which Attica, the intellectual and the rational, 
is contrasted in the poem. There Theseus becomes "com­
promised" in the blood of the Minotaur, who is the off­
spring of Pasiphae's mystical and sexual union with the 
bull from Poseidon. In killing him Theseus incurs the 
pollution that is finally only expiated by the deaths of 
Ariadne, Phaedra, Hippolytus, and, at the end, Theseus 
himself, who, in the last section, is cast by Lycomedes 
into the sea of Poseidon, the other offended deity in 
the poem, beside Artemis.
The opposition that runs throughout the entire trilogy
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is that between the divine and the human. The establish­
ment of the realm of humanitas, which is the purpose of 
Theseus' life, is at all times threatened by the invasion 
and contamination of irrational forces, divine in origin 
and mystical in nature, which would destroy intellectual 
values and moral distinctions, and reduce the human vision 
to a purely subjective, intuitive state of being, symbol­
ized in the poem by the "insistence of the staring eye" 
of Artemis. Theseus fails because he is too much entangled 
in these forces —  "the taint of hell has eaten through my 
skin," he says at one point--yet he does acquire in his 
old age an understanding of human experience which none 
of the other characters do. Out of the tragedies he suf­
fered himself, as well as those he caused in others, he 
distils "the honey of calm wisdom," which in essence con­
sists of the recognition of the vital distinction between 
the divine and the human. The other characters are only 
victims from the beginning to the end. All in all, the 
poem is one of the most powerful meditations in modern 
literature on what can be called the divine contamination 
of the human sphere.
We are now somewhat in a better position to under­
stand the reasons for Winters' attitude toward the Absolute. 
It was equated or intimately associated in his mind with 
death, and, as far as man is concerned, in its purity and 
inscrutability, it was a source of confusion, even of
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contamination, as we have just seen in "Theseus." With 
such views in mind, Winters' attitude toward the Absolute 
is necessarily going to be fearful and suspicious.
After this has been granted, it yet remains to ask 
whether or not there are irrational elements in Winters' 
attitude itself, which apparently he was not aware of.
By asking the question I do not mean to imply the exist­
ence of a purely psychological explanation, though I 
suspect there is one. The evidence found in the auto­
biographical "The Werwolf," which was briefly discussed 
in the first chapter, suggests he must have been influ­
enced by his mother in his objections against religion, 
and the fear it instilled in him. Yet we are in obscure 
regions indeed when we talk about such matters, and in 
doing so we neglect others equally important and more 
accessible. I mean, specifically, the philosophical and 
literary, realms where he carried on his public life, 
and where he is to be met, if he is to be met at all.
The legitimate side of Winters1 attitude should 
first be noted. What he is opposing, and rightly so, in 
much of his critique of the Absolute is the illegitimate 
invasion of necessity into the moral realm. The con­
sequence of such an invasion inevitably is either some 
form of determinism or what Etienne Gilson calls "theolo- 
gism," a concept which influenced Winters a great deal. 
Winters is above all protecting here Aristotle's sphere
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
of the practical intellect, which presides over what 
man makes and does of his own free will, and where, conse­
quently, things can be other than they are, in Aristotle's
27memorable phrase. This sphere of the contingent moral 
choice is contrasted to the realm of the theoretical in­
tellect, where things can not be other than they are, 
the realm of necessity, of those immutable laws such as 
Aristotle thought discoverable in physics and natural 
theology, over which man has no control. They are the 
Absolutes in every sense of the word, and if their "neces­
sity" is allowed to encroach too far into the human world, 
man loses freedom of will and becomes completely determined 
by inhuman, or supra-human, forces. He then cannot be 
other than he is; he is forced to renounce all responsi­
bility for his acts, and any moral judgement made on them 
is meaningless. For Winters the essential human act, the 
act, that is, that makes one human, is the perception by 
the intellect of moral law and the execution of that law 
by the will. Any system of thought that interfered with 
this act, such as he saw in Calvinism, for instance, he 
viewed as a violation of the human being, and his opposi­
tion to it was uncompromising.
The other consequence which Winters rightly opposed 
is "theologism." Such a term characterizes those who are 
animated by what we may call an excessive sense of divine 
glory, which they allow in blind zeal to invade and
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dominate all conceivable areas of human and natural life.
Such persons are eager to regard the created world and
everything found in it, especially the mind itself, as
essentially invalid and meaningless in comparison to the
purity and perfection of divinity. And in order to render
that divinity all glory, they take away any power and
validity the created world might possess, even as a gift
from its Creator, and refer all things to God alone, so
that He can then rule over a desert of unintelligibility.
The results are radical skepticism--what sufficiency can
the mind have when it totally and constantly depends upon
divine illumination for the least of its operations?— and
a denial of the divine power to create anything with an
efficacy of its own. In "theologism" nature and grace
then are in active and unrelenting opposition to each other,
and the Thomistic understanding of grace as the perfection
of nature is rejected. Jean-Pierre de Caussade, the French
mystic of the 17th century, states the situation with
brutal simplicity in his Abandonment to Divine Providence:
"When God speaks He uses mysterious words, and they are
a death blow to all that we are as rational human beings,
for all the mysteries of God destroy our physical sense
28and our intellectuality." One is tempted to say that 
this extreme mysticism also issues into a variant of deter­
minism, yet this would be inaccurate, for, after the divine 
has done with its destroying, there is nothing left to be
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determined in the void that follows. There is instead 
only the silence, and the isolation, of the godhead.
Winters' criticism of these two dangers involved in 
man's relationship with the Absolute is sound and legiti­
mate, but there are times when he seems to exceed rational 
limits, and his objections then become a sort of stubborn, 
automatic reflex. We begin to feel that he is. determined, 
even if he has to proceed against reason itself, to re­
gard any contact, even purely intellectual contact, with 
God as harmful and irrational. If this is true, if there 
is indeed an irrational element in his attitude toward 
the Absolute, then we must ask ourselves exactly what 
philosophical error he commits that makes him open to such 
a criticism.
We have seen how Winters was driven to admit the 
existence of God as the cause of degrees of truth found 
in a poem. They are effects of an absolute cause. Effects 
have to resemble their cause in so far as the cause has 
within itself that which actualizes the effect, unless, 
that is, one, following Hume, sees the connection between 
the two as "occasional" and fortuitous, a position Winters 
himself objected to as destructive of reason itself. A 
cause also has either to equal the effect, or transcend 
it; otherwise, one has the logical impossibility of a 
greater thing coming out of a lesser. If transcendence 
is involved, the transcendence is such that in no way
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1Q5
does it jeopardize the existence of the effect or anni­
hilate the resemblance between it and the effect, because 
the specific cause we are concerned with is a perfect one 
whose will to create cannot be frustrated, nor can its 
power to maintain the existence of the created thing be 
questioned. Besides, the mere fact that Winters can 
refer to degrees of truth as existing, almost as if they 
are empirical facts, means that the transcendence of their 
cause, in and of itself, does not threaten their existence. 
Otherwise, they would not be there for him to refer to.
The cause-effect we are dealing with here is God and 
truth as apprehended by the mind, truth which for Winters 
is most completely realized in poetic structures. God 
then either equals this effect or He transcends it. Since 
He is God, by His very nature, He necessarily transcends 
it, but in such a manner that its existence, as we have 
just seen, is not threatened. Otherwise, both truth and 
mind, since He is their cause, the very reason of their 
existence, would immediately lapse into nothingness. The 
unquestioned fact that we continue to speak of them is 
evidence that God, as their absolute first principle, 
which Winters is forced by philosophical necessity to ad­
mit that He is, continually safeguards their existence.
The error that extreme mystics fall into is assuming 
automatically that transcendence of an effect means its 
annihilation. It is the same error that Winters himself
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falls into. With them it is as if a cause, after having 
created an effect, should then wish to turn against it 
and destroy it, in the manner of a father against his son 
God destroys our intellectuality, Caussade says quite 
simply. Much of Winters1 critique of the Absolute is 
animated by the same belief. But the crucial fact to 
remember is that if indeed transcendence means annihila­
tion and God does destroy the human mind, then there 
would be no mind to register the fact of destruction. 
There would be instead the silence of a non-creative 
godhead.
The mind that forgets this fact and sees instead a 
destructive dichotomy between God and reason will even­
tually view God as beyond intelligibility. He then be­
comes either Plotinus' One-Above-Being or Meister Eckhart'
29"wilderness of godhead." Such a God will be sought 
by some mystics and embraced in ecstasy, no matter what 
entangling contradictions and absurdities they have to 
cut themselves free of. On the other hand, for someone 
like Winters--and this fact radically separates him from 
the mystics —  such a God will be both avoided and opposed 
as threatening the existence of the only thing that gives 
meaning to his life.
Winters, I think, frequently forgot this fact and 
viewed any kind of transcendence as irrational, even the 
sort of transcendence we have noted in the cause-effect
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relationship between God and reason. Contradictorily
enough, he admits God as the cause and guarantee of
reason and then proceeds in other contexts as if God,
by His very nature, were opposed to reason, as if he,
Winters, were forced by a desperate situation to protect
reason from the very divinity that in other places he
says caused it and gave it being. "The Absolute is in
its nature inscrutable," he says categorically in In
30Defense of Reason. But how can this possibly be true 
in so far as that Absolute is admitted as the very cause 
of reason itself?
4. The Definition of God
What Winters does in view of the situation outlined 
above is to define God in the most philosophically fa­
vorable terms at his disposal, which in his case will be 
intellectual, not existential. God then becomes, not 
pure existence as in Thomism, but pure intellect as in 
Aristotelianism; that is, He is defined as an intellectual 
essence in which what He is is given philosophical su­
premacy over that He is. "But thou art mind alone," as 
he states it explicitly in "To the Holy Spirit," his 
most important poem on the subject of theism.
Two philosophical possibilities are then open to 
him that further mitigate the "irrationalism" of a
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theistic position, both of which Winters embraced at one 
time or another during his career. One is to extricate, 
as it were, the Divine Essence out of God and set it up 
in isolation as Concept, as a kind of theoretical ideal 
which man himself might achieve at the cost of almost 
inhuman effort and, finally, with the sacrifice of his 
own individual existence. The other is to eliminate 
everything from the definition of God but that same in­
tellectual essence, including existence itself, which, 
as Kant has explained to all subsequent idealists, is 
not essential to the definition of a thing. The former 
way is basically Platonic in spirit; the latter, Aristo­
telian. Both depart radically from Thomas Aquinas, who, 
according to some critics, is the dominant influence in 
this area of Winters' thought. As Grosvenor Powell inter­
prets the situation in Language as Being, "Yvor Winters 1 
development as an artist and man can be best understood 
as a development from . . . the romantic to the Thomistic.' 
But the basic difference, and one so crucially important 
that it ramifies through all other things, is that Aquinas 
thought of God, not as concept or essence, but as exist­
ence itself. His God is the Ego sum £ui est of Exodus, 
not the eternal thought of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, 
which only thinks of itself in an isolation purified of 
the accidents of mere existence.
Winters' position, on the other hand, is best
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described as the "essentialist11 approach of classical 
Greek thought, which, as Etienne Gilson describes it in 
Being and Some Philosophers, is characterized by the 
same inclination toward the "intellectualism" we see 
operating in Winters. In an essay on Paul Valery and 
Edgar Bowers, Helen Trimpi has provided us with a con­
cise definition of such an "essentialist" approach. As 
she admits, her definition is derived from Gilson’s book 
mentioned above.
In the course of criticizing the philosophical 
position which he calls "essentialism," the 
contemporary philosopher and historian of 
philosophy Etienne Gilson has described the 
variations from Parmenides to Kant of the as­
sumption that essence (what being or a being 
is) is the first principle of being in reality, 
contrasting this assumption with that of exist­
ence (that being or a being is) as the first 
principle in reality. It is such a philosophi­
cal inheritance of essentialism in which some 
near primary and essential aspect of being is 
distinguished and held to be primary, as it 
was developed and transmitted by Neoplatonic 
thinkers from Plotinus to his eighteenth-century 
translator Thomas Taylor and to the German 
Idealists and American Transcendentalists, that 
I see as furnishing the intellectual context 
of Bowers' poems and as presenting him with 32 
some of the problems that his poetry concerns.
For "essentialism," then, primary reality does not reside 
in the fact that something is, i.e., the act whereby some­
thing exists, but rather in what that something is, i.e., 
its conceptual definition as formulated by the mind, a 
definition which, in Aristotle, then becomes the "essence" 
of the thing defined. Helen Trimpi sees this as the
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context of Bowers' poetry; it is also the context for 
Winters', although the influence of the German Idealists 
and the American Transcendentalists is inoperative in 
his own poetry. As we have seen, Winters' intellectual
discomfort with the idea of God drove him to define God
as "mind alone," a definition more Aristotelian than it 
is anything else.
Such "essentialism” can be approached, as I have 
said, from two different, but closely related, points of 
view when it comes to the subject of deity. One is to 
take the essence out of God and view it as concept; the
other is to take everything out of God but essence. To
illustrate the first of these approaches I should now 
like to look at a group of poems in which the isolated 
concept is thought of in divine terms.
The most complete statement on the subject is 
"Heracles." The Greek hero is treated in the poem, as 
Winters' footnote informs us, "as a Sun-God," and al­
legorically as "the artist in hand-to-hand or semi- 
intuitive combat with experience." The result of his 
struggles with "the numbered Beings of the wheeling track" 
is his total mastery of human experience, the understand­
ing on his part of the Concept governing that experience, 
and his subsequent deification in terms of that Concept.
It is important to note that this apotheosis occurs out­
side time, in a non-human realm of perfect silence, and
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at the sacrifice of his own individual existence:
This stayed me, too: my life was not my own,
But I my life's; a god I was, not man.
Grown Absolute, I slew my flesh and bone; 
Timeless, I knew the Zodiac my span.
This was my grief, that out of grief I grew—  
Translated as I was from earth at last,
From the sad pain that Deianira knew.
Translated slowly in a fiery blast,
Perfect, and moving perfectly, I raid 
Eternal silence to eternal ends:
And Deianira, an imperfect shade,
Retreats in silence as my arc descends.
The "god" mentioned in these lines is not the God 
that appears, for instance, in "To the Holy Spirit"; he 
is, on the other hand, the absolute concept we have just 
outlined. All the accidents of human existence and in­
dividuality, symbolized in the poem, not only by the "sad 
pain of Deianira," but also by the tragic entanglements 
of Heracles himself, are "unreal" dregs in comparison to 
this timeless concept, divine in its nature, which 
Heracles realizes in the "fiery blast" of his apotheosis.
Its absoluteness is in tragic conflict with human exist­
ence; in fact, man has to slay himself in order to become 
the only thing "real" in such a universe, the form, the 
concept, the absolute mind. The same oppositions and 
dichotomies we saw operating in Winters' criticism of 
mysticism are operating also in this poem, but Winters 
now sees them as necessary to, and productive of, an 
intellectual good, even though the cost is still unthinkably 
inhuman:
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Grown Absolute, I slew my flesh and bone.
All in all, the poem realizes the full consequences
of Valery’s gnomic and terrifying remark in Monsieur
33Teste: "The essential is against life." In few other 
poems Winters wrote did he so starkly and unrelentingly 
draw out, as here, the full implications of the conflict 
he saw as inevitable between ordinary humanity and the 
isolate concept presented as divinity.
The "crime" in "Socrates," another related poem, is 
the philosopher's having raised up against the times a 
"Timeless Form," against which the ignorant and the non- 
philosophical react violently and senselessly. In the 
sacrifice of his own life, which is offered in atonement 
for man's general stupidity, Socrates undergoes the same 
intellectual apotheosis as Heracles and likewise becomes 
himself the timeless concept:
Thus are the times transmuted: understood,
A Timeless Form, comprising my estate.
No such apotheosis occurs in "To Edwin V. McKenzie," 
a poem addressed to the trial lawyer who defended David 
Lamson, a friend and neighbor of Winters, who had been
Q  /
accused of murdering his own wife; neither is there in 
it the tragic conflict we have been noting in the other 
poems. But the essential situation still obtains: the 
Intellect viewed as divine concept separate from man,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
but one which man can realize in his own way, though 
still with considerable difficulty:
The concept lives, but few men fill the frame.
You filled the courtroom with historic power;
Yourself the concept in the final hour.
Immortal mind and the individual man, again, are 
separate from each other in "Time and the Garden," just 
as the Form is from the particular in the Platonic sys­
tem. As in the preceding poems, man has the opportunity 
to reembody the Intellect, though the cost of this "un­
broken wisdom" is his own life, and it is never achieved 
in an existential context. The Intellect is divine and 
eternal. The temporal realm is relegated to a philosophi 
cally inferior position in the order of things; wisdom 
occurs elsewhere, in death and eternity:
Though we know well that when this fix the head
The mind's immortal, but the man is dead.
The same sacrifice is the subject of "To a Portrait
of Melville in My Library," in connection with which 
Kenneth Fields in his unpublished dissertation reminds 
us that "one should remember that the poem addresses a 
portrait and that Melville himself is dead. 'What life 
was buried, ere you (sic) rose reborn', refers to the re­
birth of Melville's reputation long after his death and
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after years of obscurity. The balance is near perfection 
35only in art.” The apotheosis here then is artistic; 
the individual artist dies in the acquisition of Socratic 
wisdom and becomes immortal only in art, from which the 
idea of divinity is not absent. And when the speaker 
of "To a Portrait" meets, not so much the face of the 
individual man, but the outline of the concept which that 
man realized in death, and which is now "framed" in art, 
times becomes inoperative for him, noon is immobile:
0 face reserved, unmoved by praise or scorn!
0 dreadful heart that won Socratic peace!
What was the purchase-price of thy release?
What life was buried, ere thou rose reborn?
*****
The lids droop coldly, and the face is still: 
Wisdom and wilderness are here at poise,
Ocean and forest are the mind's device,
But still I feel the presence of thy will:
The midnight trembles when I hear thy voice,
The noon's immobile when I meet thine eyes.
The identical relationship between the concept and 
the individual exists in a poem similar to the one on 
Melville, "On the Portrait of a Scholar of the Italian 
Renaissance." In it existential life must also be de­
stroyed and buried before the Form can be realized, and 
the Form is, again, conceived of as philosophically 
superior to the accidents and peculiarities of the human 
personality, which are but "lees/Residual from this 
clear intent" of the Form. The important thing is the 
"vision in a frame":
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The face is noble; but the name 
Is one that we shall scarcely hold.
This is a vision in a frame,
Defined and matted down with gold.
Our names, with his, are but the lees 
Residual from this clear intent;
Our finely grained identities 
Are but this golden sediment.
Finally, the two minor academic poems, "For the 
Opening of the William Dinsmore Briggs Room" and "An Ode 
on the Despoilers of Learning in an American University," 
justify the existence of the university on the ground 
that it can provide the framework for successive re­
embodiments of Intellect, since, as "For the Opening" 
states, "Our Being grows in Mind." The struggle and 
isolation involved in such an under taking, again, are 
emphasized, and its religious overtones are pointed out, 
especially in "An Ode on the Despoilers of Learning," 
in which the embodiment of mind is recommended as an 
appropriate act of atonement for the stupidity and evil 
of the majority of men.
We are now in a position to summarize. The essen­
tial spirit of the passages quoted, as well as the poems 
from which they are taken, is Platonic. The relationship 
that obtains between the concept and the individual at­
tempting to realize it is the same one obtaining between 
the Form and the particular in the Platonic system. The 
concept is the paradigm of Perfect mind, and is considered 
as isolated from any phenomonological or existential
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context, which is the realm of "becoming," hence the
realm of error, ignorance, and evil. The concept, on
the other hand, is located in Being, and, consequently,
it has philosophical supremacy over the individual man
who is in time and is "tangled with earth," to quote from
36a poem by Janet Lewis. The individual achieves reality, 
in a philosophical sense, only in so far as he partici­
pates and grows in Mind, which in Winters1 thought is 
deified, formed as it is by what he extricates from the 
idea of God and sets up as a separate divine concept.
Such participation on the part of the individual rarely 
results in his own deification, though this is possible 
in the case of some men who possess tremendous powers of 
will and intellect. But when such men do eventually ac­
complish such perfect realizations of concept, they then 
cannot possess them, for the very perfection of the pro­
cess finally necessitates the sacrifice of their own 
individual lives. Mind, or rather God-as-Concept, re­
sides in a timeless realm, usually thought of in artistic 
terms, purified of the "existentialism" of life as we 
know it now; man is inextricably bound up in time, from 
which there is for him no escape, though he is possessed 
of the desire for transcedent perfection. Human life, 
therefore, is ultimately tragic. Man "is so created," 
Winters writes in his discussion of Valery's Ebauche d'un 
serpent in The Function of Criticism, "that he desires
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infinite knowledge, and he is so created that he cannot
have it. The desire is his nature, his greatness, his
37sin, and his torture, and it is inescapable."
Some further observations are in order. As I have 
said, Winters embraced the alternative of "conceptualism," 
or "essentialism," as Gilson would have it, in order to 
mitigate the "irrationalism" of a theistic position he 
was forced into by logical necessity. Part of the 
"rationalism" of this approach, apart from its exclusively 
intellectual nature, is that it opens up the area of the 
divine to human participation. In fact, nearly all of 
the poems we have just been considering are more concerned 
with the human attempt at the realization of the concept 
of perfect mind, than with the religious nature of that 
concept in and of itself. What Winters was in essence 
searching for was a kind of rationalistic variant of the 
Christian Dogma of the Incarnation. He was, of course, 
not Christian, and he rejected the belief that God became 
man and so bridged the gulf that separates the divine 
from the human. Instead, he habitually thought of an 
"absolute cleavage" as existing between the two realms.
Yet when the argument about degrees of truth led him to 
theism and he was forced to deal with God, his intellec- 
tualism inclined him to define things in such a manner 
that at least he would not have to deal with the "foreign 
god" of undiluted mysticism. Hence, the isolation of
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the divine essence as Perfect Mind, and the setting up 
of that concept as a paradigm and model for human partici­
pation. His whole purpose in doing so, though, was not 
so much to deify man as it was to rationalize and humanize 
God. He wanted to bridge rationalistically the gulf that 
in Christianity is bridged dogmatically.
Yet the drift of these passages would suggest that 
he failed in this attempt. If we go back to the quote 
from Caussade and compare it with Winters' position as 
illustrated above, we can discover, I think, at least one 
similarity between the two, though, otherwise, they are 
quite different indeed. Both the God of mysticism and 
the conceptual God of Pure Mind, by their very natures, 
are in active opposition against existential humanity and 
the ordinary experience that humanity undergoes in time. 
Each insists on an either-or situation that is nothing 
short of tragic: either the perfection of themselves out­
side time or a meaningless individuality in time that 
only knows its own death. If it would be too much to 
say that they are both hostile to what we have called 
existential humanity, at least it would be safe to say 
that humanity itself is destroyed as it approaches or 
approximates, in any really significant degree, the purity 
of these models. The starkly great line from "Heracles," 
"Grown Absolute, I slew my flesh and bone," states the 
theme unambiguously and straightforwardly. To approach
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this God is indeed to approach annihilation as far as 
individual human life is concerned.
I do not want at all to give the impression that 
Winters was happy at the prospect of humanity destroying 
itself in the process of achieving intellectual perfec­
tion. His vision is tragic, as tragic as anything one 
will find in the Greeks. He saw no way out of this 
dilemma; for him, it was built into the nature of things 
To pretend that it was otherwise, he would say, would be 
merely exchanging the bleak truth for guile and illusion
I have said that the spirit of this position is 
Platonic, yet another philosophy seems hinted at in the 
conclusion of "Time and the Garden." The last line of 
this poem, "The mind's immortal, but the man is dead," 
might strike the unwary at first as intimating a belief 
in some form of personal immortality, if not that of the 
individual soul, then that of the individual mind. But 
Winters never at any time entertained such a belief, and 
he is quite clear on the subject. Some might say that 
the immortal mind in question is the figurative, collec­
tive mind of the race. Yet the subj ect of the poem is 
the individual acquisition of wisdom, and, besides, 
Winters' opinion of the intellectual capabilities of 
the human race as a whole would, I think, make such an 
interpretation seem naive. "Life is painful,” he writes 
in In Defense of Reason, "if one expects more than two 
or three men in a century to behave as rational animals.1
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The mind involved has to be the conceptual deity 
discussed above. It is also almost identical to Averroes’ 
notion of a Separate Intelligence in which man thinks, 
or, more accurately, which thinks for man. Such an Intel­
ligence is immortal, divine, and perfectly self-sufficient; 
it is also totally and radically distinct from the indi­
vidual human soul, which for both Averroes and Winters is 
deprived and mortal. Gilson has given us a summary of 
Averroes* position on the matter; his account reads, 
strangely enough, as if it were an explication of the 
last line of ’'Time and the Garden":
. . . the intellectual operations observable in 
man are caused in him by a separate intellectual 
substance that is present in him only by its 
operations. As separate, this intellectual sub­
stance is, by the same token, incorruptible and 
immortal; but its own immortality does not en­
tail our personal immortality. We ourselves 
have a soul, which is personal to each of us 
and is the form of our body; but for this very 
reason it perishes along with the body. To sum 
up, that which causes intellectual knowledge in 
us is separate and immortal, but it is separate 
and immortal for the very reason that it is not 
the form of our body; it is not our soul.39
The other alternative mentioned at the first of this 
section remains to be discussed, though I shall only deal 
with it briefly here, since I plan to discuss it more fully 
in the fourth chapter in connection with "To the Holy 
Spirit." As I have said, if one is intellectually ill at 
ease with theism, but is forced by the logic of one’s 
argument to entertain it, one will tend to refashion it
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in the most intellectually respectable terms at one's 
disposal. The one alternative which extracts the divine 
essence out of God and views it as separate concept we 
have just dealt with and illustrated. The other, which 
Winters also embraced, leaves that divine essence within 
God but eliminates everything else from Him, so that He 
becomes exclusively whatever that essence is defined as 
being, which, in Winters' case, is "pure mind." Philo­
sophically the most important of these eliminations is 
"existence." Like the concept of mind, which "exists" 
more as a theoretical possibility than an actual existant, 
the God of Pure Mind is existentially neutral, so much 
so that the two really can be dealt with as if they are 
one. To view God as Concept or Concept as God is after 
all much the same thing.
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEISM
1. The Nature of Evil
Yvor Winters 1 recognition and treatment of the 
problem of evil sharply separates him from the majority 
of his contemporaries, along with their Romantic prede­
cessors. That he faced this problem and seriously dealt 
with it in both his poetry and criticism is, by itself, 
the most telling piece of evidence for his claim to 
classical reaction against what he considered as the 
persisting influence of Romanticism in modern poetry. 
Paraphrasing Pascal, Allen Tate once noted that Winters 
knew "the abyss" in spite of the fact that everyone else 
"is eagerly trying to fall into it."'*' Winters himself 
saw the problem as central in his poetry. In the 1934 
Foreword to Before Disaster, he writes with almost theo­
logical rigor, "The matter of the following verses is 
in the main the stress to which the permanent, or ideal, 
elements of the human character are subjected by the 
powers of disintegration, by the temptations of Hell, 
which, though permanent in their general nature, usually 
take particular forms from the age."
125
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As Winters saw the situation, the "general nature" 
of Romanticism locates evil in the rational mind and in 
those disciplines and institutions which are products of 
that mind. It views the problem of evil as remedial. 
According to the Romantic myth, man in his primitive, 
pre-civilized state enjoyed a monistic existence in which 
"he identified God with the universe" and found his salva­
tion in a surrender to impulse, which he interpreted as
3
the voice of God. This state was disrupted by the 
"satanic" introduction of reason, which broke man's unity 
into duality and spawned those disciplines and institu­
tions that stifle man and inhibit the free play of his 
instinctual existence. Yet the situation can be corrected. 
Once reason is negated, and its products either purified 
or destroyed, man will automatically revert to his origi­
nal innate goodness. Evil is finally an illusion, a 
medieval encrustation that can be washed away in the 
blood of revolution.
Winters opposed this view with intensity. For him, 
the identification of God with the universe and the sub­
sequent surrender on the part of man to impulse can only 
result in moral suicide and the destruction of human 
values. Far from locating evil in the rational mind, he 
saw the proper use of that mind as the means by which 
man can protect himself from evil and save himself from 
disintegration. He viewed rationally motivated disciplines
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
and institutions, not as inhibiting the development of 
man's nature, but as fostering it. By introducing man 
to the "collective wisdom of the race," which contains 
the "norm of what humanity ought to be," as he calls it 
in his essay on Robert Frost, these traditions make 
human growth possible: "The poet is valuable, therefore, 
in proportion to his ability to apprehend certain kinds 
of objective truth; in proportion as he is great, he 
will not resemble ourselves but will resemble what we 
ought to be. It becomes our business, then, to resemble 
him, and this endeavor is not easy and for this reason 
few persons make it."^
The reason for the difficulty of this endeavor lies 
precisely in the presence of evil in man's nature. The 
extent to which Winters considered evil a part of the 
very texture of that nature is best indicated by his pub­
lic commitment to the Christian dogma of Original Sin, 
a doctrine which Romantics view with particular abhorrence. 
In his discussion of Robert Bridges' "Low Barometer," a 
poem which had a great influence on Winters' view of 
evil, he speaks of the various names given the "tenants 
unknown," which in the poem symbolize evil: the "lower 
nature" of St. Paul, the "unconscious mind" of modern 
psychology, the "pre-human memory" of modern anthropology. 
In his own poem "Heracles" he says, "Older than man, evil 
with age, is life." As Winters saw the situation, it is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
128
man's fate to be involved, and to an alarming degree, 
in this ancient life, which is contaminated at its core 
with evil. It is this view which prompted Grosvenor 
Powell to designate Winters' metaphysics as Manichaean.^
We may go further and ask ourselves where he specifi­
cally locates the source of evil. In answering the ques­
tion, we shall discover an intimate relationship existing 
between his theism and his view of evil.
As we have already seen in our discussion of the 
early poems, Winters at one time located evil in a demonic 
possession of the physical universe by an actual malignant 
spirit. In certain contexts he speaks of this spirit as 
manipulating matter from the outside, as it were; in 
others, as residing in matter itself as one of its con­
stituent principles. In either case evil and matter share 
an intimate relationship in Winters' mind. From the begin­
ning to the end of his career, the vision of the universe 
under its aspect of pure materiality inspired in him a 
sort of fascinated terror. Certain of the poems in The 
Bare Hills, which we have cited, as well as descriptive 
passages in "The Brink of Darkness," possess an hallucina­
tory intensity barely controlled by the medium of language. 
In his essay on Herman Melville in In Defense of Reason 
he signals out the chapter in Moby Dick on the whiteness 
of the whale for special attention, calling it "the most 
extensive elucidation and defense of the notion of the
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demonism of Moby Dick, as well as of 'the demonism of 
the world,"1 and "equally one of the most astonishing 
pieces of rhetoric and one of the most appalling speci-
Q
mens of metaphysical argument in all literature." In 
the third stanza of "At the San Francisco Airport," one 
of the very last poems he wrote and one that summarizes 
his entire life, he reverts explicitly to this earlier 
view of evil as matter in that it causes the destruction 
of his being:
The rain of matter upon sense 
Destroys me momently. The score:
There comes what will come. The expense 
Is what one thought, and something more-- 
One's being and intelligence.
The demonism of The Bare Hills and "The Brink of Darkness" 
has here undergone considerable modification. It is ex­
pressed in terms more abstract and philosophical, not in 
the admittedly melodramatic ones of the earlier works.
Yet "At the San Francisco Airport" proves that vestiges 
of "demonism," even if discarded at other points in his 
career in favor of a more sophisticated philosophical 
solution, persist even into Winters' late poetry. Through­
out all his life he thought of evil as some external 
force to which man exposed himself by submitting to its 
possessiveness to the end that we become possessed by 
an evil power which is great enough to control us and 
diminish our own being. Evil also was closely related
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to, even at times actually identified with, matter, so 
that the redemptive activity of the human mind was seen 
as the "pull against gravity, against earth and those 
determined by it.""^ Finally, he always viewed the mind 
as being actively opposed by inimical foreign influences, 
and human life as essentially tragic in that "the rain 
of matter" eventually destroys man’s being and his in­
tellect. All three of these attitudes, which we find in 
both early and late Winters, point to the persisting in­
fluence of "demonism" on his thought.
During the transitional period in the late twenties 
and early thirties Winters shifted ground and located 
the source of evil in man's emotional life. In "Notes 
on Contemporary Criticism," an essay first published in 
The Gyroscope in 1929, he states categorically, "The 
basis of Evil is in e m o t i o n . T h e  good, on the other 
hand, resides in the rational mind's tight control over 
the emotions, even in the attempt of eliminating them 
altogether, that is, as far as this is possible. At 
first this might appear as unmitigated stoicism. Yet 
Winters recognized, then and later, an element of what 
he calls "irreducible emotion" in human nature, which
12must be accepted, understood, and properly evaluated.
Such Stoics as Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, Winters 
says, failed in this endeavor. "Because the Stoics de­
nied the emotions completely, in favor of the intellect,
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they failed to make any provision for them and so became
13easily their victims, as of an insidious consumption." 
Besides, Winters at all times recognized the limits of 
the mind. There are areas in man's own life, especially 
his emotional life, that are forever closed to the mind's 
apprehensive abilities. As Winters states concisely and 
simply in "The Moralists," a poem written roughly during 
the same time as "Notes on Contemporary Criticism": "No 
man can hold existence in the head.”
Qualified as this might well be, such an explanation 
of evil must soon have struck Winters as philosophically 
inadequate to account for certain complexities he wanted 
to express in poetry. The central drive of his mind was 
toward a synthesis of concept and image, thought and 
emotion, as is apparent in his critical principle of mo­
tive and feeling and in his formulation of post-Symbolist 
imagery in which one finds a fusion of the abstract and 
the sensory, a fusion that unavoidably calls for emotional 
engagement on the part of the poet. Furthermore, since 
emotions are quasi-physiological reactions to external 
stimuli, they lack by their very definition the independent 
subsistence necessary for such attribution. As Winters 
makes abundantly clear in his criticism of T. S. Eliot's 
objective correlative, to engage in such talk is to pre­
suppose, for the moment, that emotions have no causes.
The moral issue lies precisely in the cause of the emotions,
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which in and of themselves are morally indifferent. Con­
sequently, the simplistic formula of "Notes on Contemporary 
Criticism" was discarded in favor of one more philosophi­
cally adequate to his own poetic purposes. Henceforth, 
the poet attempts not to eliminate the emotions altogether, 
but to discipline, even to enrich, them. And poetry is 
valued and set apart from philosophical discourse pre­
cisely because it provides an emotional equivalent for 
thought.
It was Winters' philosophical theism which provided 
him with the exact formula for the source of evil. As we 
have seen earlier, the mind's ability to apprehend certain 
objective truths and then to live according to those truths 
is man's proper good. In order for such "good" thought 
to exist and possess reality, there must exist by philo­
sophical necessity, as Winters saw it, perfect thought, 
which is another name for God. Consequently, evil, will 
be seen as a deviation from such a perfect standard and 
will be located in the absence or imperfection of thought. 
The formula occurs in a 1942 poem written in commemora­
tion of William Dinsmore Briggs:
Because our Being grows in mind,
And evil in imperfect thought . . . .
Evil then essentially is deprivation, not of "exist­
ence," in the Thomistic sense, but of "thought," in the 
more classical sense. We find a world of false fire and
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from such a deprivation. The whole poem, as Winters 
himself notes, deals with "the de-intellectualized sensi­
bility" specializing in "verbal hallucination. In
other poems the vision becomes not hallucination but a 
nightmare, as the mind encounters that which has no mean­
ing and is consequently inexpressible in "name" or "word.1 
This vision is most acutely rendered in two poems that 
have the Second World War as their background; the poet's 
private vision is duplicated on a worldwide scale involv­
ing massive destruction, and so achieves greater density 
and power. From "Summer Noon: 1941":
With visionary care 
The mind imagines Hell,
Draws fine the sound of flame 
Till one can scarcely tell 
The nature, or the name,
Or what the thing is for.
And from "Moonlight Alert: Los Altos, California, 1943," 
a poem much more successful in its imagistic intensity 
than the preceding one:
The sirens, rising, woke me; and the night 
Lay cold and windless; and the moon was bright, 
Moonlight from sky to earth, untaught, unclaimed 
An icy nightmare of the brute unnamed.
Moonlight, so described, is an appropriate image for 
Winters' notion of evil as "thoughtlessness." In its 
brutality and intellectual deprivation, it indifferently 
presides over a world of suffering and pain:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
In the dread sweetness I could see the fall, 
Like petals sifting from a quiet wall,
Of yellow soldiers through indifferent air, 
Falling to die in solitude.
It is apparent from Winters1 designation of the 
moonlight as "an icy nightmare of the brute unnamed" that 
language plays a crucially important role for him in the 
problem of evil. In fact, Winters adheres to what we 
might call a doctrine of the Word, which is comparable 
to the theological doctrine of the Logos: the Word, in­
dicating as it does meaning and definition, embodies 
order and intellectual perception; whatever is beyond it, 
or below it, is meaningless and consequently, for him, 
evil. The poem that best illustrates this is "A Spring 
Serpent." It is less dramatic than "Moonlight Alert," 
but in its calm definiteness it is, I think, artistically 
more successful. The poem is an indirect, even oblique, 
criticism of Symbolist poetry and its pursuit of an in­
human purity. The poet Winters specifically had in mind 
when he wrote it was Mallarme, who deliberately attempted 
to rid poetic language of rational meaning and to achieve 
in the process a de-intellectualized, purely connotative 
state, which Winters saw as almost the essence of evil, 
even though he was strongly attracted to it. The entire 
poem follows:
The little snake now grieves 
With whispering pause, and slow,
Uncertain where to go
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Among the glassy leaves,
Pale angel that deceives.
With tongue too finely drawn, 
Too pure, too tentative,
He needs but move to live,
Yet where he was is gone;
He loves the quiet lawn.
Kin to the petal, cool,
Translucent, veined, firm,
The fundamental worm,
The undefined fool,
Dips to the icy pool.
The best commentary on the poem is winters' own, 
found in "By Way of Clarification," written in response 
to Alan Stephens, who, in an earlier essay, had cited 
the poem as an instance of what he called Winters' 
"cultishness .
The grief and uncertainty (for their own sake) 
are romantic traits, and so is the hedonistic 
sensuousness throughout the poem; the snake is 
a deceiver, and this is always true of the in­
definable and shifting perception; his tongue 
is too pure, and pure poetry, the extreme form 
of romantic poetry, is poetry as free as possible 
from concept, from definition; lines eight and 
nine describe the snake but also summarize the 
romantic doctrine to the effect that true being 
can be found only in the moment of change.
. . . the last stanza continues with these 
ideas, but its first two lines emphasize the 
remoteness of the snake from all human concerns 
or intelligence, and the remoteness is proper 
to both vehicle and tenor.16
About the last line of the poem, Howard Kaye writes in 
"The Post-Symbolist Poetry of Yvor Winters":
The last line of the poem sounds like pure de­
scription, but in context has considerable
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abstract significance. It suggests something 
more specific than a sense of strangeness or 
death. The icy pool is associated with the 
remoteness from human concerns which is a prop­
erty of the Symbolist image, with the unimagi­
nable world where Mallarme/,s swans float, and 
with the fatal effect on the human intelligence 
of following an aesthetic like Mallarme' s.
In its absence of thought, in its freedom from con­
cept and definition, the serpent is Winters' coolest, most 
effective image of almost pure evil, if such a thing can 
be imagined. Yet such purity is rarely encountered in 
the human world; there, more often than not, man has to 
deal with degrees of evil. This fact raises the following 
question: If evil is defined as the absence of thought, 
what then is to be man's proper attitude toward the natural 
world, which is necessarily "thoughtless," as well as to 
his own body, which, taken by itself, is just as "thought­
less" as nature itself?
2. "The Brutal Earth"
Winters was attracted to nature as few other poets 
are in the twentieth century. He experienced pantheistic 
trances in boyhood, in which he felt, as he describes 
the experience in "On Rereading a Passage from John Muir," 
like "one forever by the dripping tree, / Paradisaic in 
his pristine peace." Not just the "religion" of nature, 
but the science of it held his attention. He thought
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seriously at one time of studying biology at Stanford, 
and in later life, as Donald Davie points out in a per­
sonal memoir of the poet, he could describe the migratory
18habits of certain birds in bewiideringly minute detail.
In his poetry itself he has one of the clearest eyes
for natural detail of any poet in the twentieth century,
with only Thomas Hardy as a close rival. In his criticism,
the formulation of the principles operating in post-
Symbolist poetry places the image drawn from the natural
world on an equal footing with abstract thought. As he
says in a criticism of J. V. Cunningham, "We live in a
physical universe, and we have senses as well as rational
faculties, and the physical universe affects the lives
19and understanding of most of us profoundly. Yet for 
all this attraction to nature, and the attention he gives 
even to its minute detail, there is, nevertheless, in 
both his poetry and criticism, a certain Manichaean 
tendency to view the natural world as the domain of dis­
order and evil. "The ocean is the home of demons and
symbols of evil too numerous to mention," he says in his
20essay on Melville. He develops the same thought in a 
passage of great rhetorical power in the same essay:
The sea is the realm of the half-known, at once 
of perception and of peril; it is infested by 
subtle and malignant creatures, bent on destruc­
tion; it is governed by tremendous, destructive, 
and unpredictable forces, the storms, calms, 
currents, tides, depths, and distances, amid
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which one can preserve oneself by virtue only 
of the greatest skill and then but precariously 
and from moment to moment.21
A companion piece to the Melville essay is "The Slow 
Pacific Swell," a poem in heroic couplets which is one 
of Winters' greatest achievements. In it the sea threatens 
everything distinctively human. The conclusion is par­
ticularly powerful. The sea there assumes an intention 
of almost conscious and deliberate bestiality:
By night a chaos of commingling power,
The whole Pacific hovers hour by hour.
The slow Pacific swell stirs on the sand, 
Sleeping to sink away, withdrawing land, 
Heaving and wrinkled in the moon, and blind; 
Or gathers seaward, ebbing out of mind.
In other poems the scene shifts from the sea to the 
land, yet the idea persists of nature as meaningless and 
thoughtlessly destructive. Consider the following passages 
from some key poems:
The calloused grass lies hard 
Against the cracking plain:
Life is a grayish stain;
The salt-marsh hems my yard.
from "By the Road to the Air-Base"
This life is not our life; nor for our wit 
The sweetness of these shades; these are alone. 
There is no wisdom here; seek not for it!
This is the shadow of the vast madrone. 
from "The Manzanita"
Small though its corner be, the weed 
Will yet intrude its creeping beard;
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The harsh blade and the hairy seed 
Recall the brutal earth we feared.
And if no water touch the dust 
In some far corner, and one dare 
To breathe upon it, one may trust 
The spectre on the summer air:
The risen dust alive with fire, 
The fire mads visible, a blur 
Interrate, the pervasive ire 
Of foxtail and of hoarhound burr, 
from "Much in Little"
And where is that which made you just? 
Which gathered light about the bone 
And moved the tongue, in earth's despite? 
from "The Cremation"
I could hear the farting toad 
Shifting to observe the kill,
Spotted sparrow, spawn of dung, 
Mumbling on a horse's turd,
Bullfinch, wren, or mockingbird 
Screaming with a pointed tongue 
Objurgation without word.
from "A Dream Vision," Part Two of 
"Two Old-Fashioned Songs"
In some of Winters' poems, such as "Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight," natural detail symbolizes in an ob­
viously allegorical way certain irrational forces in man 
himself. In others, such as "On a View of Pasadena from 
the Hills" and "The California Oaks," the beauties of a 
natural landscape are recognized as such, and their de­
struction by modern technological society is protested 
against. Yet in the poems from which the above passages 
have been taken, and they are the majority, nature is 
relentlessly opposed to thought, and in this opposition
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it is viewed as containing in and of itself the principle 
of disorder and evil.
Part of the explanation of such an attitude lies in 
Winters' historical position. He came after the Romantics, 
whose claims for nature as a moral function Winters finally 
saw as unrealistic and unintelligible. To submit to nature, 
as the Romantics recommended, was for him to submit to un­
differentiated flux and to destroy one's humanity. Since 
he himself actively followed this Romantic procedure dur­
ing the first part of his career, wrote poems about it, 
and lived according to its principles, he knew the tempta­
tion at a level deeper than the merely theoretical. He 
also knew its consequences. As he is on public record as 
having said, he came close to a state of clinical madness. 
Consequently, his reaction against the moralism of nature 
was bound to be intense, even at times extreme. Howard 
Kaye states the matter quite succinctly:
J. V. Cunningham, who called him a "congenital 
romantic" despite Winters' notorious repudia­
tion of romanticism, recognized that Winters' 
concern with self-control arises out of a 
specifically romantic context. The temptations 
which the poet of "The Slow Pacific Swell" must 
resist are the temptations which Wordsworth and 
Crane invi t ed.22
"Where is the meaning that I found?" he asks himself 
in "A Summer Commentary," a poem concerned with his child­
hood experiences in the natural world. It is a rhetorical 
question, the answer to which is negative. "The impersonal
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23universe lying in sunlight1' is really an "old penumbra 
of the ground," as he calls it in the poem, divorced from 
intelligibility and foreign to human values.
The more significant part of the explanation lies in 
his theism and his definition of evil. The God Whom one 
posits as first principle is bound necessarily to furnish 
one with the absolute standard by which everything in the 
intellectual and physical worlds is judged. What partici­
pates in that God or is analogous to Him in whatever de­
gree becomes thereby good; what falls off from such 
participation is evil, the degree to which it falls off 
determining the degree of its evil. Winters' God was 
Pure Thought, Pure Mind, Who is activated by no providen­
tial concern for preserving and ordering either the human 
or natural world. His isolation in this respect is as 
absolute as Aristotle's Unmoved Mover's. Since nature 
by its very definition cannot participate in thought, it 
inevitably will be sloughed off, according to Winters' 
vision of things, into a penumbra of unreality. Man may 
do what he can with it, and the image of the garden becomes 
crucially important in Winters' poetry. But the "wilder­
ness" of pure nature, inherently meaningless and indif­
ferent to the human realm, finally will have the last word:
The drift of leaves grows deep, the grass 
Is longer everywhere I pass.
And listen! where the wind is heard,
The surface of the garden's blurred--
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It is the passing wilderness.
The garden will be something less 
When others win it back from change. 
We shall not know it then; a strange 
Presence will be musing there.
Ruin has touched familiar air. . . .
The great difference, from which everything else 
follows, between Winters and Aquinas in this matter is 
that Aquinas' definition of God, not as Thought, but as 
Existence, enables nature in its own limited way to 
participate by analogy in the Deity. If nature cannot 
think, it at least exists, and in so far as it does exist, 
it achieves meaning and order in its admittedly restricted 
resemblance to a God Who is defined, in what Gilson calls 
in The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy "the metaphysics 
of Exodus," as I-AM-WHO-AM. Furthermore Gilson declares 
in the same passage:
For St. Augustine, as for St. Thomas, coeli 
enarrant gloriam Dei, and if the heavens de­
clare His glory it is because they bear His 
likeness; only, with St. Thomas, the divine 
likeness sinks for the first time into the 
heart of nature, goes down beyond order, number 
and beauty, reaches and saturates the very 
physical structure, and touches the very ef­
ficacy of causality.24
Even matter itself cannot be construed as a cause of dis­
order, much less evil:
. . . matter is not even the cause of the 
possibility of evil, nor the reason for its 
existence; in itself it implies no tendency 
to disorder. As God created it the material
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world was excellent: valde bonum, and so it 
would have remained had not a sin that came 
to birth in the realm of the spirit, and not 
in that of matter, brought disorder into
matter.25
I go into the differences between Winters and Aquinas 
on this score in some detail to correct a view currently- 
gaining acceptance among certain of Winters * critics that 
Aquinas was the decisive influence in his notion of the 
ultimate nature of Being. No doubt there are similarities 
between the two. Winters was bound to be attracted to 
Thomistic intellectualism and its rather uncompromising 
separation of faith and reason. But Aquinas would never 
have understood nature in any form as a "chaos of comming­
ling power" or a "brutal earth," precisely because nature, 
participating in the existence of Pure Existence, was for 
him saturated with order and intelligibility.
Winters* position, on the other hand, is more like 
the general drift of pre-Christian classical thought, for 
which matter and the sensible world are tainted in varying 
degrees with unintelligibility and disorder. Plato often 
speaks of the body as the prison or tomb of the soul.
He never thought knowledge of the sensible world was 
possible because of the contingency and flux to which 
that world was subjected. Even Aristotle posits a "mis­
chievous element" in nature, so that the potentiality of 
matter in his system is the cause of corruptions, altera- 
tions, monsters, etc. What is real for him is not so
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much, sensible reality as the intelligible form which 
the mind abstracts out of the material object, and, as 
many critics have pointed out, his position is not that 
dissimiliar to Plato's.
There are also vestiges of Protestantism in Winters'
thought, which Howard Baker alluded to in a very early
27review of Winters in the New Republic. Luther and 
Calvin, in a certain sense, revert to the classical view 
of matter by totally rejecting the Catholic position as 
expressed in Aquinas. For both of them the effects of 
original sin invade the very heart of nature and contami­
nate it at its source, so that nature becomes "irreme-
°8diably corrupted by sin."*1 As a result, an impassable 
gulf exists between God and nature, just as in Winters' 
vision of things, and the true Lutheran's retreat inside 
his own soul to seek God is also similar in its general 
outline to Winters' reversion to Mind to find there the 
order and intelligibility that were horrifyingly absent 
for him in the "burning ground" of nature.
I do not wish to give the impression that Winters 
was a doctrinaire Puritan who cut himself off from the 
contaminating influence of the natural world. I delib­
erately used the words "tendency" and "vestige" in de­
scribing this strain in his thought. And Kenneth Fields 
is quite right in criticizing the view put forward by 
Paul Ramsey and James Dickey, among others, that Winters
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divorced himself from imagistic richness and embraced an 
arid classicism. The poems themselves, with their own 
particularity and feel, not only for the temptations, but 
for the beauties of the natural world, are evidence 
enough that such a view is wrong. For Winters the rela­
tionship of man with nature is complex. It is true he 
saw dangers in the natural world, but it is equally true 
he saw intellectual and spiritual benefits from the poet's 
temporarily immersing himself in sensory experience. 
Following Melville in identifying the sea with the in­
human and the half-known, and the land with the known 
and human, Winters states:
The relationship of man to the known and to the
half known, however, is not a simple and static
one; he cannot merely stay on land, or he will 
perish of imperception, but must venture on the 
sea, without losing his relationship to the 
land; we have, in brief, the relationship of 
principle to preception, or, in other words, 
the problem of judgement.29
"The Slow Pacific Swell" is concerned precisely with 
such a relationship. Fields points out how the two alle­
gorical realms of land and sea interpenetrate each other, 
correcting each's peculiar deficiencies, and how the poet, 
after his immersion in the sea in the middle stanza, situ­
ates himself in the last one near the "limber margin" of
the sea, so that his "principle" may receive the benefits
30of "perception." And there is the hauntingly beautiful 
late poem, "A Stammer Commentary," with nature smearing
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brandy on the trampling boot of the poet and "sending it 
sweeter on its way."
Yet none of this contradicts what we have said earlier 
about Winters' Manichaean view of nature. Even in "A 
Summer Commentary" the poet's boot is a trampling one and 
he leaves the natural world because no meaning is to be 
found within the circle of its "old penumbra"; if the two 
realms interpenetrate each other in "The Slow Pacific 
Swell," they nevertheless are kept distinct, and the sea 
is still chaos. However one may describe Winters' view 
so that justice is done to its complexities, the following 
are the facts one has to reckon with. He was attracted 
to the natural world and knew it in detail; he at one 
time accepted the Romantic interpretation of it, but later 
reacted violently against it, seeing at times evil where 
the Romantics nearly at all times saw "morality"; if he 
knew the poet must venture into the realm of perception, 
he also knew he does so at considerable risk and peril; 
nature in and of itself is meaningless and foreign to hu­
man values, and man encounters in it evil and disorder.
3. The Debate of Flesh and Spirit
One's attitude toward the human body is just as in­
structive in determining the final consequences of one's 
philosophical position as one's attitude toward nature
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or the mind itself. We have just cited the Platonic no­
tion of the body as the tomb or prison of the soul, whose 
salvation depends upon its liberation from such a corrupt­
ing confinement. "Think nothing of the body," Marcus
Aurelius tells us. in the Meditations, "of its viscid blood,
31its bones, its web of nerves and veins and arteries."
Remember, he states later on, to withdraw "into the little
32field of self" where things "can never touch the soul."
Plotinus more insistently recommends separation from the
contaminating body, "slave to the corporal nature," as
he calls it, "which has barely preserved a trace of the 
33soul." The union of the soul with the body is not es­
sential or necessary in the definition of the person. In 
Plato's words, man is a "soul using a body," but he is no 
more his body than a worker is the tools he uses or than 
any of us is his own garments. ^  Later Avicenna, the dis­
ciple of Aristotle, will never admit that the human intel­
lect is the substantial form of its body. "To say that
would be to suppose a dreadful confusion of essences," as
35Gilson paraphrases him in Being and Some Philosophers.
In Christianity, with the Incarnation as its central 
dogma, we see a reversal of this classical attitude toward 
the body, which now enters into the human composition as 
a necessary and essential element. In the Gospels Christ 
ministers to both body and soul, and promises salvation, 
not to. the soul, but to the whole man. All of St. Paul's
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dogmatic teachings revolve around the fact of the resur­
rection of the body, so that henceforth the Christian 
hope, in the words of St. Anselm's Cur Deus homo, is
"that the whole man shall enjoy a happy immortality both
36in body and in soul." No one goes as far as Aquinas
does in this matter. For him the soul is united with
the body in order that the soul might perfect its nature.
Separated from the body, the soul is in a deprived state.
"It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that
it was united to a body," he emphatically states in the 
37Summa. Thomistic intellectualism is partly the reason
for his elevating the body to such a high philosophical
position. In Aquinas' epistemology the origin of man's
knowledge lies in the body's senses, which furnish the
mind with the essential material for its intellectual
operations. Without a body the mind cannot know: "Our
natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural
knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible 
38things." In the Contra gentiles he speaks of "the hu­
man intellect, to which it is connatural to derive its
39knowledge from sensible things."
Protestantism reverses this attitude by returning, 
as we have seen earlier in our discussion of nature and 
sensory reality, back to what E. R. Dodds calls in his 
important study, The Greeks and the Irrational, "classical 
puritanism."^ It is no accident that Renaissance
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Protestant theology accepts Plato and so bitterly rejects 
the Aristotle of Catholic Medieval philosophy.
Winters' attitude toward the body and its. union 
with the mind is just as complex as his attitude to the 
natural world. Like Aquinas, he posits the senses as 
the beginning point in the process by which the intellect 
achieves abstract knowledge. In his argument with John 
Crowe Ransom over nominalism, he designates his own philo­
sophical position as the moderate realism of Aristotle 
and Aquinas.^ There is no doubt in his mind as to the 
reality of things nor that their apprehension by the 
senses is anything but a good. A healthy relationship 
between "things" and "ideas" is the condition of knowledge 
itself. And such a relationship presupposes the inter­
mediacy of the body. This position not only affords 
Winters an escape from nominalism, but also from solip­
sism, the dilemma that haunted him in his early poetry.
As Douglas Peterson states the situation,
It is only through a conceptual system, Winters 
would maintain, grounded in scrupulous empiri­
cal investigation that the world of particulars 
can be rendered intelligible. For him idea and 
thing are in ter dependant. For the observer, 
ideas render things intelligible and things 
confirm the reality of the ideas of which they 
are instances. Such a system not only affords 
the observer with a way of understanding the 
world he experiences as extended to himself; 
it also enables him to perceive himself as a 
part of that world rather than as isolated with­
in it in the prison of his own consciousness.42
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In one of the most affirmative poems Winters ever 
wrote, ’’The Marriage," he records actual delight in the 
body and its sensuous apprehension of the physical world 
outside it, a delight intensified in that its context is 
sexual.
Incarnate for our marriage you appeared,
Flesh living in the spirit and endeared 
By minor graces and slow sensual change.
Through every nerve we made our spirits range.
We fed our minds on every mortal thing:
The lacy fronds of carrots in the spring,
Their flesh sweet on the tongue, the salty wine 
From bitter grapes, which gathered through the vine 
The mineral drouth of autumn concentrate,
Wild spring in dream escaping, the debate 
Of flesh and spirit on those vernal nights,
Its resolution in naive delights,
The young kids bleating softly in the rain—
All this to pass, not to return again.
The sexual union itself is described in the following 
lines:
And when I found your flesh did not resist,
It was the living spirit that I kissed,
It was the spirit's change in which I lay . . . .
One might describe the spirit behind this poem as 
that of a gentle, sensual Platonism. Though the delight 
in the particulars of the physical world is actual and 
unmistakable, yet those particulars pass away or change, 
and final supremacy is given the mind and spirit, which 
are at all times kept distinct from the body. The spirit 
uses the body by "ranging" along the nerves in the ap­
prehension and accumulation of rich sensory experience,
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and the mind is "fed" in the process as the ultimate 
reality. Even in the sexual union itself, the lovers 
experience the same extra-physical ecstasy the lovers 
do in John Donne's famous poem. They so die out of their 
bodies, to use the Renaissance pun, that they can dispense 
with their bodies and say "it was the living spirit that 
I kissed."
In other poems the union of the mind and body does 
not result in the same sort of felicity as it does in 
"The Marriage." A philosophical hesitancy, bred ulti­
mately of his theism, sets in and causes the poet to view 
the body suspiciously as a likely impediment to the life 
of the mind, even while Winters recognizes that the mind 
depends upon the body for the material of thought. In 
"To My Infant Daughter" the poet anticipates with appre­
hension the dangers and obscurities involved in the flesh 
and the disasters which "earth" seems deliberately to be 
preparing for his child:
Ah, could you now with thinking tongue
Discover what involved lies
In flesh and thought obscurely young,
What earth and age can worst devise!
In "Chiron" the "stallion body" of the centaur frus­
trates and finally defeats the "scholar," so that Chiron 
is driven at the end of the poem "to express the wise
man's preference," as Grosvenor Powell says, " . . .  for
/ 1
death rather than life." The body brings on the death
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of the mind, though between the mind's "magnitude in­
violate” and "the stallion body" there is an absolute 
cleavage. The poem acquires further tragic dimensions 
in that its total context is Chiron's admission of 
another defeat: his failure to educate Achilles suffi­
ciently so that the hero could have saved himself from 
the destructive passions of the body. I quote the whole 
poem:
I, who taught Achilles, saw 
Leap beyond me by its law,
By intrinsic law destroyed,
Genius in itself alloyed.
Dying scholar, dim with fact,
By the stallion body racked,
Studying my long defeat,
I have mastered Jove's deceit.
Now my head is bald and dried,
Past division simplified:
On the edge of naught I wait,
Magnitude inviolate.
One of Winters' most complete statements on the sub­
ject occurs in "A Prayer for my Son." He recognizes in 
the poem the sensory origin of knowledge, but he empha­
sizes the danger of spiritual and intellectual blindness 
inherent in the mind's union with the body. The epigraph 
for the poem is a line from "The Earth-Bound," a poem 
by his wife, Janet Lewis, in which, if I am not mistaken, 
she gently criticizes her husband's severe position by 
stating the body's case in more positive terms. The line
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is: ’’Tangled with earth all ways, we move."^ The 
significant portion of Winters' own poem follows:
To steep the mind in sense,
Yet never lose the aim,
Will make the world grow dense,
Yet by this way we came.
Earth and mind are not one.
But they are so entwined,
That this, my little son,
May yet one day go blind.
Finally, in "To the Holy Spirit," a poem which will 
be treated in greater detail in the next chapter, the 
poet addresses the Deity and contrasts the "simplicity" 
of God’s Pure Mind with the impure "complexity" of his 
own mind, mixed as it is with a body that eventually and 
inevitably causes its death. This entanglement is 
lamented in unmistakably tragic terms as nothing short 
of a complete intellectual disaster, and the desire for 
disentanglement is as strong as anything in Plotinus.
In fact, the vision might be called gnostic with little 
or no exaggeration: God is indirectly criticized for 
the "blemish" of creation, to use Paul Valery's phrase, 
especially the creation of the "irregular body," which 
belongs to the "fallen sons," and the two realms of 
sense and thought, time and eternity, are radically sepa­
rated from each other. There is none of the flexible 
interdependence and interpenetration which we have noted 
in other poems. The scene of the poem is a deserted 
graveyard in the Salinas Valley in California:
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Thou whom I try to reach.
Thou whom the quick eye shuns, 
Thou dost elude my speech.
Yet when I go from sense
And trace thee down in thought,
I meet thee, then, intense,
And know thee as I ought.
But thou art mind alone,
And I, alas, am bound
Pure mind to flesh and bone,
And flesh and bone to ground.
With the evidence here collected, one can say, I 
think, that there is a marked tendency on the part of 
Winters toward "classical puritanism," to use Dodds' 
term again, and that he deviates rather sharply from 
the Thomistic position on the matter. He maintains a 
philosophically tight dichotomy between the mind and 
the body, and the union of the two in the human compos­
ite, according to his vision of things, is a possible 
source of intellectual confusion and disorder. The 
body, also, for him is involved with death, which, as 
we have already seen, inspired in him a sort of meta­
physical horror just barely controlled by the rational 
mind. It is true he feels none of the disgust and con­
tempt with which the extreme Puritan dismisses the body 
as corruption itself; there is, though, a sense of ap­
prehension, a sort of philosophical hesitancy, which 
quickly at times erupts into actual suspicion. Man 
achieves knowledge because of his body and its senses, 
and yet, because of the potential disorder, even evil,
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inherent in the flesh, he can just as well go spiritually 
and intellectually blind because of that same body.
The connection between this attitude and Winters' 
theism is not fortuitous.. It necessarily develops from 
it. If God, as well as man's ultimate good, is defined 
in terms of thought, and evil in terms of an absence of 
thought, what else can one do but attempt to keep the 
mind as distinct as possible from the necessarily thought­
less body, if, that is, one wishes to achieve the good?
Yet Winters' terms are more tragic than this statement 
indicates. As we shall see in our later discussion of 
"To the Holy Spirit," the achievement of the final good, 
even though man has an intense desire for it, is completely 
frustrated. Mind and body cannot be kept distinct from 
each other, and the body finally causes the destruction 
of the mind.
4. The Giant Movements
We see further consequences of Winters' theism and 
his definition of evil in his poems dealing with the 
larger context of society and the State. Taken as a 
whole, these are the most classical poems Winters wrote, 
standing out sharply, as they do, from the imagistic and 
post-Symbolist. Their subject matter is impersonal, the 
style plain and abstract, the point of view from which
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they are written uncompromisingly moral. But certain 
Romantic strains can be detected in their classical 
texture. The pattern occurring in all of them is that 
of an isolated figure protesting, not just against 
particular forms of political corruption, but against 
the very nature of the State itself in the modern world. 
Like the "scientism" of "The Invaders," the State is 
seen as a destructive abstraction, sometimes merely de­
void of human values, other times actively immoral;
He served that mathematic thing, the State.
from "On the Death of Senator Thomas J. Walsh"
And he who having power would serve the State, 
Must now deceive corruption unto good . . . .  
from "The Prince"
Fool and scoundrel guide the State, 
from "Before Disaster"
The destructiveness of the abstraction is intensified 
in those poems which have the Second World War as their 
immediate background. The individual is caught up and 
blindly killed in the "giant movements" of the State:
Impersonal the aim 
Where giant movements tend; 
Each man appears the same; 
Friend vanishes from friend.
In the long path of lead 
That changes place like light 
No shape of hand or head 
Means anything tonight, 
from "Night of Battle"
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The private life is small;
And individual men 
Are counted not at all.
Now life is general. . . . 
from "To a Military Rifle”
The private life of the individual poet or scholar, 
working in isolation, would "reembody mind," as Winters 
says in "Ode on the Despoilers of Learning," and hold to
. . . what men had wrung 
From struggle to atone 
For man’s stupidity 
In labor and alone.
But such redemptive activity is either ignored or 
rejected by the "giant movements" of the State. In one 
of the most bitterly disillusioned poems Winters wrote, 
"Defense of Empire," he speaks of this rejection and 
isolation in personal terms:
The perils of immortal mind,
The core of empire in a word,
The worth of state grown hard to find 
Because true meaning is unheard;
The deviation from the strength 
Which forms our motion, and the phrase 
Which cheapens thought and yet at length 
Would simulate more honest ways;
This fine deceit, this perfect rift, 
Dissociating thought from sense,
I traced in quiet; and the shrift 
Of wrath was all my recompense.
The thought and feeling of this poem is echoed in a 
moving passage from the Introduction to Forms of Discovery, 
written immediately before his death by cancer in 1968,
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when the United States was undergoing the tragic disloca­
tions of another war. The passage occurs just before 
Winters confesses he is pessimistic about the future of 
the human race.
The practical mind, the mind which conquers, 
rules, invents, manufactures, and sells, has 
dominated every civilization and ultimately 
destroyed every state. The great philosopher, 
the great poet, the great painter or musician 
has almost always lived precariously on the 
fringe of the state, sometimes as the servant 
or dependant of the "great," sometimes in 
poverty, sometimes in the priesthood, in our 
time as one of the most contemned members of 
the academic profession. But he has created 
and preserved civilization, often working in 
the rubble of a collapsing state.
There are other poems not on the general nature of 
the State, but on particular acts of political corruption 
and injustice which the State has committed. In the con­
cluding section of "Theseus: A Trilogy" the hero in his 
old age assumes the leadership of Athens and attempts to 
establish "immitigable good" there, but, instead, is 
betrayed by the State and exiled to Scyros where Lycomedes, 
acting as the agent of Athens, pushes him to his death 
in the sea. In "Socrates" the philosopher, having asked 
the crucial question, "What is the city?," is executed 
by the State for having tried to answer his own question 
in philosophical, moral terms. The best of these poems 
is "John Sutter," in which the innocent Sutter, on whose 
land gold was discovered in California in 1848, is destroyed
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by an "evil with no human sense" in the form of greed 
and rapacity. It is true the poem does not have the 
evert political context of "Theseus" or "Socrates," but 
instead the inchoate social disorder existing in California 
at that time; yet its final stanza alludes to the failure 
of the United States government to perform any judicial 
act of restitution for what Sutter suffered and lost at 
the hands of the mob. The State overlooked the evil and 
made no attempt to assuage the "final drouth of peniten­
tial tears."
The three poems on the David Lamson case deserve 
special treatment in this connection, and I should like
/  7
to go into that case in some detail. Lamson was the 
sales manager of the Stanford University Press and was 
a neighbor of Winters in Palo Alto, although the two men 
did not become friends until the case was well under way.
On Memorial Day, 1933, while Lamson was raking and burn­
ing leaves in his backyard, his wife suffered a freakish 
accident in the bathroom of their house, which resulted 
in her death. "There is every reason to believe,"
Winters states in a defense he wrote for Lamson in the 
October 10, 1934 issue of The New Republic, "that she 
slipped in the tub while bathing, struck her head on 
the corner of the washbasin, turned in falling, hung
48helpless over the edge of the tub, and bled to death."
When Lamson discovered her some forty or fifty minutes
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afterwards, there was no evidence on her body or in the 
room itself of any attack or violent struggle on her 
part. The braids of her hair, intricately pleated, were 
still in place, though the back of her head was bashed 
in. The walls of the extremely small bathroom had been 
evenly and smoothly coated with her blood, which would 
have been impossible had there occurred the necessarily 
irregular movements of a violent struggle. And there 
were no bruises or any kind of marks on the rest of her 
body apart from the fatal head lesion. Yet when the 
police, who were immediately summoned to the scene, ar­
rived, they became suspicious of the distraught Lamson, 
did only a ten-minute investigation of both the house 
and the yard outside, and, on the basis of a nine-inch 
length of pipe discovered in the rubbish Lamson had been 
burning, concluded the husband had bludgeoned his wife 
to death. He was arrested on the spot for first-degree 
murder.
On the basis of the police report, the State of 
California committed itself, apparently at all costs, to 
proving Lamson guilty and obtaining a death sentence, in 
the face of evidence proving the man's innocence, evidence 
which the State either tried to suppress or rule inadmis­
sible in court. In the words of a Time magazine report
of April 13, 1936, "It (i.e. the State) spent $60,000
49to try him, retry him, mistry him, retry him again."
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At one time Lamson was found guilty and was sentenced 
to hang (the trial was later judged a mistrial); during 
the year spent on death row at San Quentin he wrote his 
apologia, later published as We Who Are About to Die. 
Winters visited him there and later wrote of his friend
Who, though human thought decayed,
Yet the dissolution stayed,
Gracious in that evil shade.
The whole ordeal lasted for three years. When the third 
trial resulted in a hung jury, the judge finally set 
Lamson free.
Winters became involved in the case quite early.
In fact, a friend of his who knew him quite well at the 
time has said that he became obsessed with it."*^  He 
stopped all creative and critical work so that he could 
concentrate all his time and energy on Lamson1s defense. 
With Frances Theresa Russell of the Stanford English 
Department, he co-authored a hundred page summary of the 
case. He helped in raising a defense fund and in organiz­
ing expert witness, which he later saw used or not used 
at the whim of the presiding judge. All in all, the 
whole affair was a decisive event in his life and exerted 
an influence that went beyond the three poems he wrote 
on the subject, poems which are not among his best work.
It caused him to become further disillusioned with the 
academic community, his relations with that community
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being always at best uncertain and suspicious; as he 
says in "To David Lamson," the "special intellect" of 
the scholars who failed to come to Lamson*s defense 
blinded them to "virtue in extremity" and brutalized 
their feelings. It also further confirmed his suspicions 
of the modern "abstract" state, which here victimized 
an innocent individual in a case which was described at 
the time by August Vollmer, professor of Criminology at 
the University of California, as "the most amazing situa­
tion that has ever risen in American jurisprudence--a 
man sentenced to hang for a crime never committed and the 
evidence itself proving his innocence.Experiencing 
at first hand and in concrete terms "the brutal power" 
of the state, Winters himself came close, as he confesses 
in one of the three poems, to a complete nervous collapse.
In more general terms, the David Lamson case, along
with the suicide of his friend Hart Crane, which occurred
immediately before the Lamson affair, furnished Winters
with an instance of evil that assumed almost metaphysical
proportions in his mind, apart from its specific political
judical context. "Lamson . . . was the victim of accident
Winters writes in summary at the end of his New Republic
article already cited, "and of the irreducible ugliness
52and irrationality of the human mind."
Such a vision of "the irreducible ugliness and ir­
rationality of the human mind” is bound to be extremely
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disturbing to one who, like Winters, defines being and 
the good in exclusive intellectual terms. In fact, a 
moral system of "intellectualism" will thrust upon one 
more instances of evil than a system which locates evil, 
not in a corrupted intellect, but rather in a corrupted 
will and its intention. Peter Abelard is a good repre­
sentative of the latter system. He went to extreme 
limits in the matter, and restricted the area of evil 
to just the intention, so that an objective evil act can 
easily be interpreted in his morality as a good if the 
subjective intention of the agent is good. Now, it is 
a fairly safe statement to say that most human beings 
have good intentions, but it is dangerously naive to 
say they have such good intellects. Winters was acutely 
sensitive to this fact.. "Few men are born with suffi­
cient intelligence to profit by more than a small part
of the tradition available," he writes in the Introduc-
53tion to Forms of Discovery; elsewhere he says life 
will be painful if one expects more than two or three 
men to behave rationally in a given c e n t u r y . T h e  con­
clusion forced upon a moral intellectualist holding 
such a bleak view of the race is that most human beings 
are, or can easily become, morally ugly and vicious.
Of course, Winters would say that civilization provides 
the race with habits and inhibitions that somewhat con­
trol its evil possibilities, but he also thought this
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control was only uncertainly maintained and could easily 
be dislocated. In so many of his poems he speaks of the 
rational mind holding on to itself only moment to moment. 
Nowhere is this dislocation more likely to occur than 
when men collect themselves together into a mob and be­
come ruled by blind passion, such as we saw in "John 
Sutter." But what Winters faces in his political poems 
is a far more frightening dislocation: the dehumanization 
of the State itself into a morally vicious power. And 
the David Lamson case furnished him with an historical 
example in his own backyard, as it were, of how easily 
the State can become subverted into "brutal power, judi­
cial and sedate," which defiantly refuses to understand 
the logical deductions of expert witnesses defending an 
innocent man charged with murder.
When I say that Winters' intellectual concept of 
being provides him with more examples of moral evil to 
deal with than does voluntarism, I do not at all mean 
to imply that he projected evil where it did not exist, 
nor that his criticism of the State is grounded, not on 
fact, but on a neurotic 5.magination. As for the latter, 
the most cursory glance at twentieth century history 
will quickly disabuse one of that notion. Never before 
has more massive evil been committed in the name of the 
State than in this century; Moloch seems the enlightened 
one in comparison to the State-god of the purges and
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the concentration camps. I mean only to say that, 
given Winters' principles, one is bound to interpret 
certain situations as evil, which will receive slightly 
different interpretations, as the case might be, in a 
voluntaristic moral system, which is finally based on 
a more optimistic view of human nature. Doubtless, in 
most cases "intellectualism" and "voluntarism” will 
agree on the moral verdict of a given act; the intellect 
and the will are too intimately connected with each other 
for one to become cleanly dissociated from the other.
And if "intellectualism" provides its followers with 
more instances of evil, it is because its higher, more 
rigorous standards demand more from human nature than 
does the laxer "voluntarism" of someone like Peter Abelard. 
But even if one ultimately disagrees with Winters’ posi­
tion on the matter, one is forced, I think, to recognize 
and admire its severe grandeur.
It is also a lonely grandeur. The final consequence 
of such a position for Winters was isolation. He did 
not make a gnostic retreat away from philosophical objec­
tivity or personal political involvement--he remained 
committed to liberal political and social causes to the 
end of his life;*^ but in the philosophical and artistic 
realm he felt compelled, on account of his allegiance to 
the intellect, to maintain himself aloof from the irra­
tionalism of those "giant movements" he saw undermining
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and destroying, not only the philosophical and artistic 
life, but also the political and social life, of the 
modern world. The figure of the isolated poet confront­
ing, usually late at night, a world on the point of dis­
integrating into irrational madness, occurs over and 
over in his poetry. Heracles, who allegorically repre­
sents "the artist in hand-to-hand or semi-intuitive
5 6combat with experience," finally isolates himself from 
the imperfect shade of Deianira and by himself "raids 
eternal silence to eternal ends." The young pilots, 
whose cause Winters connects with his own, are alone as 
they "learn to control the earth and air" in "Defense 
of Empire." There is also the isolation of Theseus, 
Socrates, John Sutter, John Day, and Winters himself, 
both early and late, who in various poems are left help­
less at the end to confront and deal with, as best they 
can, the "irreducible ugliness and irrationality of the 
human mind." In one of his last poems, "To the Moon," 
Winters addresses in his old age the intellectually 
severe Muse he had followed all his life and says
Goddess of poetry,
Maiden of icy stone 
With no anatomy,
Between us two alone
Your light falls thin and sure. . . .
In two occasional poems he recommends solitude as the 
necessary condition of both moral and intellectual 
excellence:
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Take few men to your heart! 
Unstable, fierce, unkind 
The ways that men impart.
from "To My Infant Daughter"
The angry blood burns low. 
Some friend of lesser mind 
Discerns you not; but so 
Your solitude's defined, 
from "To a Young Writer:
The best poem on the subject of this necessary soli­
tude is "The Journey," perhaps because its treatment of 
solitude is oblique and not immediately obvious. The 
poet's journey through the raw Western towns is both auto­
biographical and allegorical. The vision of moral chaos 
and of an almost formless social order vitiated by the 
irrational is rendered in detail:
And I remembered with the early sun
That foul-mouthed barber back in Pendleton,
The sprawling streets, the icy station bench, 
The Round-up pennants, the latrinal stench. 
These towns are cold by day, the flesh of vice 
Raw and decisive, and the will precise;
At night the turbulence of drink and mud,
Blue glare of gas, the dances dripping blood, 
First thudding murder in the shadowy air, 
Exhausted whores, sunk to a changeless stare.
At the end of the journey, after he has dissociated him­
self from those determined by earth and gravity, the poet 
finds himself alone, "in naked sunlight on a naked world."
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CHAPTER IV 
THE UNFLESHED EYE
1. An Explication of "To the Holy Spirit"
"To the Holy Spirit" was first published in Poetry 
magazine in 1946, just a year before he made his theistic 
"confession" in the Introduction to In Defense of Reason. 
It is his most complete statement on the subject, and 
one that also summarizes a number of other themes that 
preoccupied him all during his poetic career. Metrically 
and stylistically, the poem is a complex achievement. 
Working in the iambic trimeter line, Winters varies the 
pattern with a number of initial trochaic substitutions 
that slow down the movement of the line, which in the 
short trimeter line is apt to become too rapid for the 
meditative tone the poem aspires to. He also varies the 
rhyme scheme of each of the four stanzas, with one time 
as many as four lines intervening between the rhyming 
words. Stylistically, "To the Holy Spirit" combines ele­
ments of both the plain style and the post-Symbolist 
method which Winters "discovered" and analyzed in the 
fifth chapter of Forms of Discovery. The plain style is
171
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evidenced by the absence of rhetorical embellishments,
by the frequency of abstract statement, particularly in
those passages addressing the Holy Spirit directly, and
by the tone of disillusionment and resignation which
pervades the entire poem. Donald E. Stanford has called
it "the impersonal style," with imagery reduced to a
minimum;^ yet the imagery that is there is post-Symbolist
in its combination of the sensory and the intellectual.
Such imagery is appropriate to a poem like "To the Holy
Spirit," since one of its themes is the intertwining in
the human being of mind and flesh. As Kenneth Fields
has noted, "The descriptive details . . . are as important
as the abstractions because the theme requires us to
recognize that ’pure mind' is embodied in the flesh; it
takes the soul to the brink of the incomprehensible to
realize that man's spiritual and mortal natures cannot be 
2
separated." The procedure of the poem is also post- 
Symbolist in that its transitions are effected, not by 
strict logic as in the plain style poems of the Renaissance, 
but by controlled association as in such modern poems as 
Valery's "Le Cimetiere Marin" and Stevens' "Sunday Morning."
Intellectually the poem is no less complex. It deals 
with the greatest and most inclusive of subjects, the hu­
man relation to divinity; yet Winters complicates this 
basic theme by introducing others that impinge directly 
or indirectly on it. The relationship between God and
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man leads the poet to consider "the relationship between 
mind and body, between flesh and spirit" in man himself, 
as Stanford characterizes the theme;*' the perfection of 
the divine mind, in turn, suggests as its opposite the 
imperfection of the mortal mind. The poem also deals 
with the irreducible elements of illusion and deceit 
found in human perception, which Winters contrasts to 
the perfect intellectual vision of God. The shifting 
and indeterminate universe of modem science, the illu­
sive and error-producing object of human perception, is 
subtly implied in the first stanza of the poem in much 
the same way as the pigeons embody that same universe 
in the concluding stanza of "Sunday Morning." Finally, 
"To the Holy Spirit" is a meditation on death such as 
one finds more frequently in seventeenth-century litera­
ture than in modern literature; in it the soul is taken 
"to the brink of the incomprehensible" where it recog­
nizes and accepts what for Winters was the tragic fact 
of human annihilation. The only consolation it offers 
the reader is the severe control and moral dignity with 
which the poet faces such a catastrophe.
Before we can begin a discussion of the poem in de­
tail, we must first settle the question of the identity 
of the Holy Spirit. (It is curious at first that Winters 
chooses the third person of the Trinity for his title; 
the most likely reason for his choice is the frequent
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synonymy of "spirit" and "mind" and the fact that both 
the Father and the Son would have been too personal for 
his philosophical position.) Some readers have inter­
preted the Holy Spirit in a rather loose allegorical 
fashion as a projection or idealization of Winters' own 
mind, thereby depriving the Spirit of objective existence. 
In part Howard Kaye commits himself to such a definition:
Although there are nostalgic connections, this 
Spirit should not be identified with the God 
of St. Thomas Aquinas. The uncertainties of 
the fourth stanza seem to rule out the Spirit 
as a God of redemption and resurrection— or at 
least to cast these qualities into the area of 
the undemonstrable. The Holy Spirit is pure 
mind , th e spirit of reason. He is a projection 
of human reason, a kind of idealization of 
Winters' own mind; but his existence is inde­
pendent of Winters.4
Kaye is correct in saying that the Spirit is neither 
the God of Aquinas nor the God of redemption and resur­
rection; notwithstanding the title, the poem is nowhere 
Christian. But one may wonder how He can be both a pro­
jection of the human mind and independent of it at the 
same time. It would be more correct, I think, to say 
that reason itself is an attempted projection of God that 
fails in the poem because of the mind's entanglement in 
flesh. The evidence found in the poem itself points to 
a reality for the Holy Spirit external to the human mind. 
At no place in it does Winters identify that mind with 
God, nor does he idealize his own mind into a godhead--
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the human mind is always spoken of as mortal and contin­
gent, God's as eternal and self-sufficient. In fact, a 
cleavage is found to exist between the two, even though 
the human mind makes periodic and intermittent contact 
with the divine mind. Besides, the Holy Spirit is re­
ferred to as the creator of both man and the universe.
Such ascription is implied in the first line of the third 
stanza, "These are thy fallen sons," and stated explicitly 
in another poem, "A Prayer for My Son,” written a few 
years before "To the Holy Spirit":
Eternal Spirit, you
Whose will maintains the world,
Who thought and made it true. . . .
For once in modem literature, we are dealing here with 
a poem written from the point of view of theistic 
absolutism.
I should now like to discuss each of the four stan­
zas of the poem separately, going into them in some de­
tail, and then I would like to draw whatever conclusions 
seem necessary. We should first note the italicized 
words with which Winters introduces the poem, from a 
deserted graveyard in the Salinas Valley. We shall dis­
cover that deserted works on more than one level of mean­
ing in the poem. First of all, the graveyard is deserted 
by human attention because it is located in the uninhab­
itable area of the Salinas Valley in California, but in
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what other symbolic way it may be deserted will become 
apparent as we discuss the poem. The first stanza follows:
Immeasurable haze:
The desert valley spreads 
Up golden river-beds 
As if in other days.
Trees rise and thin away,
And past the trees, the hills,
Pure line and shade of dust,
Bear witness to our wills:
We see them, for we must;
Calm in deceit, they stay.
Beside introducing the poem and describing in some 
detail its location, the first stanza develops through 
that description one of the central ideas of the poem, 
namely, the indeterminancy of the physical world, includ­
ing man's body, and the ambiguity and uncertainty found 
in the human perception and understanding of that world.
In fact, the poet seems to suggest that knowledge of the 
physical world, in the Platonic sense of the word, is 
not possible for the human mind. The medium through 
which that world is seen is "immeasurable haze," which 
necessarily distorts all objects of human perception.
And in the poet's own mind, the illusory persistence of 
the past, with its "golden river-beds," also interferes 
with any objective vision of things as they are. (The 
fragmentation of man's temporal order into time present 
and past can be contrasted to the eternal present of 
God's Pure Mind in the third stanza.) The poet's un­
certain vision is like the trees, which "rise and thin
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away"; if he is only uncertain about the immediate objects 
of perception, his uncertainty dissolves into total am­
biguity when he directs his attention to the vision of 
the "bare hills" which loom beyond the trees. In the 
early poems these hills are always associated with death; 
here they are related to those inhuman elements of the 
physical world that in the last analysis defy human ap­
prehension and understanding. Because of its innate de­
sire for order, the mind is driven in their presence to 
impose form and then to obtain some kind of meaning 
through artifice. As the poet sees the hills in the dis­
tance, enveloped in "immeasurable haze," they possess the 
"pure line" of a definable object. But such a line does 
not correspond to objective reality; it is an illusion 
which exists only in the mind of the observing poet. As 
Kaye says, "The hills . . . are hills only through the 
imposition of form by the poet's mind," a form which he 
goes on to say partakes more of the imagination than of 
reality."* The imperfections of our senses render such 
an imposition inevitable, given the human mind's insist­
ence on form and its aversion to meaninglessness. As 
Winters states the matter in the Introduction to Forms 
of Discovery, "We are told also that our senses deceive 
us, and in some ways this is obviously true, for the 
physicists and the mathematicians have discovered realms 
of what appears to be reality beyond the apprehension of
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our senses."^ The "bare hills" of "To the Holy Spirit" 
are located in this inaccessible realm. They are "deceit" 
in that the "pure line" which the poet's perception 
creates and his mind accepts does not correspond to their 
true shifting and indeterminate nature; yet the hills 
"stay," mysteriously enough, and form permanently a solid 
background against which man can test his unsteady will.
That the human mind has no alternative but "to ac­
cept the evidence of our senses, to act as if it were 
true"^ is indicated by a passage in Forms of Discovery 
immediately following the one already quoted:
The realm which we perceive with our unaided 
senses, the realm which our ancestors took to 
be real, may be an illusion; but in that il­
lusion we pass our daily lives, including our 
moral lives; the illusion is quite obviously 
governed by principles which it is dangerous, 
often fatal, to violate; that illusion is our 
reality.°
This passage further explains what Winters means 
when he says that the hills "bear witness to our wills," 
for to assert that an illusion is a reality requires 
more of the will than it does of the intellect, just as 
more of the will is involved in seeing the "pure line" 
of the hills. We see it, "for we must." Otherwise, our 
world would literally become senseless, and no moral or 
intellectual order in it would be possible.
The theme of perception and the indeterminacy of
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the perceived object is put aside in the second stanza 
for a fact about which there can be no ambiguity:
High noon returns the mind 
Upon its local fact:
Dry grass and sand; we find 
No vision to distract.
Low in the summer heat,
Naming old graves, are stones 
Pushed here and there, the seat 
Of nothing, and the bones 
Beneath are similar:
F.elics of lonely men,
Brutal and aimless, then 
As now, irregular.
The "local fact" to which the mind returns is the 
commonplace one of death and moral chaos in the human 
realm. The poet knows the fact at high noon, the shadow- 
less point of clearest sight, and no vision, such as the 
"immeasurable haze" produces, distracts him from its 
immediacy and clarity. As I have said, the fact is two­
fold; physical death suggests spiritual death. The con­
fusion of the dislocated gravestones, "pushed here and 
there," recalls to the poet's mind the aimlessness and 
moral irregularity of the men buried somewhere beneath 
them. These men are the same as those who figure in 
"John Sutter" and "A Journey," and their historical back­
ground is the raw towns and bleak Western landscape of 
the turn of the century and afterwards. The men were 
exclusively determined by the earth, as Winters says in 
his note to "A Journey," and in the absence of any ra­
tional principle to regulate their lives they were
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spiritually and intellectually dead before they were 
physically so. That no hope of resurrection is offered 
them is indicated by the fact that the stones are now 
"the seat of nothing." Death is annihilation of the 
human being. There is consequently an element of compas­
sion in Winters' judgement of them. "Relics of lonely 
men" he calls their scattered bones, as if the loneliness 
of the men in both life and death were a mitigating 
factor in the consideration of the brutality of their 
existence. As he says in "The Journey" about the towns 
which these men, or others like them, once inhabited,
Nothing one can say
Names the compassion they stir in the heart.
Obscure men shift and cry. . . .
Their loneliness extended beyond the social to the 
philosophical and the theological. Because of their 
thoughtlessness, the Holy Spirit, the God of Pure Mind, 
could not participate in their severely limited existence; 
consequently, they were as spiritually deserted in life 
as they are now in death. The dry grass and summer heat 
are their inferno where they suffer the final loss of 
being. Existence provided them with not the barest trace 
of similitude to God. Between the mindlessness of their 
existence and the perfection of His Pure Mind there had 
to be the absolute cleavage which Winters' vision dictates, 
even though God is credited with their creation. And in
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the deserted graveyard they only fall into the radical 
divorce from God that in their lives they had already 
prefigured. It is in this sense other than the literal 
that we are to understand the deserted graveyard of the 
title.
In the third stanza Winters turns abruptly and ad­
dresses the Deity Himself, at first as if in accusation:
These are thy fallen sons,
Thou whom I try to reach.
Thou whom the quick eye shuns, 
Thou dost elude my speech.
Yet when I go from sense
And trace thee down in thought,
I meet thee, then, intense,
And know thee as I ought.
But thou are mind alone,
And I, alas, am bound
Pure mind to flesh and bone,
And flesh and bone to ground.
It is as if God had failed the fallen sons, for whom 
He was morally responsible, or else as if He had failed 
Himself and compromised the purity of His own unity and 
essence by creating such multiplicity and moral irregularity. 
The question is indirectly related to the oldest of all 
philosophical problems, that of the one and the many, and 
directly to the gnostic rejection of the Christian idea 
of creation. If I am not mistaken, Winters is here being 
influenced by Valery's "Ebauche d'un serpent," which re­
volves around the old gnostic belief that creation is a 
blemish on the purity of non-being. Winters considered 
the poem the single greatest one ever written, and his
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analysis of it in the first chapter of The Function of 
Criticism contains passages that clarify a great deal of 
"To the Holy Spirit." The relevance of "Ebauche d'un 
serpent" to Winters' poem is apparent in the following 
stanza, which contains the poem's thematic core. The 
speaker is Satan who is addressing God and criticizing 
Him for what Valery's intellectual angel regards as the 
tragic folly of creating something other than Himself, 
which necessarily will be imperfect:
0 Vanite! Cause Premiere!
Celui qui regne dans les Cieux,
D'une voix qui fut le lumiere 
Ouvrit 1'univers spacieux.
Comme las de son pur spectacle,
Dieu lui-meme a rompu 1'obstacle 
De sa parfaite etemit&;
II se fit Celui qui dissipe 
En consequences, son Principle,
En etioles, son Unite.9
By the act of creation God broke the barrier of perfect 
eternity, dissipated the Primal Cause into consequences, 
and fragmented Unity into the multiplicity of stars.
The result is divine despair; the universe becomes the 
Cieux, son erreur *. Temps, sa ruine.'; and creation bears 
within its core "tan soupir de despoir," as the superior 
intelligence of the angel most acutely realizes:
Devant votre image fun^bre,
Orgueil de mon sombre miroir,
Si profond fut votre malaise 
Que votre souffle la glaise 
Fut un soupir de despoir
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Strictly speaking, Valery's gnosticism applies only 
to the third stanza of "To the Holy Spirit"; Winters men­
tions it only in passing, as it were; but it is an impor­
tant concept for him, and one intimately connected with 
his idea of God as Pure Mind. If being is intellectual, 
and if God is perfect intellect and perfect being, then 
it is philosophically appropriate to accuse Him of caus­
ing the "fallen sons" and to wonder how such thoughtless­
ness could come out of perfect thought.
The rest of this stanza is devoted to the nature of 
God's essence and the poet's relationship to that essence.
We have here fully realized the second of the two approaches 
to theism we discussed at the end of the second chapter. 
Instead of the essence taken out of God and set up as con­
cept, we have here God defined exclusively in terms of 
His essence, which in this case is pure intellect. "But 
thou art mind alone," the poet states quite simply and 
straightforwardly. Existence as such is disregarded as 
philosophically irrelevant to the "mind alone.” As far 
as the poet *s relationship with the Spirit goes, Winters 
describes Him as bafflingly remote, even almost inacces­
sible, for the human intellect which painstakingly attempts 
to reach Him. There is no possibility that such a meeting 
can be accomplished through the senses, to which the in­
tellectual essence of God is absolute foreignness. There 
are no philosophical traces of Him left, but still operating,
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in the physical universe He created, which might reveal 
to the human mind studying them some limited, even nega­
tive, knowledge about His nature. In the terms we used 
in the second chapter, none of the cause is to be found 
in any of the effects of the created world, even though 
these effects are admitted as coming out of the cause.
The Thomistic position that man possesses a ’’natural" 
knowledge of God, and that it is rooted in his sensory 
experience, is thus rejected. The mind is the divine 
element in man, and it is only in that element, as like 
in like, that the Pure Mind can be traced down, met, and 
known as He ought to be known. The implication, if I am 
not mistaken, is that in this union the two minds become 
equated with each other, though Winters leaves undiscussed 
the exact nature of the equation.
How such a meeting is possible, if the Holy Spirit 
is to keep the transcendence which Winters gives Him in 
the poem, is not clear; nor any clearer is how the Pure 
Mind can both elude the "speech" of the poet, and yet be 
effectively traced down in his "thought." One might ask, 
if He is ineffably beyond any of the categories of language, 
how then can He be apprehended by the very intellect which 
produces these categories and which operates only in them? 
Perhaps Winters means no more than that the subject is 
the most difficult of all and that language becomes inade­
quate in attempting to express its complexity. For once,
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though, Winters does not treat divinity as undermining 
the human realm but as supporting it and grounding it in 
truth in a manner that finally defies human analysis.
More simply put, Winters admits the reality, as well as 
the validity, of a thought inexpressible in language, 
which somehow makes possible for him a moral and intel­
lectual life lived primarily through language. "The poem 
acknowledges mystery," as Howard Kaye says in his con­
cluding remarks on "To the Holy Spirit.
But the union of the divine and human is brief and 
uncertain. God as Pure Mind enjoys a simplicity and self- 
sufficiency which the poet finds tragically missing in 
his own complex and deprived existence. His mind is en­
tangled with flesh, the breeding ground of error and im- 
perception; the body is the impediment that interferes 
with and eventually frustrates the attempt of the human 
mind to reach and apprehend God. The no uncertain terms 
with which Winters here laments the possession of a body 
are almost gnostic in their quiet intensity. Further­
more, it is the body's allegiance to the ground, its 
leaning toward nothingness, as St. Augustine somewhere 
expresses it, that drags the mind back to time and causes 
its annihilation in death. The only alternative to an 
indeterminate universe rotten with change and death is 
a transcendent intelligence to which man is mysteriously 
related but from which he is at the same time excluded
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because he is trapped in that universe from which he 
would escape. Man is literally caught between two in­
finities, one below him, one above him, and he experi­
ences, as in Pascal, the "grandeur et misere de l'homme."
The final stanza summarizes all previous themes and 
draws the conclusions that given the poet's position 
are inevitable:
These had no thought: at most 
Dark faith and blinding earth. 
Where is the trammeled ghost? 
Was there another birth?
Only one certainty 
Beside thine unfleshed eye, 
Beside the spectral tree,
Can I discern: these die.
All of this stir of age,
Though it elude my sense 
Into what heritage 
I know not, seems to fall, 
Quiet beyond recall,
Into irrelevance.
He returns to the men buried in the graveyard, con­
siders their separation from the Pure Mind in "blinding 
earth" and concludes against immortality for them. Their 
ghosts, enlightened at best by only a "dark faith," are 
trammeled inextricably in matter. The poet does not say 
specifically that his fate will be the same as theirs, 
but the implication of the last part is that it is: all 
this stir of age, which would include his own, falls into 
the irrelevance and meaninglessness of death. His mind, 
pushed to the brink of the incomprehensible, returns with 
three certainties: the perfect intellectual vision of
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God' s "unfleshed eye," the fact of moral choice between 
good and evil for man, and the concluding fact of death 
as annihilation. (I take the "spectral tree" to refer 
to Genesis's Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, 
whose "mortal taste" ended man's innocence and awakened 
his consciousness to moral and intellectual activity, 
death being somehow the inevitable by-product of such 
consciousness. Winters is following here, I think, 
Valery's version of the Fall in "Ebauche d'un serpent.") 
But the first two certainties are "beside" the last one 
in its overwhelming emotional effect on the human being 
facing it. To know that God exists as Pure Mind, to 
desire to reach Him and partake of His perfection, to 
be able to do so, even if briefly and uncertainly, but 
finally to be forced by the body to turn back from that 
vision to where annihilation awaits the mind, all this 
explains the sense of tragedy working beneath Winters' 
tight lines. As he says in "At the San Francisco Airport
The rain of matter upon sense 
Destroys me momently. The score:
There comes what will come. The expense 
Is what one thought, and something more—
One's being and intelligence.
The terms of the tragedy are stated just as unrelent 
ingly in his analysis of "Ebauche d'un serpent" in The 
Function of Criticism. As Winters interprets the poem, 
Satan is the embodiment of the human intellect. Of him
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he says, "He is so created that he desires infinite know­
ledge, and he is so created that he cannot have it. The
desire is his nature, his greatness, his sin, and his
12torture, and it is inescapable."
2. Conclusion
"To the Holy Spirit" is a summary of Winters1 entire 
poetic career, one which began in free-verse, imagism, 
and atheistic relativism and which ended in traditional 
meter, classicism, and theistic absolutism. The universe 
of the early poems, seething with constant change and in­
tellectually ungraspable by the human mind, is the same 
as the one which appears in the "immeasurable haze" of 
"To the Holy Spirit." The "bare hills" of the free-verse 
are transformed into the later "pure line and shade of 
dust," but they both refer to the same reality for Winters, 
the presence of what we might call a death-principle in 
the physical world, which is either indifferent or hostile 
to the human attempt to create and then maintain moral 
and intellectual cohesion. The aimless and brutal men 
buried somewhere beneath the irregular stones of "To the 
Holy Spirit" summarizes a theme that remains conscant 
throughout all Winters' criticism and poetry, the sense 
that human life is threatened inside itself by what he 
calls in The Bare Hills some horror "spined with rigid
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13age," and that life will end in tragedy and the annihila­
tion of the human being.
The difference separating "To the Holy Spirit" and 
the rest of Winters 1 traditional poetry from his earlier 
free-verse is not subject matter, as we have just seen, 
but the kind of poetic treatment and intellectual under­
standing he was able to give that subject matter after 
his conversion in his late twenties to a peculiarly modern 
version of classicism. As we have noted in the second 
chapter, the substance of the change resides in Winters' 
theory of poetry based on the power of the human mind to 
apprehend some degree of truth about human experience 
and then to express that truth in poetic language which 
permits "extraction from every unit of language of its 
maximum content, both of connotation and denotation."^
The poem then becomes, as Donald E. Stanford has charac­
terized the theory, "an act of contemplation rather than 
an expression of personal f e e l i n g . A s  a result,
Winters' understanding of his subject matter becomes ra­
tional, and his treatment of it governed by the principles 
of traditional meter, which he saw as a more flexible 
and complex instrument than free-verse for handling sub­
jects now complicated by the introduction of reason into 
the poetic process.
On account of such a theory, he was thus enabled to 
achieve some degree of spiritual control over his subject
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matter, the moral and psychological benefits of which 
were inestimable when the subject was as stark and tragic 
as that of a poem like "To the Holy Spirit." The bare 
ability just to know and to name has anciently been a 
part of every victory man has achieved over the chaotic 
and the irrational.
"To the Holy Spirit" illustrates such control. The 
ultimate vision of the poem, which is also the ultimate 
vision of Winters' poetry, is nihilistic, the one signifi­
cant fact which makes him, I think, modern to his core. 
(Irving Howe has said that the inner demon at the heart
CL
of modern literature is nihilism. ) The definition of 
life, as he gives it in "The Grave," is
To stand, precarious, near the utter end; 
Betrayed, deserted, and alone descend,
Blackness before, and on the road above 
The crowded terror that is human love;
To still the spirit till the flesh may lock 
Its final cession in eternal rock.
To face this vision and to write about it with the calm 
seriousness and stoic restraint with which he does so in 
poems like "The Grave" and "To the Holy Spirit” require 
a degree of moral and intellectual control that only a 
few men are capable of. The chief value Winters' life 
in poetry possesses, I think, is the example it affords 
us of such a control in an age and literature noted for 
excessive self-pity and a pervasive tone of almost cosmic
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complaint. This is true even if one disagrees with his 
ultimate philosophical position.
Such rational control finally rests on a theistic 
base. The whole theory that regulates and governs his 
traditional poetry depends, as we have seen, on the ob­
jective existence of truth. What Winters saw as philo­
sophical necessity drove him to admit the existence of 
God in order, first of all, to account for, and then, to 
safeguard the existence of truth. But he admitted his 
theism most reluctantly. A deeply rooted distrust and 
suspicion of the transcendent remained with him from 
the beginning to the end of his career; for reasons of 
his own, he saw the transcendent as necessarily blurring 
moral distinctions and generating intellectual confusion. 
Consequently, when he was forced by his "hard argument" 
to deal with God, he defined Him in those terms which 
would be most congenial with his rationalism and which 
would reflect his belief that ultimate reality, in the 
philosophical sense, is intellectual in nature.
Only "thought" had real meaning for Winters. As 
Howard Kaye has noted, "Change, or motion, is for him 
antithetical to human significance. We can find meaning 
only if we stop m o v i n g . W i s d o m  is always associated 
for him with a perfectly static and silent realm outside 
time and change, which he most frequently characterizes 
as "eternal." Heracles is one of his symbols of the
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poet "in hand-to-hand or semi-intuitive combat with ex- 
18perience." That hero achieves victory over that ex­
perience only through intellectual mastery of it in a 
timeless realm where he raids "eternal silence to eternal 
ends." Death and wisdom, then, are intimately connected 
with each other in Winters' thought. If we give "life" 
a strict philosophical definition denoting, and involving, 
phenomenological change, and thus contrast it to "being" 
such as one finds in "essentialism," we then find Valery's
gnomic remark in Monsieur Testa peculiarly applicable
19to Winters: "The essential is against life." Conse­
quently, God is defined as "pure mind alone," with "ex­
istence" as such being ruled out as philosophically 
negligible. The "unfleshed eye" of Winters' God is thus 
more like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover than He is like St. 
Thomas Aquinas' God of Pure Existence.
"To the Holy Spirit" contains this definition of 
God in its most complete form. The poem also recapitu­
lates all the crucial consequences of such a definition, 
consequences which we discussed and illustrated in the 
third chapter. With "pure mind" as one's absolute by 
which one is enabled to judge whether or not something 
is real and good, these consequences immediately follow, 
all of which we see working, either directly or indirectly, 
in "To the Holy Spirit." First of all, evil will be 
defined, not as the deprivation of existence, but as the
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deprivation of mind; it will be seen as a kind of 
"thoughtlessness." From this the second consequence 
follows. The natural world, mindless as it necessarily 
is, will be looked upon as source of evil and disorder; 
Winters at times even suggests it is demonic; since it 
exists only in a phenomenological sense, not in an in­
tellectual one, there will always be an element of un­
reality about it, because of which an absolute cleavage 
exists between the natural world, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, the human and the divine realms; while 
recognizing its beauties, even at times responding to 
its temptations, the intellect will separate itself from 
the natural as far as it is able to do so in order to 
realize its own end. What has just been said about the 
natural world applies also to man's own body; the thought­
less principle in flesh is capable of unbalancing moral 
control and causing spiritual blindness; consequently, 
the relationship of mind and body is one that is fraught 
for Winters with ambiguity and peril; in fact, it is the 
source of tragedy, since the body's death, as we have 
seen in "To the Holy Spirit," causes the annihilation 
of the mind. Finally, since the principle of evil found 
in the human realm will be located, according to Winters' 
vision, not in a corrupt will, but in an imperfect mind, 
and since only a few men achieve intellectual excellence, 
one will tend to view, as Winters does, the mass of men,
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whether collected together in a state or a mob, as capable 
of erupting into irrational destructiveness; a form of 
intellectual isolation will inevitably be the result.
As I have said, Winters’ vision of life is as tragic 
as anything one can find in the Greeks. He thought at 
one time in his late forties of mitigating the rigors of 
that vision by embracing Christianity, but he just as 
quickly decided against it. The whole experience is re­
corded in an epigram titled "A Fragment," which was writ­
ten immediately after "To the Holy Spirit":
I cannot find my way to Nazareth.
I have had enough of this. Thy will is death,
And this unholy quiet is thy peace.
Thy will be done; and let discussion cease.
His comments on Edgar Bowers in The Uncollected 
Essays and Reviews are particularly applicable to himself; 
speaking of Bowers' religious position, Winters says that 
Bowers had "an inability, both temperamental and intellec­
tual, to delude himself. . . . The words guile and 
deceit recur several times as indicative of attitudes 
which turn one from one's real beliefs toward something 
one would like to believe, and hence toward spiritual 
corruption.
He held on to his own "real beliefs" to the end and 
never compromised them. After "To the Holy Spirit" was 
written, his poetic career was all but finished; he had 
only three more short poems to write. The real work
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which remained for him to do was two books of criticism,
The Function of Criticism and Forms of Discovery, and
the anthology of short poems which he co-edited with
Kenneth Fields, Quest for Reality. A great deal of
Forms of Discovery was written while he was suffering
from terminal cancer; in fact, close to the very end, he
21postponed an operation in order to finish the book. 
Donald Stanford has the best epitaph for him, which suc­
cinctly captures his peculiar combination of dignity and 
stubbornness. In the obituary notice which Stanford 
wrote for Winters in the Southern Review, Stanford quotes 
from a letter he received after Winters' death from a 
friend who had known him since his youth: "There never
was anyone like Arthur [his name among his friends] .
22He got his work done and he died."
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NOTES
^ Stanford, "A Note on Yvor Winters," 46.
^ Fields, "The Rhetoric of Artifice," p. 286.
 ^Stanford, "A Note on Yvor Winters," 45.
^ Kaye, pp. 120-21.
 ^Kaye, p. 119.
g
Winters, Forms, pp. xii-xiii.
 ^Kaye, p . 119.
Q
Winters, Forms, p. xiii.
 ^Valery, Poems, p. 186-88.
^  Valery, Poems, p. 188.
Kaye, p . 122.
12 Winters, Function, pp. 64-65.
13 Winters, Collected Poems, p. 51.
^  Winters, Defense, p . 83.
^  Stanford, "Yvor Winters: 1900-1968," Southern 
Review, NS 4 (1968), 861.
See Kaye, p. 157.
^  Kaye, p. 114.
I Q
Winters, Collected Poems, p. 189.
19 /Valery, Monsieur Teste, p. 78.
90
Winters, Uncollected, p . 183.
^  See Winters, "Alan Swallow: 1915-1966," Southern 
Review, NS 3 (1967), 798.
^  Stanford, "Yvor Winters: 1900-1968," 863.
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